00027445

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 June, 2018

POLITICAL SKETCHES

OF THE

TATE OF EUROPE FROM 1814-1867

TAINING COUNT ERNST MÜNSTER'S DESPATCHES TO THE PRINCE REGENT, FROM THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

27445
ac

BY

GEORGE HERBERT COUNT MÜNSTER.

RR 71.

EDINBURGH
EDMONSTON & DOUGLAS
1868.

00027445

PREFACE.

THE political edifice erected at the Congress of Vienna has been destroyed, the last remnants having been swept away by the German war of 1866. Naturally everything relating to the Congress and to that time deserves more than ever our attention, and this gave the idea to the author, that the publication of the despatches of his father, the late Count Ernst Münster, would be useful and interesting.

The political sketches preceding these despatches give a general superficial *résumé* of the principal historical events that took place from 1815 to 1868. They were written by a German for Germany, who has endeavoured to write as impartially as he could.

The late Countess Münster, well known in England as Lady Harriette St. Clair, the dearly beloved and deeply regretted wife of the author, took a great interest in this book, translated it, and wished it to be published in England. The author would feel truly gratified if he could think that the British public will find that he was right in doing so.

DERNEBURG, *April* 1868.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

I.—THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA, ... 1

II.—RUSSIA, ... 14

III.—GERMANY, ... 46

IV.—GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXISTING STATE OF POLITICS, ... 121

V.—DESPATCHES FROM PARIS, ... 151

VI.—DESPATCHES FROM VIENNA, ... 185

I.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA.

THE first Treaty of Paris was signed on the 14th of May 1814, and was followed by the Congress of Vienna, the object of which was the further consideration of the negotiations which then took place, and the endeavour to form on a solid basis a lasting European peace. Since the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 the peace of Europe had been incessantly disturbed either by actual wars, or the rumour of wars; and the Ambassadors of all, and the Princes of most of the European States, were to assemble at Vienna on the 1st of October 1814, in order to consider the best means of restoring concord, regulating a friendly harmony between the different European nations, and to deliberate upon such a well-grounded arrangement of their affairs as should insure the future fate and prosperity of Europe. At no period have the European Princes enjoyed a greater degree of popularity than at the time of their assembling at Vienna for this purpose. Europe in general felt herself grateful to them that they had relieved her from the yoke of a feared and hated foreign aggressor. Their people had with rare fidelity stood by them, trusting implicitly their rights and their future to their mediation. The Princes themselves had passed through the school of adversity, and

their experiences were a further guarantee for these expectations. On the 8th of October the ratifiers of the Parisian Treaty announced that it was useless that a general assembly should take place, till the questions, which the Congress was expected to settle, were so matured as to enable it to bring them to such a conclusion as should be in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, the rights of the people, and the just expectations of the various nations. This declaration proved that the fundamental principles of the French negotiations were defective. And the members of the Congress soon found themselves under the influence of circumstances over which they had lost the power of control. In this attitude of affairs the first to come to some determination was the Emperor of Russia, and his firmness gave him from the commencement an undoubted influence over the Congress. At his suggestion, to the question of the future of Poland was given the pre-eminent position. Immediately after the evacuation of Poland by the French army, the Emperor Alexander had pledged himself to make her, in alliance with Russia, an independent nation. Austria and Prussia had lost in the war with France the provinces which they had acquired at the last division of Poland, and they now sought to regain them, but Russia opposed herself so decidedly to this that it was evident Austria and Prussia would have to resign their claims. Prussia consequently sought to indemnify herself for these losses through the acquisition of Saxony; and Russia, in her desire to monopolize Poland, made, at the commencement, no opposition to this attempt, but Austria, France, and England absolutely refused to consent to such an absorption of Saxony. It soon became evident, however, that these questions were to occupy the chief attention of the members of Congress, and that the consideration of the formation of

the Bund and the constitution of Germany were for the present to be set aside. Russian influence, in fact, preponderated too much over the Congress. This was owing partly to the force of former events, but still more to the personal character of the Emperor Alexander. He was anxious to arbitrate for the future of Europe; but at the time his principal desire was to settle the Polish question according to his views, and acquire her entirely for himself. His intention was to give her a liberal constitution, and to make use of her as a connecting medium between Russia and the rest of Europe.

It is remarkable that the Emperor Alexander, with his noble character and liberal opinions, did not perceive how requisite it was to promote civilisation in Russia. The great obstacle to this was the existence of serfdom. That he did not remove it seemed inconsistent with the nature of such a man. It is true that an attempt had been made to do so, but evidently without much sincerity. We shall later have occasion again to refer to this question. That the Emperor and his Corps Diplomatique bestowed less attention upon the future of Italy and Germany than the importance of these countries in the natural equilibrium of Europe demanded, was owing to his eagerness to annex Poland. For Italy, Russia only demanded the restoration of the King of Sardinia, with some territorial additions—the rest he resigned to the dominion of Austria; as for Germany, it appeared at one time as if Russia would not oppose Austria's usurpation of the empire. This country was ambitious of becoming the first Continental Power, and of obtaining supremacy both in Italy and Germany, and she might have succeeded, and indeed for a period appeared likely to do so. But Metternich miscalculated his power. He did not sufficiently consider the rights of the people and the strength of national

feeling. Austria was composed of various States, and he never learned the secret of inspiring them with a united patriotic feeling. This want of unity has ever, even to the present day, given Prussia the advantage over Austria; and to the patriotism which universally animates that nation are they indebted for the victory of Königgrätz. Austria's rule in Italy for fifty years brought nothing but misery to that country and trouble to herself. This might have been very different had she been contented with the possession of Lombardy, allowing that kingdom to retain its own government, under her control. Had she not further endeavoured to rule and restrain all advancement or progress in civilisation in the other Italian States, she would not have ruined her own finances nor been drawn into three different wars, which have ultimately resulted in the independence of Italy. Even up to this time Austrian statesmen have been unable to resign the idea of a German empire under Austrian rule, and they have even sought through intrigues to regain that influence in Germany which they had lost since the Westphalian Treaty of Peace in 1648. At, and even since, the Vienna Congress, Austria found in Prussia a dangerous and powerful rival. Without open opposition, she exerted all her diplomacy to alienate Russia from Austria and connect her with herself. These endeavours were soon crowned with success, and the Cabinet of Vienna was forced to seek for other allies. These she found in France and England. Prince Talleyrand openly favoured Austrian views, the English Government agreed with them, and so these three Powers united to resist the restoration of Poland and the annexation of Saxony.

Prussia had done much to free Germany from a hated foreign yoke, and had undoubted right to reclaim the territories she possessed in 1806, but, with the covetousness she

has at all times displayed, she not only laid claims to the whole of Saxony, in which she expected Russia to support her, but exacted the restoration of her Polish provinces, forgetting that Russia, with her aims, would naturally decidedly oppose this pretension. The real object of the Prussian Government was the aggrandizement of their own country, but they endeavoured, by setting forth the rights of fraternity of the German nation, and even liberty of the Press, to delude public opinion into the belief that their only wish was the prosperity of the German nation. Their statesmen, however, at this crisis were hardly equal to their task. France, in this juncture, was nearly powerless, and a less clever man than Talleyrand would scarcely have obtained any influence. France naturally strongly desired the dissolution of the coalition which existed against her in Europe.

We shall now, having made these few observations on the Vienna Congress, present to our readers some despatches, written by Count Münster, who was a member of it, to the Prince Regent of England.[1] They give a good idea of what then took place, and we hope, being hitherto unpublished, will not be without interest.

These despatches prove, what we have previously mentioned, that at the commencement the negotiations of the Congress were much restricted, and it was only when they saw that the peace of Europe was again seriously endangered by the reappearance of Napoleon (in France), that it began earnestly to consider the many important questions which were before them. The news reached Vienna that Napoleon had landed on the 1st of March at Cannes. The courier who brought this intelligence, like the bird that heralds the storm at sea, was the harbinger of the agitations

[1] For Despatches, see page 151.

that were again to disturb Europe; and as the barometer at the approach of the tempest falls from Fine to Stormy, so were the European diplomatic powers roused from *quasi* apathy to fierce excitement. As soon as they received this intelligence the Ministers of the four great powers assembled in Conference. They resolved to declare war against Napoleon, that should end only with his fall; that he should be treated as an outlaw, the personal foe of Europe. Many who have written about those times have blamed the Congress for its harshness, forgetting, however, what Europe had suffered from the wars into which Napoleon's ambition and overbearing arrogance had dragged them, and how hateful foreign rule had become throughout Europe. One brother of Napoleon was King of Westphalia, another King of Spain, a third of Holland, and Murat, King of Naples. His invasion of Russia and the continental blockade against England were sufficient reasons for the coalition against him, and it was only natural that they should make use of every means in their power to prevent the recurrence of such events; and the probability of renewed wars with the dreaded Napoleon inspired the Conferences at Vienna with fresh energy.

The consideration, however, of the question of the future of Germany was postponed from the 17th of November till the 23d of May, although meanwhile some preliminary negotiations were carried on between Prince Metternich, the Prussian Chancellor, Count Hardenberg, and Count Münster. Of the last, whose despatches to the Prince Regent of England we present to our readers, we will here give a short notice, which will explain how he came to occupy a more important position in the Congress than was perhaps due to the Hanoverian representative. Count Münster was born in the year 1767, at Osnabrück, in West-

phalia, educated at Dessau and the academy for noblemen at Lüneburg, went afterwards to the University of Göttingen, and subsequently entered the civil service in Hanover. In 1793, he unexpectedly received an order from George III. to accompany the Duke of Sussex to Italy, where he remained five years, cultivating and improving his love for the arts and sciences. In 1800 he was sent as ambassador to St. Petersburg, where he stayed till 1804, and became a highly esteemed member of the diplomatic corps, and was united by the most friendly ties to many of the cleverest men of the time. In 1804 George III. recalled him. He went to London, and was then appointed Prime Minister for Hanover. He resided nearly continually at Court, and possessed the King's most unlimited confidence, and afterwards that of his successor, both as Prince Regent and as George IV. He was on the most intimate terms with the English statesmen of the day, and a foreigner has seldom had conceded to him more political esteem and confidence than he enjoyed.

During the time of the Prussian and French occupation of Hanover he remained in England, constantly occupied in his endeavours to assist the struggles for freedom of the German nation. Notwithstanding that Prussia had in 1806 behaved very badly to Hanover, Count Münster admitted that she ought to take the most prominent position in the liberation of Germany, and it was he who first suggested the English subsidies. From that time he became the centre of the patriotic movement for the freedom of Germany, and was in constant communication with the Prussian patriots and statesmen. He was in Paris in 1814, and went in September of that year to Vienna as representative of Hanover for the Prince Regent of England. Although considered in England a "High Tory," he was in

reality, as all true aristocrats are, very liberal-minded; and indeed it would be scarcely possible for one who had for ten years inhaled the pure air of English political freedom to feel any sympathy with the restricted views and selfish love of power of the rulers and diplomatists of the smaller German States. He was one of the few who at Vienna frankly and in plain terms interceded for the rights of the German nation. Although the "Bund" was partly the result of his labours, he always acknowledged, both at the time and afterwards, that it did not thoroughly realize that unity and freedom which the German nation had a right to expect after the war for independence; he rather regarded it as a precursory measure, and rejoiced that some basis had been secured for the foundation of German unity; and he trusted to the honour and sagacity of the Government hereafter to regulate the rights of the German Confederation. Count Münster relinquished with the greatest reluctance the idea of a German empire and a general Parliamentary constitution, but he arrived at the conviction that Prussia could not be separated from Germany, and that it was impossible to expect that so powerful a State should be subservient to another power. On these grounds he also always opposed Metternich's idea of dividing Germany into departments, with a king at the head of each, the whole to be under the dominion of Austria. He had, as the faithful servant of his king, done all in his power to make Hanover a great kingdom, and in these endeavours had met with much success, and had obtained many concessions from Prussia, convinced as he was that the interests of the two countries were homogeneous; he always advised co-operation with Prussia, and so long as he was at the head of the Hanoverian Government, the best understanding existed between them.

In the difficult times of and after 1848, King Ernst August endeavoured to maintain these friendly relations. Unfortunately, his son King George had been misled into following other politics, and his advisers, impotent as statesmen, had neither the courage nor the foresight to prevent him rushing blindly to his destruction.

Let us now return to the Vienna Congress. As we have already mentioned, the consideration of the German question was postponed till the 23d of May; and on that date it assembled to deliberate upon it. Austria and Prussia proposed to the other members a plan for the formation of the German Bund. At their second sitting, the observations upon this were resolved into a Protocol, and, on the 8th of June, the fundamental Treaty which created the German Bund was signed. This we have already seen once succumb in the year 1848, and although, through the Treaty of Olmütz in 1851, it was in a manner revived, yet it has since then been found impossible to breathe any new life into it, and on the 14th of June 1866 it finally gave up the ghost. The restoration of the Bund in 1850 has always appeared to us like the embalming of the corpse of a person whose death it is desirable to conceal on account of the pension that is paid during his life. The authors of the German Bund tried to resolve a problem which, in our opinion, was impossible, and if it appeared to be successfully accomplished, if the Bund was undisturbed and Germany enjoyed peace till the year 1848, it was not in consequence, but in spite of, the Bund. Nevertheless, much credit is due to the statesmen who originated it, that they made German unity possible; and if its success was not what might have been hoped and expected, it was owing to two causes:—First, the thirteenth clause stipulated that each of the confederate States should have its own Parliament,

and it is well known how Austria and Prussia fulfilled their part of the bargain. In the second place, the Bund was grounded in error, confederation of States being inconsistent with Monarchism. The basis of Monarchy is that one should govern; that of a Republic, *the belief* that every one may govern. The great mistake was the concession of the same sovereign powers to such wretched little States as those governed by Princes Reuss and Lichtenstein and others, and which as German principalities they had never enjoyed, as were possessed by the powerful ones of Prussia and Austria. This was nearly as absurd as the idea of universal suffrage, placing the power in the hands of the multitude, —for there are always more Minnows than Tritons.

In reality, the confederation was a republic of Sovereigns, and they were guilty of the usual republican errors, the one refusing to be subservient to the other. If the idea of modern Liberalists, viz., a Parliament in connexion with the Bund, to be held at Frankfort, had been carried out, then republicanism would have been established, because either the Parliament must have been ineffectual, or else it would have deprived the Princes of all power, and what then would have been left of their sovereignty? Most of the statesmen of 1815 desired the restoration of the German Empire, but the realization of this idea was then impossible. Austria had become too impotent, and Prussia too powerful; she neither could, nor would, submit to Austrian rule, and was become so formidable in Germany that the intention Prince Metternich once entertained of repudiating her was quite out of the question. Her present position was untenable, and the necessity obvious for her becoming of either more, or less, importance. This was fully recognised by all the rational men of the time; indeed, they did not anticipate that the strife for supremacy in Germany which they fore-

saw must ensue, would be postponed till 1866. The catastrophe is now over, Austria is driven from Germany, and it is Prussia's duty to accomplish the just wishes of the German nation for unity, and consequent power. History has shown us the alliance of Monarchical countries, but never existing on such principles as the Bund did. It has also given us various examples of confederated Republics, of which, in our days, Switzerland and America are instances. America has lately shown us that as soon as the interests which unite the different States are at variance, the ties which bound them are severed. The only possibility of uniting separate monarchic States is the principle of vassalage under an empire; but here the danger is that either the emperor deprives his vassals of all power, or that they become too powerful, and the empire falls to pieces. Such was formerly the German Empire, and such we have seen has been its fate. An empire based on these principles must be ever liable to vicissitudes; but in the position of affairs in Germany, even such a mutable empire may be better than the forcible foundation of a kingdom constituted through the shameless disregard of all historical, legal, and moral rights.

No other nation but the German could ever have created such a political arrangement as constituted the Bund. It is remarkable what idealists Germans are on all political questions. In their own affairs, in every-day life, they are sufficiently materialists. "*Gefühlspolitik*," only to be translated as "sentimental policy," a word they have themselves invented, and which, as it is practised by no other nation, has no equivalent in any other language, proves the truth of this observation. A German does not found his political views on real premisses; he pursues what he desires and believes, not what exists.

In the year 1848 the German colours were everywhere to be seen; everybody wore them; every house was hung with black, red, and gold; yet all the while, beyond its geographical position, Germany was nothing but a myth. Prussia could boast of an admiral while she only possessed a small ship of war—"The Amazon." So had Germany an Imperial Parliament and a Regent, but no empire. Now all is changed. She has been awakened from her dreams by the thunder of the cannon in 1866. Let her beware lest she again fall into such a state of somnambulism.

The three Sovereigns left Vienna at the end of May. By the 8th of June most of the Plenipotentiaries had departed. The Vienna Congress was at an end!

On the 15th of June 1815 the battle of Waterloo was fought, and the allied troops entered Paris for the second time. On the 2d of August, Prussia, Austria, and Russia signed an agreement declaring Napoleon prisoner, and consigning him to the custody of England. Thus concluded one of the bloodiest wars Europe has ever sustained, and thus began a new era of peace. The so-called Holy Alliance between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, was ratified on the 26th of September 1815. On the 20th of November of the same year the Treaties of Chaumont and Vienna were acknowledged, and the frontiers of France determined.

The Holy Alliance had, notwithstanding the religious garb in which the Emperor Alexander had clothed it, great political importance. The destruction of the Quadruple Alliance, to which England belonged, and the ratification of the second Treaty of Paris, as well as the little consideration they showed for their obligations to their other German allies in all questions of European policy, clearly proves this. So long as Germany's two greatest powers followed one road,

the existing danger for the rest of Germany was diminished, and consequently the Holy Alliance, by uniting these two powers, contributed more towards the preservation of peace than even the Bund itself, which naturally could only maintain it till the interests of Austria and Prussia separated them. France was perfectly isolated; as for England, if she preserved a good understanding with the three Powers, it was even at that time the publicly expressed opinion that she should maintain, as far as possible, an independent European policy, and occupy herself chiefly with her maritime and colonial interests. This feeling has since then even increased, and at the present day forms the basis of English political conduct. Napoleon's boundless ambition led him to the belief that his power should be absolute in Europe. The supremacy of England at sea was as a thorn in his side, and the cause of his bitter enmity. Britannia ruled then; as she rules now, the waves. He, in all his glory, was here checkmated. He wished to land in England, and made extensive preparations at Boulogne to effect that purpose, but was foiled in the attempt. He then sought, through a continental blockade, to ruin English commerce. This resulted in so great a hatred between England and France, that although it was natural to imagine the alliance of the two greatest maritime Powers, it became no longer possible to entertain such an idea.

As we have to consider the position of Europe from this period to the present day, there is here a convenient opportunity of reviewing the state of individual countries and their diplomatic relations with each other, concluding with the affairs of Germany, and endeavouring to narrate, as impartially as possible, the occurrences of the year 1866, and their probable consequences on the future of Germany.

II.

RUSSIA.

It may excite some surprise that Russia should be placed first; but this country, the youngest, yet the most considerable member of the European family of States, had, through her armies in the wars, and through the diplomacy of the Emperor Alexander in the negotiations at Vienna and Paris, approximated herself so much to Europe, and assumed such an important position, as to justify the precedence given to her.

It is not intended that this should be a history of Russia, the commencement of which, and particularly that of Peter the Great, is so well known.

Russia is a very remarkable country, and it is excessively difficult to form an accurate judgment of her; neither the land, geographically speaking, nor yet its inhabitants, can be measured according to the European standard. The Russian, like his country, partakes both of Europe and Asia; less civilized than the one, and more than the other.

St. Petersburg has been, as if through enchantment, built in the midst of a barren wilderness; whoever sees the enormous city, which measures nearly ten miles across, with its massive palaces, huge public buildings (the public buildings of St. Petersburg occupy as much space as those of

London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin all put together), and the magnificent quays of the Neva, finds it difficult to realize the fact that in the year 1700, on the same spot, nothing was to be heard but the wild cry of the black-cock, and the call of the capercailzie to his mate,—that the wild duck swam and the woodcock nested where now stand the finest palaces.

When one sees in summer the beautiful pure stream of the Neva, which flows out of the Lake Ladoga, uniting the whole of Russia as far as Astracan, and connecting the Baltic with the Caspian Sea, one ceases to be astonished that the lord of these almost immeasurable realms should resolve to found a city which should be at once distinguished for its commerce and as his capital. Peter the Great and his court were as the sunshine—without which nothing can flourish—of this savage country, and his great wish to establish St. Petersburg as an important commercial city led him therefore to reside there.

But let us look on the reverse of the medal. When in winter one sees the ships, which have lain half the year helplessly inactive, enclosed in ice, and reflects on the dangers they must run in the spring of being crushed by the floating masses of ice; when one feels the icy cold, the frozen limbs; if one sees, as the author has seen, the coachman of a lady, who, while his mistress was enjoying the finest Italian singing at the opera, was frozen dead on his box, which she discovered when on coming out he did not answer to her call; if one has at times, in autumn and spring, heard the alarm-cannon from the fortress announcing to the inhabitants the peril they were in from the rapidly rising waters of the Neva,—one asks one's-self, doubtfully, whether Peter the Great was right in beginning so gigantic a work in such a situation.

What man's ingenuity can discover, or man's luxury

invent, to make life pleasant, and to conceal the shady side of the climate, has been done; and as far as regards magnificence, and all the splendour of grand society, as far as regards pleasant social life, there is no city that can compare with St. Petersburg. It is the city of contrasts! An hour's distance, so near indeed that in the sunshine one may see the light glistening on her windows, the author has shot wolves and capercailzie; at this distance from the city begin forests and morasses, which stretch as far as the White Sea; only a few miles off the peasant is as far behind in his ideas of agriculture as his brethren a thousand miles further in the interior. Civilisation in St. Petersburg is merely artificial, consequently her vivifying breath has not had sufficient strength to reach beyond her immediate precincts. It is not to be denied that an ungrateful soil and climate scarcely rewards the labour of agriculture, and through serfdom, and particularly through the nature of the government of Russian parishes, progress is difficult, if not impossible. These are managed on the principle of practical communism; and since the author has seen on the spot the actual working result of this system, it has been inconceivable to him how so clever a man as August von Haxthausen, in his well-known work on Russia, speaking of the Russian parishes (*Myrr*), can so strongly support it.

It was then, and still is, the custom to divide the land belonging to the parish, or which might have been given over to it by the lord of the manor, into three fields, and these are again subdivided into as many portions as there are male inhabitants in the village. This occurring frequently (generally every nine years), destroys all interest in the improvement of the soil, and all pleasure in its possession is rendered impossible. It has always appeared to the author that the Russian does not attach the same value or

respect to property that other nations do: he must consequently be judged differently; he has less conscience about helping himself to the property of others, but, on the other hand, he is more ready to give.

A Russian official who may have eked out his income through means not strictly legal, may, in other respects, be a very worthy man, only his ways and thoughts are different from ours; he may be withal charitable, merciful, even generous. Whereas a German official who did the same thing would be certain to be a morally bad and corrupt man. It is certain that this want of principle among the officials is very detrimental to the interests of Russia, and that so long as the evil exists it will be impossible to bring order either into her finances or administration. Much has however already been done by the present Emperor in order to eradicate it; and in many respects, Russian officials are more hardly judged by foreigners than they really deserve. Public justice and the greater freedom of the Press have already had an excellent effect towards improving them.

In our European countries, where every official has a supervisor or inspector almost at his door, where a daily post enables his superiors to be in constant communication with each official, control is much easier, and abuses much more difficult than in the immense distances and difficult communication of Russia. The following story, which occurred a few years ago, is related as an instance of this:—

A German mechanic who had been working in a manufactory at Perm wished to return, and began his journey on foot, intending to pass by Nijni-Novgorod. Unluckily for him, on the road he met with a convoy of prisoners on their way to Siberia; the non-commissioned officer who had the charge of them had lost one of the prisoners, at any rate he

was one short of the right number, so, as the unfortunate workman was passing, he quietly took him prisoner, shaved his head, bestowed on him the missing number, and walked him off to Siberia. The poor man travelled thus for nine months, when accidentally, but most fortunately for him, they met with a German doctor who was on a scientific tour in Siberia; to him he related his unfortunate story. The doctor at once wrote to the representative of his country. He immediately applied to the highest authorities. Every means were taken to find the unfortunate man, but it was a long time—fully a year and a half—before he was discovered and sent to St. Petersburg, where everything was done to indemnify him for what he had suffered. It is impossible that such adventures could occur in a less vast and lonely country, and it must be acknowledged that whenever such cases are brought to notice, all that is possible is done to repair the evil and prevent its recurrence.

Let us now turn back and shortly sketch the reigns of the Emperors Alexander I., Nicholas, and the present Emperor, Alexander II.

Rarely has a monarchy, more especially an absolute monarchy, had the good fortune to be ruled consecutively by three such excellent men and monarchs as the Emperors Alexander I., Nicholas, and Alexander II.

Alexander I. was born in the year 1777, on the 13th of December, and succeeded to the throne of his father Paul on the 26th of March 1801. As is well known, this Emperor was murdered in his palace, through the result of a Court conspiracy.

It is a sad reflection upon the human character, how few natures are strong enough to bear the test of absolute power; how few can withstand the intoxicating feeling given by the possession of unlimited control over the worldly destiny of

their fellow-beings, and when all must bow before the will and temper of one man. It is hard for that man, however noble, weak and imperfect as his nature must still necessarily be, not to become the slave of his own passions. Despotism easily leads to petty tyranny. This was demonstrated in the last years of the life of the Emperor Paul; and tyranny too often suggests the awful remedy of murder. An intelligent Russian once remarked to us, "Every country has its own constitution; ours is absolutism moderated by assassination." The manner in which Paul treated the aristocracy of his country sounds in these days scarcely credible. It has often been related to me by an old lady in St. Petersburg, that she remembered, when a young girl, driving with her mother, if they happened to meet the Emperor, no matter how inclement the weather or how deep the snow, they were compelled to descend from their carriage and make him the deepest reverences. If any unfortunate lady neglected this mark of homage, either her father or husband, or both, met with the severest punishment. We are not aware if it has before been published, but in Russia the following anecdote is well known:—In consequence of the arrival of a foreign prince at St. Petersburg, the Emperor paraded his regiment of Horse Guards, in which all the noblest of the land served, on the ground at "Gatshina." He wished to charge at their head, placed himself in front, but gave a false word of command, and after galloping forwards, found himself alone. Nearly out of his senses with passion, he rode back, and immediately ordered the whole regiment, just as it was, off to Siberia. They marched many weeks, till beyond Tichwin, before he could be prevailed upon by the earnest prayers of their relatives to recall them. Such anecdotes are innumerable; but these are sufficient for our purpose.

That a frightful feeling of bitterness and a system of denunciation and espionage prevailed among the nobility is not to be wondered at, although even this can scarcely palliate so horrid a murder. Whether Alexander was aware of the conspiracy is uncertain, but judging from his character it is impossible for us (as many however have done) to accept the belief that he actually gave his consent to it; nay, the melancholy which characterized his whole being may have had its origin in the sad catastrophe which was the immediate cause of his ascension to the throne. Alexander was wise, noble, and in all respects highly gifted, his education had been excellent, and his information was very extensive; he was philanthropic in his ideas, and esteemed in all respects liberalism, which he even tried to introduce into Russia, but found it wholly unsuited to her constitution. In the beginning of his reign he attempted many improvements in the interior government, the defects of which he fully recognised, but appeared finally to be wearied and overwhelmed with the difficulties of his undertaking; he strove at first to fight against the innumerable abuses, against the inveterate vice and corruption that existed in Russia, but finding himself unsupported in the struggle, he gave it up, and fell into the error which has been so often the failing of Russian rulers—occupying himself more with foreign politics than concerning himself with the internal improvement of his country. After his return from Vienna and Paris in 1815, his mind was much occupied with religion, and the wish to abdicate to which he had formerly given expression was frequently repeated. Only a few years after his ascension to the throne he wrote to his excellent tutor La Harpe—"If Providence would allow me to lead Russia to the first step of that pinnacle of greatness on which I desire to see her placed, my first wish would be to lay down the

burden of Government, and retire to some peaceful and beautiful part of Europe."

The Emperor was singularly affected by the burning of Moscow, and his already deep feelings for religion were still further excited. The construction he gave to the coalition between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and on which he bestowed the name of the "Holy Alliance," may be regarded as the exuberance of this religious sensibility. Historians relate the influence exercised over him by a lady possessed at that time of some celebrity, the Baroness Krüdener. She followed him to Paris, and encouraged and confirmed him in his exalted religious ideas with regard to the Holy Alliance; which notwithstanding was, as we have before mentioned, of a singularly political character. The Emperor believed and hoped that through his officers who had served in the wars, and returned from Germany and France, he would be able to propagate the liberal opinions which, as we have before said, he entertained, and that a useful and enlightened impulse would be given to civilisation in Russia. But he did not reflect that the ground in Russia was not prepared to receive such seed; he neglected first to cultivate it, and eradicate the weeds. Consequently the weeds sprang up and choked the good seed; thus his labour was lost. He commenced incautiously by allowing the establishment of secret societies, and encouraging Freemasonry. It soon appeared that these very officers were spreading the most dangerous principles, and when in the year 1822, through a decree of the Minister of the Interior, Count Victor Kotchubei, the Freemason Lodges were closed, and secret societies forbidden, and all officials obliged to give their word not to belong to any secret society either at home or abroad, the mischief was done, and the incentive to conspiracies and revolution was given.

At the Vienna Congress, Poland was in reality divided into five parts, under five different constitutions: first, the new kingdom of Poland, which was the old dukedom of Warsaw; secondly, the Russian-Polish provinces; thirdly, the Austrian-Polish provinces; fourthly, the Prussian-Polish provinces; fifthly, the free town of Cracow, with the districts appertaining to it, which was placed under the united protection of the great powers. The brother of the Emperor, the Grand-Duke Constantine, was Vice-King of Poland, but without the title. He was the heir to the throne of Russia, but had no inclination to ascend it. On the 26th of February 1822, he wrote to the Emperor, saying he wished to resign his rights in favour of his brother Nicholas. Two weeks afterwards the Emperor answered him that he had shown his letter to the Empress's mother, and that she as well as himself honoured his feelings and gave him full permission to follow his inclination. In the summer of 1823, the letter of the Grand-Duke was laid before the Archbishop Philaret of Moscow, and he was commissioned to prepare a manifesto appointing the Grand-Duke Nicholas successor to the throne. This manifesto was signed by the Emperor, and when he was at Moscow, on the 6th of September of the same year, it was placed in a sealed cover, with the following directions, in the Emperor's own hand, written upon it: "This is to be kept with the State papers in the Ascension Cathedral, and in the event of my death to be opened in the Cathedral by the Archbishop and the Governor-General before all the public." The Emperor also ordered the Archbishop to send copies of the manifesto, to be deposited in the Archives of the Senate and Council of State. This was all conducted with secrecy, and the future heir to the throne knew nothing of it. By the command of the Emperor Alex-

ander II., the text of the letter, as well as the manifesto, together with many other interesting documents, were published in 1857, through Baron Korff, by Sigismund Wolff, in Berlin, in which work is also to be found an interesting and trustworthy account of the accession of the Emperor Nicholas.

In the autumn of 1825 the Emperor Alexander went with the Empress, for the good of her health, to the south of Russia, and because fever was raging in the Crimea he selected Taganrog for her residence. After a short time, leaving her there, he himself made a tour in the Crimea. He returned on the 17th of November, having been taken ill during the journey. On his arrival he said to the Empress he thought he had the fever. In spite of all medical assistance he took to his bed, got rapidly worse, and finally expired, in the arms of the Empress, on the $\frac{1}{13}$ of December 1826. The news of his death spread like lightning throughout Russia, and there, as well as all over Europe, he was believed to have been poisoned. He left three brothers—Constantine, born in 1779; Nicholas, born 1796; and Michael, born 1798. We have already seen how Constantine resigned his rights, and the arrangements Alexander made for the succession; but as this was a secret both to the nation and to the Grand-Duke Nicholas, a courier was immediately despatched both to Warsaw and St. Petersburg. The Grand-Duke received the news of his brother's death on the 7th, and immediately sent the Grand-Duke Michael with a letter to his brother Nicholas acknowledging him as Emperor and offering him his allegiance. The courier sent to St. Petersburg reached it on the 9th, just at the moment when thanksgivings were being offered up in the church of the Winter Palace for the supposed recovery of the Emperor, news having arrived a few days before of an amelioration in his condition. The Grand-Duke

Nicholas, immediately on receiving the sad intelligence of his death, did homage to his brother Constantine, and made the Guard of the Winter Palace, the regiment of Preobrajenskii, take the oath of allegiance to him. He had already communicated the mournful news to the Empress-mother, and now went to tell her the steps he had taken. She exclaimed, "Nicholas, what have you done? *You* are the Emperor!" The President of the Council of State requested his presence at a solemn meeting of its members, and as the Grand-Duke refused, on the ground that he did not belong to the Council, the President opened the document deposited in the chambers, and went, with all his associates, to do homage to him as Emperor. The Grand-Duke received the Council, but replied, "I am not the Emperor, and will not take the rights of my eldest brother from him; but if he persists in his resolution to abdicate, it is true I cannot refuse it." The Council implored Nicholas not to permit any interregnum, which might be the source of great danger. But he remained firm, and even compelled them to acknowledge his brother Constantine, who thereupon was proclaimed Emperor in St. Petersburg. The Grand-Duke Michael arrived on the 13th with Constantine's letter, but Nicholas would not allow it to be made public, and begged his brother immediately to return to Warsaw and inform Constantine that the oath of allegiance towards him had already been taken. On the way Michael met a confidential friend of the Grand-Duke's, bringing, expressed in still plainer terms, his renunciation of the throne. So he turned back with him, and arrived in time to take an active part in the revolution which had broken out in St. Petersburg. The interregnum had lasted three weeks. On the 24th of December Nicholas received the positive assurance of the resignation of his brother, took the reins of the Govern-

ment, and had himself proclaimed. The consequences of the secret societies now began to manifest themselves. The seeds of the evil spirit imported from France began to flourish. Under the ashes glowed the fire of revolution, which, in consequence of Alexander's death and the uncertainty and insecurity produced by the interregnum, now burst into flames. In the south of Russia, indeed over the whole country, among the officers, was a widely-spread conspiracy, and in almost every regiment of the Guards at St. Petersburg were conspirators. The revolutionary feeling was well known at Court, but that it would ever reach the door of the Winter Palace, and with such celerity, no one knew or believed. The conspirators, having at their head the Princes Trubetzkoi and Obolenski, and Conrad Rylieff, had resolved to make their outbreak on the day on which the authorities and regiments were to take the oath of fealty to the Emperor Nicholas. This it was now settled was to take place on the morning of the 26th. On the previous day, and the whole night, the conspirators assembled themselves at the house of Rylieff, and sent officers belonging to the conspiracy to the different barracks, in order to tell the soldiers that they were deceived, that Constantine was their real Emperor, and that their being called upon to swear allegiance to Nicholas was only an intrigue to ruin them and Russia.

In some of the regiments, particularly those of Moscow, the Marines, and the Artillery of the Guards, they were listened to, and the soldiers were so little aware how they were misled, that when the conspirators cried "Long life to the Constitution!" they believed it to be meant for the wife of Constantine!

Some companies of the regiment of Moscow, part of the battalion of the Marine Guards, and divisions of many regi-

ments, assembled themselves in the large Admiralty Square close to the Senate; also great numbers of Monjocks (peasants who served in the town), and many private persons. Intelligence was sent to the Emperor that this crowd assumed a very threatening attitude. The old Governor-General of St. Petersburg, Count Miloradovitch, who, singularly enough, had never even suspected what was now taking place, hastened to the Emperor, and set before him, as strongly as possible, the danger of the position. The Emperor went to the Empress, sent to fetch his children from the Anitschikoff Palace, offered up a short prayer in the church, then took his son of eight years old, the present Emperor, by the hand, and went into the court of the Winter Palace, where a company of the battalion of the Finland Rifles had the guard; to these, after making them an affecting address, he gave over the care of his son, and from the tears which glittered in the eyes of these bronzed old warriors, he could feel sure that so long as one of the brave soldiers lived the heir to the throne of Russia would be protected. After that he proceeded to the parade-ground in front of the Winter Palace. The first battalion of the Preobrajenskii regiment of the Guards was just marching out, followed by the Horse Guards, commanded by Orloff.

The Emperor addressed these troops, told them that he was their lawful Emperor, and that he was going to put their fidelity to the proof. The expression of the determination to fulfil their duty which showed itself on all their countenances, gave him, as he often afterwards himself related, the assurance that he might rely upon these troops. Count Miloradovitch now came to the Emperor with the intelligence that things were going very badly, and that he wished to try and speak with the rebels. The Emperor made no reproaches to him, but answered in a friendly

manner that he might do so. The old soldier, with much resolution, rode alone to meet the threatening insurgents; he commenced to speak to them, but while he was yet talking, one of the crowd came up behind and shot him dead. The Emperor was anxious, as long as possible, to prevent bloodshed, and resolved even now not to begin. The old Archbishop of St. Petersburg also tried to reason with the rebels, but the rude crowd scoffed at his white hairs, and he returned unsuccessful to the Emperor. A few shots were now fired, and the conflict began. The Emperor rode towards a division of mutinous soldiers out of different regiments, and as he saluted them he was answered by cries of "Long live Constantine!" As these were repeated, he said quietly, "Then join the conspirators," and watched them march off to do so. He now gave the order to the regiment of Horse Guards to disperse the mob, but without unnecessary violence. The attempt failed, and it became requisite to have recourse to energetic measures, and a part of the artillery corps which had remained faithful was ordered to fire. The combat was becoming more serious. At this juncture the Grand-Duke Michael, returning from his journey to Warsaw, went at once to the barracks of the revolted Moscow regiment, and persuaded a part of the regiment which had remained in the barrack to follow him. Through his energy and activity he brought to a happy conclusion much that was threatening. By six o'clock in the evening the revolt was at an end, and the Emperor, who through his exemplary conduct on this day had saved both Russia and his dynasty, was enabled to return to the Empress, who had passed the whole time in prayer.

Thus commenced the reign of the Emperor Nicholas; but the impression he received on that day, the manner in which the consequences of the liberalism of the Emperor Alexander

were brought before his observation, produced a most essential difference on his future government. He became harsh, which did not at all belong to his natural character; and the dread he entertained of all intellectual progress of education and general mental improvement originated in the fact that he had seen how the propagation of false liberalism had turned the people's heads, and led to the spread of dangerous ideas, threatening his throne, and bringing Russia to the verge of ruin and destruction. Moreover, Russia was not in reality as ripe and ready for progress and civilisation as the Emperor Alexander had believed; and a Frenchman of the time truly said—"La civilisation Française est pour les Russes comme l'humidité sans soleil pour les fruits, cela les pourrit avant de les mûrir." ("French civilisation is for Russians what humidity without sun is for fruits; it rots without ripening them.")

While the revolt we have been describing was going on in St. Petersburg, there was also much agitation in the interior of the country, and in the south of Russia. The leaders of the insurrection, Pestel and Apostel, had made among the troops the most dangerous preparations for a general military revolt. While the Emperor Alexander was living at Taganrog, Pestel had already been denounced to him; and as soon as the revolution in St. Petersburg was tranquillized, the most energetic measures were taken to suppress that of the interior. Soon the whole web of the conspiracy was unravelled, and all who had taken part in it seized and punished. Thus was the root of the evil eradicated. On the $\frac{1}{2}\frac{3}{5}$ July 1826, the Emperor celebrated a *Te Deum* before the Senate-house, the place where the insurrectionists had assembled.

The Emperor Nicholas was a thorough gentleman, which unfortunately princes not always are. This arises from the style

of their education, and from the fact of their always being surrounded by flatterers. Few princes have, to the extent he had, the upright wish and intention to do his duty as a Sovereign; he worked with untiring diligence and the best will. The result of his labours was not always such as he wished or might have anticipated, but he had elevated Russia to an apparently greater degree of power than she had ever before possessed, and commanded for himself a rare degree of respect both from princes and nations. He has subsequently, however, been much too harshly judged, sharing the fate of his country. The power of both before the siege of Sebastopol was overrated, and since their defeat has been equally under-estimated.

We will now merely glance over the principal events of his reign. In the years 1828 and 1829 he brought to a successful issue a war with Turkey, which concluded with the peace made at Adrianople, and then he proved himself a most generous victor. In 1830 he suppressed a revolution in Poland. For years he carried on a war in the Caucasus, and extended Russia's rule on all sides. In 1848 Nicholas was the terror of all revolutionists; he was the rock in the midst of the stormy sea to which all the princes looked for their salvation. Without immediate interference he was a great supporter of the German monarchies; he suppressed the revolution in Hungary, rendering thereby a great service to Austria, which a few years later, as Prince Schwarzenberg had predicted, astonished Europe by her ingratitude towards him.

The war on the Danube, the Crimean War, the Siege of Sebastopol, and the heroic defence of the fortress, must be still fresh in the memory of all.

In the interior of Russia, the Emperor tried most zealously to bring order into the administration; he saw the want of a fixed code of laws, and appointed a particular committee to

inquire into and regulate them. He did all that lay in his power to reform existing abuses, and punished severely even persons high in office who practised them; but his efforts seemed all in vain, for during his reign the evil seemed to grow worse instead of better. He had often thought of giving freedom to the serfs, but wished first to try the experiment of improving the condition of the peasants belonging to the Crown. For this purpose he established an especial office, at the head of which he placed Count Kisselef, who was considered to be a very enlightened man. The sole business of this office was the amelioration and management of their state; but this, so far from improving their circumstances, placed them completely under the dominion of subordinate officials, who plundered and impoverished them to such an extent that it was easy even for a stranger to recognise the difference between the poverty of a village where the Crown peasants lived, and the comparative comfort and prosperity of those belonging to private proprietors. It had been the Emperor Nicholas's intention to do much for the internal communication of his country; he made the railway from St. Petersburg to Moscow, and paid enormous sums for the formation of various high-roads. The fact that these roads, though paid for, were not made, as well as many other similar malversations, was only brought to light through the Crimean War. The Emperor Nicholas was faithful to Russia's diplomatic relationships as agreed to at the Holy Alliance, and did everything to preserve the alliance with Austria, which he considered the only means of maintaining the configuration of the German States as fixed in 1815. He believed this to be the surest means of preserving the peace of Europe, which he earnestly desired. For Russia's self, the alliance which would most have gratified the Emperor Nicholas was that of England; and who can say if

it would not have been much better policy for England to have come to an understanding with Russia about the Turkish question, instead of joining with France and Turkey in a war against her? Some English statesmen, we know, are of this opinion, and have thought that an alliance with Russia would have been the best for England's interest.

In the confidential conversation which the Emperor held with Sir Hamilton Seymour, if we do not mistake, in the year 1852, about the Eastern question, he expressed himself with a frankness which could only have been possible with the Minister of a power which he believed to be friendly. It would perhaps have been better for England if her Cabinet had agreed to the Emperor's propositions, and had not been indiscreet enough to publish this conversation. That England commenced the Crimean War through an error, that she spilt the best blood of her sons in the service of France, is now pretty generally acknowledged. Napoleon I. said, "Il faut que la Méditerranée devienne un lac Français" ("The Mediterranean must become a French lake"), and the nephew does not lightly forget his uncle's sayings, and believed the Crimean War to be a step towards this. The real reason of this war was the widely-spread idea entertained by English statesmen, that Russia might threaten England's rule in India. Napoleon is thought to have had the same opinion when he tried to penetrate Russia; but he never got further than Moscow, and from Moscow to India remains still a long, difficult, and desert way. As the Scotch say, "It 's a far cry to Loch Awe." It is not easy to understand how such fears can be seriously entertained. Russia's weakness lies in the preponderance of the Eastern population as well as in the fact that the enormous extent of country is in general insufficiently peopled; somewhat is also owing to the great distances to be traversed, and the deficiency of her

means of communication. It is well known that at one time great disquietude existed generally, from the belief that the Emperor Nicholas was ambitious of governing the world. It was universally thought that at least he intended to take possession of Turkey, and that he particularly desired to have Constantinople; but it is very doubtful whether her power would have been thereby increased, if, indeed, it would not have ultimately led to her ruin. The want of moral energy, rectitude, and order, which characterizes the Sclavonian race, and distinguishes it from the Anglo-Saxon, German, and even Romance nations, constitutes the principal evil against which Russia has to struggle; and how seriously might not this evil have been increased through the possession of Turkey! The charms of the situation of Constantinople, and the climate, would naturally have attracted thither the Court and all the grandees of Russia, and the reminiscence of the voluptuous life and Oriental customs, of which so many traces are already to be found among them, would have worked their ruin. No friend of Russia can desire to see Constantinople in the Emperor's hands. Asia is yet large enough to give both England and Russia,—ay, even for some centuries to come!—the possibility of extending and strengthening their rule there, without interfering with each other. Russia, from her position on the land side, should make it her task to become the civilized medium between Europe and Asia; but this task she can only really fulfil when the European division of the enormous kingdom has been brought to the first step of true and enlightened civilisation.

It is well known with what cunning Louis Napoleon brought about the Crimean War, and how secretly he made the alliance with England. As the nephew of Bonaparte, he wished, not unnaturally, to destroy the Vienna Treaty

and the Holy Alliance. In this he was successful. The hitherto excellent diplomates of the Emperor Nicholas in this emergency did not serve him so well as he had expected. They were completely deceived, and only a short time before the known *entente cordiale* between England and France was concluded, his Ambassadors announced, "that the two Powers would never be united." The Russian army passed the Danube. The war commenced. This was succeeded by the landing of the Allied Forces in the Crimea, and the war ended with the besieging and taking of Sebastopol. All appeared to conspire against Russia; even Austria, who owed her such a debt of gratitude, chose this opportunity to realize the prophecy of Prince Schwarzenberg, to which we have before alluded. Austria was imprudent enough to break up the so-called Holy Alliance, without taking the precaution to secure herself another ally. The Emperor Nicholas, who had a far more sensitive and tender character than people gave him credit for, had also a personal friendship for the young Emperor of Austria; indeed, loved him nearly as if he had been his own son, and his behaviour towards him had deeply wounded him. Added to this was the vexation caused by the discovery of the gross existing abuses, never suspected by the Emperor, and which were now first exposed to light. When the news of the battle of Alma was brought to him by the aide-de-camp of the Admiral Menschikoff, Colonel Greigh, and when this latter confessed to him the deficiency in the equipment and the general bad condition of the troops which had taken part in it, his passion nearly got the better of him. Blow succeeded blow. And although the heroic defence of the fortress of Sebastopol by his army and fleet, which latter, as his own creation, he especially loved, was some consolation to him, yet these repeated and bitter disappointments commenced, as it were, to sap the

foundations of his life. Through the weakness of the fortifications, the bad state of the ships, and particularly the deficiency of the armament, St. Petersburg was much more seriously endangered by the fleet commanded by Sir Charles Napier at Cronstadt than the Western Powers themselves at the time had any idea of. Her defence was personally conducted by the Emperor, and his health, already seriously affected by continued mental emotions, gave way completely under bodily fatigue. The Emperor Nicholas died on the 2d of March 1855. With the force and celerity of lightning the news spread throughout Europe.

All now hoped for peace! Rarely has a man in his lifetime been more idolized, but perhaps still more rarely has any man after his death been more harshly and unjustly judged, than the Emperor Nicholas. The author arrived at St. Petersburg a short time after the Emperor's death, and can never forget the painful impression made upon him, that those who had owed everything—position, honour, riches,—to their recently deceased sovereign, now abused him; that those who recently crawled before him, and pretended to worship him, now attributed all the misfortunes which had befallen Russia to him (due as they really were to themselves), and described him as the most short-sighted, selfish tyrant, and that Russia, and indeed all Europe, should congratulate themselves on his death. This ingratitude, this injustice, plainly shows that Russian civilisation was then only skin-deep. These, and many other observations, proved how much more necessary the abolition of serfdom was for the higher classes even than for the serfs themselves. Who ever possessed slaves treated them accordingly, and those who cannot see in their fellow-men the reflection of their own image, and do not, as such, respect them, cannot possess the Christian feelings with which they ought to be animated.

True Christianity, which civilisation brings with it, is inconsistent with slavery. Russian serfdom was nothing else. The author has seen Russian serfs treated as no Turk would treat his slaves, and has observed with his own eyes that the horrors related of Russian serfdom were no exaggeration. The Emperor Alexander II., who was born on the $\frac{29}{17}$ April 1818, and succeeded his father on the 2d of March 1855, has deserved the thanks not only of his people but of all Christians, in recognising and abolishing this shocking evil. Alexander II. succeeded to the throne in a most difficult time, and under trying circumstances. Russia was at war with France, England, Turkey, and Italy, and even Austria preserved only an unfriendly neutrality. The finances of the country and the reserve of men were so exhausted, that they were obliged to recruit with even those of forty-eight years old. There was no confidence in the administration of the country; everywhere there existed sorrow and discontent. Added to all this, the difficult question of the emancipation of the serfs made his task a really hard one. The author has the honour to be personally acquainted with the Emperor, and being in Russia during this time, from his observation of his noble conduct, became one of his warmest admirers, and is convinced that history will give him still more credit, and do him still more justice, than ever his contemporaries have done. If Russia ever attains the position which would appear to have been destined for her by Providence, if she ever becomes really civilized, and promotes the civilisation of Asia, it is entirely owing to the Emperor Alexander II.'s courage in emancipating the serfs. During the reign of the Emperor Nicholas, particularly when the war first broke out, Russia was frequently compared to a Colossus standing on feet of clay. The result of the war shows that this comparison was not altogether inapposite, but the feet were not wholly

of clay. The Colossus has not yet fallen. The present Emperor, through the railways which will soon traverse all parts of Russia, has given him iron feet, and the Colossus will soon renew, if not double, his strength. Immediately after his accession he neither would nor dared conclude peace; besides, after the death of the Emperor Nicholas, the demands of the Western Powers became too presumptuous, consequently the siege of Sebastopool lasted till the 8th of September 1855,—the Russians having retreated to the north side. The winter passed over in a sort of armistice, and not till 10th March 1856 was peace finally concluded at Paris.

Through this peace the existence of the Ottoman Porte was again renewed, but nothing was gained for the Western Powers except that through the destruction of the Russian fleet her rule in the Black Sea was destroyed. Whether it was wise, particularly whether it was wise of England, to demand the so-called neutralization of the Black Sea, and to refuse to allow Russia to keep a few unimportant ships of war on the sea which bathes her richest and most considerable shores, is very doubtful. It is impossible to suppose that with so great a Power as Russia such terms can be permanent. We have always been of opinion that Egypt and the Red Sea are of greater and more practical importance than Constantinople and the Black Sea can ever be for England, and in this, as well as in other respects, the Crimean war has done more harm than good.

Let us now make a few remarks upon the political status of Russia. The Emperor Alexander's Minister for Foreign Affairs, the present Vice-Chancellor, Prince Gortschakoff, is without doubt a remarkable man. Although to those who are not well acquainted with him he gives the impression of being vain, he is a man of a very clear understanding, pos-

sessing much well-grounded knowledge, thoroughly practical and logical, perfectly understands Russia and the Russians, is a most faithful servant of his Emperor, and a true friend to his friends. Prince Gortschäkoff took office at a period of the greatest difficulty. His diplomacy was singularly successful, particularly on the subject of the Polish question. He honestly assisted the Emperor in all his endeavours to accomplish great and difficult internal reforms, and he was one of the few nobles in the kingdom who earnestly and sincerely desired the emancipation of the serfs. Prince Gortschäkoff declared, after the peace, that Russia would abstain from any active interference with European politics, and that the Emperor would occupy himself with the great work of reform. He had, with rare talent, strengthened Russia's foreign politics, and contrived, that although she had made no formal alliance with any other Power, she should yet be on the best diplomatic footing with all countries, and that her position should be such as is most befitting so large and independent a kingdom. Free from all foreign obligations, she has perfect liberty of action on every side, and consequently, when the time comes to show it, will have immense power and weight. Such a position for Russia is far preferable to alliances. At the commencement, Prince Gortschäkoff appeared much inclined for a French alliance, but since the Polish Revolution it is undeniable that the feelings of both nations have considerably cooled towards each other. The Eastern question always remains Russia's greatest difficulty. From their resemblance in religion, Russia naturally regards herself as the protector of the unfortunate Christians in the East, and they look upon her in the same light.

Russian rule on the north shores of the Black Sea has much extended; most of the tribes have been conquered.

If the great network of railways Russia is constructing were once ended, the occupation of the Black Sea would become much more important, and the question of the Dardanelles assume greater significance. The descendants of the Knights of the Cross should be ashamed that Turkey still exists in Europe; but so long as that is the case, she will ever remain the bone of contention for European States. One piece after another has been torn from the Sultan—first Greece, next Algiers and Egypt, and now it seems probable Candia will soon follow them. Over Constantinople, the most important outpost of European commerce and civilisation, still waves the red flag; the Crescent still stands above the Cross, to the shame of Christian nations.

The author has already remarked that it is his impression it would not be for Russia's interest to possess Constantinople, nor does he believe that Russian statesmen are of a different opinion. A very general idea is a confederation of Christian States; and it was at one time proposed that Constantinople should become a free commercial city, under European protection. It was hoped that the kingdom of Greece might have, through her European education and civilisation, proved a counterpoise to the power of Turkey in the East; but up to this time these expectations have remained unfulfilled, and before Islam is cast out of Europe, European statesmen will have time to form many other plans. Greece has already experienced that her existence under foreign protection is not much to be envied, and ere this her young king has doubtless made the same discovery.

If Austria in the year 1854 had not pursued such a short-sighted policy, if she had come to an understanding with Russia on the subject of the mouth of the Danube and the antagonistic interests on the banks of this mighty stream, if she had not made an implacable enemy of Russia,

the question would probably have been more easily solved. The national hatred which, particularly since the Crimean War, exists between Austria and Russia, creates greater difficulties for Russian statesmen than is generally believed, for they are not supposed to pay as much attention to public opinion as they in reality do. If Russia and Austria cannot come to a friendly understanding about the Danubian Principalities and the future of Turkey, there is little doubt that, sooner or later, they must settle it between them with the aid of the sword. Whether the Roumanian Principalities will acquire any importance under the government of the Princes of Hohenzollern, time alone will tell.

Russia has extended her frontiers towards Bokhara, Khiva, and China, more perhaps even than is good for her, and established on the Amoor a water communication which unites Siberia with the Indian Ocean. The two great difficulties which oppose themselves to the utility of this great undertaking is—first, the almost total depopulation of the shores of the Amoor, there not being more in certain districts than a single inhabitant within a radius of sixty square miles; and secondly, that the harbour Nikolajewks, at the mouth of the river, is for six months of the year frozen up.

The understanding between Russia and Prussia is good, and it lies in the interests of both nations that it should continue so. As neither the war with Denmark, the Polish Revolution, nor the annexations of 1866 have disturbed it, we may reasonably suppose it will not be easy to do so.

If Russia perceives that she requires no greater influence in Europe than so great a power commands of itself, she may look with calmness at the growing power of a neighbouring land. Her own vastness, her nationality, and her geographical position shield Russia from all attacks.

Her relationship with England can and will improve.

The mercantile connexions of both must bring them together.

A few years ago a war with Sweden was thought possible, but this change also passed off. Finland had no wish to return to Swedish rule.

Russia had the good sense to leave to all her acquired provinces their own laws and customs, and this has turned to the advantage of both.

Russia is marching steadily onwards on the true road of progress; the fears which at first possessed her, that reform might advance too rapidly, are gradually disappearing. She has seen how quietly her most difficult question, that of the liberation of the serfs, has been solved with less disturbance, also, and less sacrifice than even the warmest friends of the measure anticipated.

We would willingly examine more closely into the internal reforms made by the Emperor Alexander II., but it would lead us too far; we must then write a work entirely about Russia; even the question of the emancipation of the serfs would furnish material enough for a volume.

In order to give the reader some idea of what has taken place in Russia during the last ten years, and how earnestly Alexander II. has undertaken the work of reforming the abuses of his country, we subjoin a short statement of those he has already effected.

Reforms in Russia under the Reign of the Emperor Alexander II.

Date of the Imperial Ukase, May 6, 1856.

Suppression of the Military Colonies and Institutions.—The members of which were useful neither as soldiers nor as agriculturists; they are now turned into small proprietors under the jurisdiction of the Minister for Agriculture.

Foundation of a Benefit Fund for the pensioning of such old Sailors and Soldiers as have meritoriously served their time. Nov. 20.

The Abolishment of the Tax of 500 roubles on Foreign Passports to leave Russia.—An acknowledgment that his subjects might gain in culture by foreign travel and intercourse with European nations. May 18, 1857.

The Abolition of a particular Censorship for Military Writings.—Establishing the principle that the military do not require a peculiar and exclusive government, but may be ruled by the same laws, and enjoy the same advantages, as the other members of the State. May 1, 1858.

Alteration of the Laws with regard to Soldiers' Children. —They are no longer to occupy a distinct position or have particular schools, or be under a different jurisdiction, but are in all respects to enjoy the same rights and privileges as other citizens. July 9.

The raising of the Salary of all Officials connected with the Administration of the Laws.—This was done in the endeavour to put an end to the bribery and corruption existing among them. June 4, 1858.

Measures passed for the economizing Public expenses. March 9, 1860.

The Officers of the different Branches of the Military Service were summoned to attend the Military Academy. —Relaxation in the duties of their profession, and even money, was given to encourage and assist them in their studies. March 31.

February 19, 1861. Emancipation of the Serfs.—Creating thereby twenty-two millions of free citizens with the right of property.

March 2, 1861. The appointment of Justices of the Peace to settle strifes between the Peasant Proprietors and their former masters.

July 4. The introduction of a Tax on Spirits.—Doing away with the till then existing system of letting the right of making brandy to certain individuals, who systematically encouraged drunkenness among the people, in order to amass private colossal fortunes at the expense of the multitude.

December 3, 1862. The nomination of Judges learned in the Law, to inquire into Criminal Cases—which inquiries were till then solely made by the Police.

April 17, 1863. New Code of Criminal Laws; the Abolition of Corporal Punishment.

June 21. The persecution of the so-called "*Old Believers*" on account of their faith prohibited, but that the Greek Church should, by gentleness and persuasion, try to bring them to acknowledge their errors.

November 14, 1864. Reform of the Courts of Justice,—Justice to be public. Advocates and Justices must have studied jurisdiction. The establishment of Justices of the Peace, both in Town and Country.

Nov. 19. The Election of different representative Bodies in each district, who had the power of assessing Taxes, and the encouragement of the various useful Institutions in such places.

The amelioration of the condition of the Peasants in the Baltic Provinces, which had remained unaltered since the year 1819. February 19, 1865.

Abolition of the Laws of the Press.—All offences of the Press to be punished by Civil Law. April 17, 1865.

Besides these, many other useful Ukases relating to the improvement of Schools, the furtherance of Public Education, and many measures to enable the Greek Clergy to acquire a more extensive and enlightened education.

This short extract is sufficient to show what the Emperor has done, and how quietly, and with what foresight, he pursues his schemes.

The most unfortunate period of the reign of Alexander II. has been that of the Polish Revolution. It has constituted one of the most sad and painful episodes of our time.

The horrible cruelties which commenced with the Poles, the murder of many innocent Russians, as well as the manner in which the revolt was suppressed, reminds one of the times of the worst barbarism.

The Emperor had the best intentions. He wished to concede to the Poles all that they could reasonably expect, but they always raised their demands higher. Many attempts to improve the state of affairs in Poland failed, and at last the Grand-Duke Constantine was sent as Viceroy to Warsaw. Immediately after his arrival he was shot at and wounded. Count Wielopolski shared the same fate. All mild measures were derided, or a base advantage taken of them.

In the Russian-Polish provinces affairs assumed a very serious aspect, and the Emperor resolved to send to Wilna General Mouravieff, a man whom he himself did not like,

and who was considered in Russia as an indiscriminately cruel character, but a man of iron will and energy. The cry of horror sent forth by the newspapers at the measures he took, must still be fresh in the memory of all. Many things were exaggerated; but the system he pursued and declared to be necessary, namely, the annihilation of the whole Polish race, was something too shocking, and tells its own tale of the fearful deeds that must have been done.

However, through his ferocious conduct and severity, a pause occurred in the Revolution. Affairs in Warsaw nevertheless continued to grow worse. The clemency of the Grand-Duke was abused. It became necessary to adopt severer measures. The Grand-Duke Constantine left Warsaw, leaving to General Count Berg, as his successor, the difficult task in which he had failed. General Berg is esteemed as a most able and excellent man, and indeed, on all occasions, has proved himself such. He is a just, and most certainly not a cruel man; but he found himself obliged to act with the greatest decision, and soon peace was in a manner restored to Poland. Thousands of Poles were banished to Siberia, and others who were less compromised sent into the interior of Russia.

If Count Berg had been sent to Warsaw immediately after the death of Prince Paskiewitsch, it is more than probable that this unfortunate Polish Revolution would never have broken out.

Russia now governs Poland as a conquered land, as a Russian province. Polish nationality is disappearing; and if many of the nobles may have deserved their fate, yet one cannot help feeling for this in many respects noble nation the deepest compassion and sympathy.

Foreign countries, particularly France and England, have, with the best intentions towards her, done Poland much

harm. They encouraged her to resistance, and showed her every commiseration, but without offering her any help, which indeed they could hardly have done without entailing a European war; and though at one moment it appeared as if France was going to unite with Austria to assist her (Austria had, contrary to her wont, suddenly expressed so much sympathy for Poland), yet she soon felt that an aggressive war with Russia was not likely to pay. Public opinion in France was much excited, but it went no further than the mutual exchange of a rather sharp diplomatic correspondence. The despatches of Prince Gortschäkoff were a model of style, logic, and decision. The relationship between France and Russia cooled considerably, and Poland was, and remains, lost Poland!

Russia suffers much financially from the depreciation of her paper money, which arises principally from bad management. A Minister of Finance, with a good head, would soon put all to rights.

The progress of this enormous Empire, the strength it must acquire through the facility of communication given by railways, connecting the Baltic with the Black Sea, gives us reasons, not to fear, but to serious reflection.

Turning his eyes to the East, seeing this progress, every real politician must see how necessary a strong German Power is for the future of Europe.

The author concludes these few observations about Russia with the earnest wish that God may grant the present Emperor long life, for the continued improvement and civilisation of his country, and that he may reap the harvest he has sown.

III.

GERMANY.

THE origin of the German Bund has already been described, and it has been mentioned that even the most hopeful of its originators were much disappointed in its actual results.

The first year after the Peace all the Governments had a great deal to attend to at home. In the year 1817 there was a general famine from the failure of the crops, and this complicated their already great financial difficulties. Added to this, the smaller States were compelled to abandon their old and give to their new government a more or less constitutional form.

The middle and lower classes troubled themselves very little about politics, and only sought to improve their own condition. The German universities displayed strong liberal tendencies. In many of the smaller States, particularly that of Saxe-Weimar, liberal constitutions were granted, guaranteeing the liberty of the Press. If one reads the periodicals of those days, it will be seen that they exercised this liberty very freely in criticising the Bund and the different Governments, and they made out the people to be in general very irritable and discontented. As we have already remarked, even the most moderate expectations were disappointed at the result of the Bund. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle,

the Conference at Carlsbad, and the second Congress of Vienna—all proved that as soon as any serious complications arose it was totally inefficient and entirely disregarded by the great Powers. Austria and Prussia treated with the most utter contempt the clauses of the fundamental treaty entailing upon them the necessity of giving to their country a constitutional government. The Bund was even incapable of regulating the most material interests of Germany; much was thought and spoken about unity of taxes, coinage, weights, and measures, but nothing was done.

Prussia saw that in this manner such a conclusion would never be arrived at, and thought that by taking the lead on these questions she would acquire an increased influence on the rest of the German States. In the year 1829 Prussia concluded the first Treaty of Commerce with Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Darmstadt, which by degrees spread over the greater part of Germany, including at first twenty, and later thirty millions of inhabitants. The Zollverein furnished a material proof of the inutility of the Bund, and showed that Prussia endeavoured to identify her own interests with those of the rest of Germany. The Zollverein was a commercial mediatization of the separate States. It was a great mistake that all means were not at the time tried to include the free Hanseatic towns; and had not these been misled by local interests and false notions of republican independence, they would have understood how much their increase and prosperity depended upon their connexion with the inland, and that the folly of a separate monetary system, as well as many other absurdities, would thus cease. The existence of these small republican towns in Germany is a curious anomaly. That they now form part of the North German Bund, as well as the debates which will occur in future Parliaments, will in time create quite a different understanding of these

things, not only in Germany, but in the Hanseatic towns themselves, which must end in the abolition of the destructive system of Free Ports.

The Greek Revolution, the Revolution in Poland, and the July Revolution in France, found their echo in Germany, and in the years 1830 and 1831 there was a movement throughout the German States of a more or less serious nature; in the smaller ones constitutional forms sprang shortly afterwards into full life.

We have no liking for absolutism; we are convinced that for States which have reached the German stage of civilisation a representative government is absolutely necessary, and has in Germany history to support it; but at the same time we cannot deny that the division of Germany into such small States has often made the attempt of constitutional government impracticable. The old German estates had in part lost their standing-point. In the small States the aristocratic element was wanting, and this in Germany has generally had its most dangerous foes in the reigning Princes.

The German Princes have always tried to draw the nobles to their Courts, and there to make use of them. Speaking generally, the Princes have never tolerated an independent nobility, possessed of landed property, versed in politics, and with opinions of their own,—a nobility conscious of its nobleness, and of which it can with truth be said, *Noblesse oblige.* The want of such a body is the more serious and detrimental since the growth, gradual indeed, but in many places, of a moneyed, independent, and educated middle class, which yet lacks age to give it political importance. This want has been supplied in some States by hereditary offices in the possession of noble families.

There is always something wanting when the mind and

manners, the look and habits of a gentleman have not descended through many generations from father to son. We are quite ready to acknowledge that high offices have been filled even from the lowest grade by excellent persons, who have done the State good service; but generally in such cases there is a want of tact, refined feeling, firmness, and other valuable qualities. Not that we would affirm that such qualities are only found amongst the aristocracy; but that that particular character and habit of mind which is required in those who are called to fill the most difficult of all offices, the representation of others in public assemblies, cannot be acquired in one, hardly in two generations, must be the result of birth as well as of education. The middle classes may have it just as well as the nobility; but it is more likely to be found when a refined education is a family inheritance.

Theorists, professors, and public speakers wanted to copy England, and, later, the Parliamentary development in France, without knowing England, and without having the materials which are absolutely necessary to prevent a Parliament from becoming either a bad comedy or a downright pernicious institution.

There being a lack of suitable candidates in the small States, the representative bodies were formed mostly of lawyers, officials, and farmers; and, with very few exceptions, these three classes furnish no good materials for such assemblies. Lawyers have seldom the social position and pecuniary independence that are desirable; they are naturally for the most part place-hunters, and use their glibness of speech to serve their own interests. Farmers as a class do not possess the necessary education. But worst of all are the officials. They are either blind tools of the Government, or they offer it a blind opposition; and in both cases they damage themselves and the Government which they serve.

The smaller the State, the more difficult is it also to find persons to serve it under a constitutional government; especially since the year 1848, when the changes of Ministry were so common, that almost every high official, almost every clever lawyer, had been at least once a member of the Government.

Between 1831 and 1848 things went quietly on in Germany to all appearance, and its material prosperity and progress were very great. At the same time there was unmistakably a rising discontent with the state of domestic politics, and a general and growing desire for unity. The succession of King Frederick-William IV. to the throne of Prussia, and the speeches that His Majesty made in Berlin and Königsberg gave occasion to the brightest hopes.

The complications in the East in the year 1840, the war in Egypt and consequent shyness which grew up between England and France, the warlike preparations in the latter country, and the appearance of Thiers on the scene as Minister—all this alarmed the German people, and they were in expectation of an attack on the side of the Rhine.

The spirit which then awoke in Germany was more full of meaning than appeared at the time: it sent a movement of national life through the masses. Added to this, railway engineers, with their metals—the most effectual propagators of political life and knowledge—were beginning their work in good earnest.

In comparison with other countries, Germany was very much behind-hand as regards the means of communication. In general the people up to this time passed a tranquil stay-at-home existence, especially in the small capitals. Unless a man was a merchant, he remained quietly at home. Of newspapers there were not many, of telegrams none, and the people lived far less in public than now; there was scarcely

a beer-house in the whole of North Germany. These places of resort are an unfortunate importation from the south of Germany, and that since about 1840. Art and literature were largely patronized in the small capitals; about politics people gave themselves very little trouble.

No one can have observed the general state of things in the period 1840-47 without perceiving that another spirit had come over the German people—whether a good spirit in all respects is questionable.

The railways had multiplied traffic and intercourse in an unlooked-for degree; and this was of political moment, because people's views and modes of thought were thereby changed, and everything assumed greater proportions. Railway travellers began to open their eyes to the small extent of many German principalities. States through which it took a day to drive, on not particularly good roads, are now almost literally flown through. You can hardly smoke through a cigar from beginning to end of a single State. The good impressions produced by the patriarchal mode of life, and the love of subjects towards their princes, are changed on the railway into a smile at the rapidity with which a whole State is traversed; men forget meanwhile what services the many capital towns have rendered, as points of attraction to art, science, and general cultivation.

It is more important to remark that this means of communication has produced very great changes in a military point of view. We saw in the war of 1866 with what rapidity armies can now be brought together.

Formerly the Germans could quarrel amongst themselves without their neighbours observing it. Now it is quite otherwise. The German element is hemmed in between peoples who speak the Sclavonian and Romance languages,

and their power is increased in a still greater degree by this greater facility of movement.

By intercourse and telegraphy our neighbours have advanced much nearer to us in spirit, if not in body; they know our weak points, and can concentrate their forces more rapidly on our borders.

Thus material changes brought out into strong relief the political weakness of Germany in its many artificial subdivisions.

All this every German said to himself, often unconsciously. It was quite natural, therefore, that there should be a longing for unity, a feeling of the necessity of a real union; and all who are ignorant of the German national character will be astonished that this feeling did not put forth more strength, that this spark of the spirit did not wax into a mighty flame.

Two other reasons must be mentioned which had an important influence in bringing about the catastrophe of 1848.

Literature, which had begun to flourish in the beginning of the century, and showed marks of nobleness, often of enthusiasm, had sunk greatly under materializing influences; and the anarchical tendencies of French literature forced their way, alas! upon us in a menacing attitude.

Then there appeared a fault, which is not natural to the character of our people,—a want of esteem and respect for one's superiors. The political freethinker sets himself above God's Word. The lieutenant, especially in the small army, deems himself infinitely wiser than his general; the attaché calls the ambassador a fool; the lawyer thinks that the judge, even if he is a Minister of the highest court, has forgotten the very rudiments of Jurisprudence. Respect for the laws exists hardly at all; no one thinks how he shall obey them;

every one how he can best evade them. We need scarcely add, that every Member of Parliament looks upon every Minister at least as an incapable pedant. The youth has no more any esteem for the white hairs of the old man.

This misfortune of our times, which came to its height in 1848, has not yet passed away. To it must be added the general want of proper religious feeling. Undoubtedly there has been a great improvement in this respect of late years, but there is still much to find fault with.

It is true that the way in which religion and politics have been often mixed up together, especially in Berlin, cannot conduce to the spread of true Christian feeling, but, on the other hand, the subversion of all order in the State, and the disrespect shown to every power ordained by God, has produced the most pernicious results.

The Revolution broke out in France, as we know, on the 24th of February 1848. The echo of it in Germany was more general, more sudden, and more decided, than any one had expected. If this general outburst of all political passions took the Governments completely by surprise, it came too early for those who had long been speculating on a revolution. Germany now stood lower than in the year 1848. All its rulers had lost their heads; there were signs of weakness on every side, especially on that from which the Revolution proceeded. It was the character of that time. When the Governments lay exhausted on the ground no one was in a position to seize the reins.

It was as if a ship's passengers, all landsmen, were to overpower the crew, remove the captain, and should now manage the ship themselves, without knowing anything of the sails or the mere rudiments of navigation. The ship is driven about, and in danger of sinking. Then the mutineers, of their own motion, call to their aid one sailor after another

again. But the storm has riven the best sails, the ship has lost its power of resistance and its course. The old sailors can just save their dear craft, but it is no more the trim-looking vessel it was.

Through such an experience, with few exceptions, all the German States, great and small, passed in 1848.

We have shown how the most different causes contributed materials for a conflagration in Germany, how the idea of a great German national Power was generally entertained. In the south especially a Republican party was formed, which, if numerically small, was compact, and strong in this, that they knew what they wanted. They were joined by many an enthusiast, who only cared for innovation of some kind, without troubling himself about the consequences. The example of France, the collapse of the Diet, the fault that many Governments committed in conferring rights by their constitutions which remained a dead letter, the condition of the Press and the Courts of Justice, gave occasion for well-grounded grievances; in short, there were causes enough for discontent, and the Republican party made use of them, without reflecting that the monarchical feeling was deeply rooted in Germany, that the Princes had become more closely united with their people than appeared, and that the German soldier has no equal in his sense of duty.

The assembling of a Convention in Frankfort; the attitude assumed by this little Republic, and by the Diet, which could do nothing more than unfurl the black, red-gold flag on their place of meeting; the assembling of the Parliament in St. Paul's Church on the 18th of March; the proofs that came out of the incapacity of the German professor and theorist to play the statesman; the way in which the President of this body exercised his authority, sent out his ambassadors, and received no recognition from any other

Government; its drawing up a constitution, and defining the rights of the German people,—things which never became law; its sending a deputation to the King of Prussia with the offer of the Imperial dignity, and his refusal to accept the offer; the upsetting of the whole by a murder, and its close of revolution;—all this must be in the recollection of every one who has taken any interest in the history of Germany of late years.

Already, on his accession to the throne, the King of Prussia had stirred up political life amongst his subjects; and when the provincial estates of Prussia proper and the Rhine Provinces demanded, in a somewhat stormy manner, the assembling of all the estates of the realm, which had been promised in 1815, and many towns had sent in petitions to the same purport, he summoned a general Parliament to Berlin in 1847. In March 1848, this was not considered sufficient; deputations were sent to Berlin to demand more, and this occasion was seized upon for the outbreak of a revolution.

This was on the 18th of March, and the insurrection in Berlin at that time assumed a very serious character. Polish emissaries, and many republicans, had assembled there, and organized a rising under the very eyes of the police, who had no idea of what was going on. The troops suppressed it completely.

All those who hastened to the King's aid during the commotion, counsellors for the most part incapable and officious, were panic-struck; there were, perhaps, some traitors among them. The King, alas! listened to them, and gave orders to the victorious troops to quit Berlin. He placed himself under the protection of the revolted citizens. The troops obeyed; discipline was preserved intact. The history of the Prussian army is full of glorious recollections and victories; but this

march out of Berlin ought to be written in golden letters. An army which could stand such a test as this gave thereby a sure pledge that the country and the monarchy were safe so long as it existed. The Prussian army, quite alone, saved monarchical rule in Germany. By and by the King saw the necessity of restoring order in the State, and fifty battalions of militia were called out. For these,—many of whom, as civilians, had no doubt taken part in the insurrection,—to have done their duty, is a proof that respect for authority and obedience to superiors, though they had disappeared everywhere else, continued to exist in the Prussian army, in a degree that could hardly have been expected.

In Vienna the Revolution was not so quickly organized, but it lasted there till May. As early, however, as the 14th of March, Prince Metternich was dismissed, and there, too, men had lost their heads. There were scenes of greater or less disturbance in all the small German States; in Munich and Hesse-Darmstadt there was even a change of rulers. All the Sovereigns ran a race to see who could the soonest replace his old Ministers by men of liberal views, who should be the first to grant to his revolted subjects a free Press, the right of meeting together, a public administration of the laws, the abolition of the Game Laws, and other demands, or rather extortions, of a similar nature.

The Sovereigns could not have lost their heads and succumbed in this way, if their rule had been in a healthy condition. For the storm uproots the tree only when its roots are too near the surface, or rotten. And so it was in many of these States.

Jealousy between the separate Governments, the inability of the Diet, in the smaller States a mock constitutionalism, fear of reforms at the proper time, quarrels about questions of right and prerogative, encroachments of the bureaucratic

spirit in the larger States, and the non-fulfilment of the promise of representative governments that had been given in 1815,—all these were grounds which made the work of revolution easier. The incapacity of the Ministers and higher officials was remarkably apparent.

A great advantage of the representative system consists in this, the feeling which the Ministers and higher officials have, as the session draws near, that their actions will be scrutinized and their sins of omission denounced. This is a spur to activity; it renders impossible many an abuse which would otherwise creep in. Besides this, the debates to which this system gives rise put a stop to the government of the pen, and when applied to the administration of justice, we get the inestimable advantage of publicity.

Before the year 1847 there was no representative body in Prussia. Had there been, the Prussian bureaucracy, and that specialty of Prussia, the Privy Councillors (*Geheime Räthe*) of Berlin, could never have developed as they did; incapable men could not have been made Ministers, and filled the highest places.

This was the case to a much greater extent in Austria, when, besides their incapacity, corruption had sunk the officials to a state of moral degradation.

To this was added, and it greatly paralysed the Governments in the middle and small States, that they felt the untenable nature of the Confederation as it was then constructed, that the whole fabric of public law in Germany threatened to fall to pieces, and that many dynasties were afraid of a republic—a movement from below, others of an empire of Germany—an intervention from above.

When we look back, as we are wont, to that time, and remember to have seen so many, who afterwards played the

proud aristocrat and the conservative reactionist, strutting about, musket in hand, and with a great black, red-gold cockade, hail-fellow-well-met with the very dregs of the people, we say to ourselves that it is a lucky thing for not a few that public has often a shorter memory than private opinion.

It must always be worthy of remark how Germany rose superior to this calamity, and recovered her strength. In spite of the stir and excitement, the mind of the nation at large was in a sounder condition than we might have imagined from what took place. The material and social relations were sound in themselves, and if many rotten trees were thrown down by the storm of 1848, vigorous trunks of a true German growth remained standing.

The consequence of the Berlin Revolution was, that the populace liberated from prison the Poles who had been condemned in 1846, Mierolawsky amongst them; and the Poles, out of gratitude, got up a revolt in their own country, and tried to murder all the Germans that were living there.

The entire want of energy and decision that was witnessed at Berlin had not only a dispiriting effect on the small States, which looked hopefully to Prussia's power,—Prussia herself long continued to feel it, and her politics have been injuriously affected by it. If Prussia had felt a proper self-respect at that important juncture, and, instead of surrendering, withstood the storm, the whole of Germany would have been in its power, the Imperial dignity, which was afterwards to be offered her by her inferiors, might have been the bestowment of her own superiority,—would have come of itself.

We thought at the time, and since, that Prussia could not be marked out by Providence to be the leading State in Germany, because we could not believe that a State which

let an opportunity like this pass, would find such another, and feel strong enough to make use of it. But the year 1866 has taught us that we were wrong, that the last war has given equal significance to the fortunes of Germany and of Prussia, that Prussia is the first German power, *that Prussia must become Germany*, let men call it what they will, and clothe it in what form and state they choose.

It would carry us too far to go into all the separate changes in the middle and small States of Germany. The maddest things were done; laws and constitutions were invented which were simply ridiculous and impracticable.

We will just recall the leading incidents of the years 1848 and 1849. The Republican party hoped to reach their end the sooner, if they first transformed a small principality into a model republic, and this they attempted, on the 11th of April, in Baden, under Hecker and Struve. They were dispersed by troops from Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, under General von Gagern, who was killed. The leaders escaped.

There was great party bitterness in the Parliament at Frankfort. Two Prussian members of it, Prince Lichnowsky and General von Auerswald, were killed in a popular tumult, and an insurrection broke out here, which, however, was put down. At the same time a second attempt to present the world with a German republic was made under Struve in Baden; but the troops defeated the Republicans, and Struve was captured.

In Berlin the disorder continued to increase, and blood was shed in fights between the National Guard and the working classes. The National Assembly showed more incapacity than ever, and greater hostility to the Government. The King saw that if he continued to yield he would be undone, and resolved upon a wiser course. For this purpose

he appointed a strong Ministry under Count Brandenburg and Herr von Manteuffel. The National Assembly now quite lost its head, was prorogued, was to meet at Brandenburg on the 27th November, but met, notwithstanding, at Berlin, and resolved upon resisting the payment of taxes. This resolution, however, had no serious consequences. On the 5th of December, the Assembly was dissolved, and a new constitution promulgated, which was to be laid before a newly chosen assembly of Estates, on the 25th of February.

The Holstein difficulty, and the war in Holstein in 1848 and 1849, may be touched in a few words. Though very complicated, the whole affair is so well known, that every one must have it in his memory. It is another question, whether the various claims of succession, the indivisibility of the Duchies, and their relation to Germany, are, so far as they are intelligible, generally understood. The main points were as follows :—

In the year 1448, Christian I., Count of Oldenburg, became King of Denmark ; he inherited the dukedoms of Schleswig and Holstein, and united them to Denmark. In a document of whose existence at any time there has often been great doubt, and which is said now, at any rate, to exist no longer, he gave them a promise that they should remain for ever undivided. (None the less was Holstein included in the Germanic Confederation in 1815, but not Schleswig.)

The house of Holstein-Gottorp, a branch of the Holstein-Oldenburg house, came in 1751 to the throne of Sweden, and in 1762 to that of Russia. It was driven out of Sweden by a revolution in 1809. In Russia it is the reigning dynasty to the present day ; and in 1772, by a treaty with the royal family of Denmark, the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg passed to a branch of the Russian imperial family.

Of the Holstein-Oldenburg family there are four collateral

lines in existence—Holstein, Sonderburg, Augustenburg, and Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg.

According to the old feudal system, females could reign in Denmark,—*i.e.*, on the extinction of the male line, the royal princess, next of kin, was entitled to the throne. But the Duchies were male fiefs, and with the extinction of the male line the fiefs reverted to the empire. As the empire of Germany no longer exists, we may allow the justice of the Augustenburg claims. These claims were opposed to some extent by special contracts. The Vienna Congress separated Norway from Denmark, and incorporated it by personal union with Sweden. Holstein was included in the Germanic Confederation, while Schleswig remained in connexion with Denmark.

In 1839, Frederick VI., King of Denmark, was succeeded by his nephew, Christian VIII.; and he had only one son, from whom he expected no issue. There was great probability that the line would die out, and the heir-presumptive, Prince Frederick of Hesse, who was also heir to this Electorate, married her Imperial Highness Alexandra of Russia in 1844. She died a year after the marriage.

In 1846, Christian VIII. published the so-called Open Letter, in which he arbitrarily proclaimed the right of females to the succession in Schleswig-Holstein. Had this Open Letter remained unopened, there would have been no war in Holstein in 1848.

Christian VIII. died in January 1848, and his son threw himself entirely into the hands of the Danish democratic party, and issued a common constitution for the whole kingdom, which caused the outbreak of the Revolution in Holstein.

The Duchies rose, and established a Provisional Government. The Duke of Augustenburg had recourse to the

Diet, which was lying *in extremis*, and it forthwith—the only quick thing it ever did—pronounced Schleswig-Holstein a member of the Germanic Confederation, in direct opposito to the Vienna stipulations.

The King of Prussia wished for a sphere of action for his troops—quite natural, after the scenes in Berlin, and the heroic endurance which they had shown there. Prussian, Hanoverian, Oldenburg, Hanseatic, and Mecklenburg troops came to the help of the Holsteiners.

Ships of war were wanting; the want was felt; and what required at least ten years to do, Germany accomplished in a few days. Collections were made for a German fleet, and one was hastily got together to serve the present need. Two years afterwards it came to a pitiful end by the hammer of the auctioneer.

By the direction of the Provisional Government, to which Prussia in this case submitted, an armistice was concluded at Malmö on the 27th of August. In March 1849 the armistice expired, and Denmark was the first to renew hostilities. On the 5th of April a line-of-battle ship, "Christian VIII.," was blown up by the batteries of Eckernförde, and the frigate "Gefion" surrendered. The German troops pushed on again, took the entrenchments at Düppel, fell into Jutland, and besieged Fredericia.

On the 10th of July, fear of European complications brought about another armistice, which was to last till 1st January 1850, and to this the Emperor Nicholas materially contributed. Four thousand Swedes occupied the northern part of Schleswig, as neutral troops.

The partisans of Germany in this duchy submitted to the Danish rule with extreme reluctance; they considered their obedience due to the Government for Schleswig-Holstein, which had its seat in the town of Schleswig, and looked

upon itself as still at war with Denmark, and irritation was constantly going on.

In the rest of Germany, 1849 was a year of anxiety and unrest. Gradually, however, the rulers recovered courage. In Prussia, and as a consequence in the other States, the authority of the Government, which had been completely prostrated, began to feel its strength again, and the happy results of energetic measures were seen at last.

If you touch the nettle as if you were afraid of it, it stings you; but if you squeeze it without fear in your hand, it never stings: so was it then.

The German Diet had determined what were fundamental rights, had created a theoretical federal State on paper, and wanted to give it a head. The greater part of the members were not inclined to seek for such a head in Austria; they were unwilling to incorporate the foreign elements of the Austrian empire with Germany; they wanted to form the basis of a Germany from which Austria was excluded, and then to make a treaty with this Power. It was proposed by the so-called small German party that the Imperial crown of Germany should be offered to the King of Prussia, and by a small majority (the so-called greater Germans, Austria and Bavaria, voted against it), he was elected to this hereditary dignity on the 28th of March, and on the 2d of April was informed of the resolution of the Diet. The King's answer to it was, that he could not accept the dignity without the free consent of the German Princes.

Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemberg, and Hanover refused to recognise the federal constitution. The work came to nothing.

Austria recalled her deputies; other Governments did the same; the number dwindled down to less than the 200 required to form a house; the 150 who were left went to

Stuttgart, and established the so-called Rump Parliament, till the Würtemberg authorities dissolved it.

Conflicts now broke out in many places about the recognition of the federal constitution. On the 3d of May the King of Saxony was required to recognise it, and on his refusal Dresden rose in revolt. With the help of Prussian troops, the revolt, which threatened to become serious, was suppressed.

In the Palatinate and Baden, notwithstanding the Grand-Duke's recognition of the new constitution, a serious insurrection was organized for the second time, and the troops, alas! presented the sad spectacle of a military revolt. The Grand-Duke was obliged to flee, seated on a gun, from his own soldiers. Prussian troops began to march under the Prince of Prussia. On the 25th of June Carlsruhe was occupied again, and Rastadt, which had fallen into the hands of the rebels, was surrounded, and surrendered. The revolters were scattered; most of them, especially the leaders, went to America, where, at a later period, they took a not unimportant part in its disturbances and the war.

In Prussia things were getting somewhat settled. The first assembly of the Estates, which came together on the 26th of February, was dissolved again on the 28th of April; but the Government came to an understanding with that which met in pursuance of the new electoral law of the 7th of August; a constitution was adopted, to which the King swore on the 6th of February 1850.

On the 26th of May 1849 the King of Prussia concluded with the Kings of Hanover and Saxony the so-called League of the Three Kings, which was joined by Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, and several other small States. It was a still-born child. An administrative council was established in Berlin, and a court of arbitration in Erfurt; but when

Prussia ordered the elections to take place to the Erfurt Parliament, Hanover and Saxony declared that they would not elect. Prussia moved no further in the matter. Prince Schwarzenberg was delighted, and tried by every means in his power to regain the influence of Austria in Germany.

The position of matters at Frankfort was untenable. Prussia came to an understanding with Austria, and they established a camp there, which was to administer the central authority (if one could speak of such a thing) till the 1st of May 1850. The other Governments acceded to it, and the Grand-Duke John went back to the Tyrol, and shot chamois as before: he was more fortunate in sport than in politics.

We have always looked upon the year 1850 as the saddest in the recent history of Germany. Division everywhere, the national enthusiasm had for the most part evaporated. In Prussia there was an absolute dearth of real statesmen. General von Radowitz, it is true, was clever, but wanting in energy. The bad position which Prussia took at a later period with the other German Powers, the fact that in the year 1866 the small German statesmen had no opinion of her capacity and strength, that they thought they could forthwith gainsay her and beat her down, must be laid to the defeat she always underwent whenever her statesmen and diplomatists appeared on the scene.

Prussia wanted to take the lead in Germany. She had, as a matter of fact, re-established order wellnigh throughout the whole country. The Prussian troops had been always victorious, and, in spite of all seductive influences, maintained their discipline in the most difficult circumstances; but nothing came of it all. By wishing to be at the head of the German States, and not doing it, by giving way to Austria in direct opposition to her own interests, and by her inability to take an independent course in politics, Prussia

was brought into a position which she could not safely maintain for a continuance. The then Prince of Prussia, the present King, saw that his country could only win back her position by the sword, and therefore his whole aim was directed to the improving and strengthening of the army.

Austria had also recovered; the revolution in Hungary was put down by Russian aid. By the constitution which, on the dissolution of the Diet at Kremsier, the Emperor conferred as an act of his own prerogative, a basis was laid for the unity of the whole monarchy. Prussia was unwilling to incorporate a united Austria with Germany; and Austria, cherishing more and more the idea of a great Fatherland under her headship, strove to retain her influence in Germany at any cost; hence arose of necessity a conflict between the two Governments, and it is well known how they fought with one another in and out of Germany on the field of diplomacy.

Prince Schwarzenberg, Austria's leading statesman, was the implacable enemy of Prussia, and attached the greatest importance to the influence of his country in Germany: he looked upon it as quite possible to put Prussia aside. He is said to have remarked, "We must degrade Prussia before we can annihilate her."

As we have already remarked, Prussia, Hanover, and Saxony, had formed the League of the Three Kings; but when Hanover and Saxony saw that the other Governments would not take part in a confederation from which Austria was excluded, they drew back, and in spite of the Erfurt Parliament, Prussia's plan of a union fell to the ground.

Austria looked again towards Frankfort, and, joined by some other German States, reopened the old Diet, with the view of providing for the common interests, and taking into consideration any changes that might be required, on the

basis of the federal constitution of 1815. On these changes the Diet deliberated without any result till the end of 1866, —just sixteen years!

The armistice with Denmark expired on the 1st of January 1850. Denmark had on her side the great Powers, especially Russia, which did not wish to see the Duchies separated from her. Austria played an ambiguous part. By the intervention of England, Prussia concluded a peace on the 2d of July, which provided for the rights of the Duchies and the rights of the Confederation in Holstein.

The Provisional Government of Holstein would not let Schleswig be separated from it, and resolved to fight, if necessary, in defence of the sister duchy. General Willisen commanded the Holstein army, and fought the battle of Idstedt on the 25th of July. The Danes had much the larger force on the field. The Holsteiners made an orderly retreat, and evacuated Schleswig. The Danes did not advance into Holstein, because it belonged to the Confederation.

The fate of the Duchies depended upon the issue of the general complications in Germany.

A conflict had broken out between the Elector and the Estates of Hesse-Cassel; and it went so far that payment of the taxes was refused. The Elector applied to the Diet for aid. Austria and Bavaria promised it; but Prussia would not permit such interference, and occupied Cassel and Fulda: a collision seemed inevitable.

The Emperor Nicholas saw the danger of war-threatenings in Germany. He was accustomed to look upon himself as umpire in this country, and with this view had appointed Prince Schwarzenberg and Count Brandenburg to meet him at Warsaw. He wanted to preserve the Holy Alliance at any cost, and intimated that he would take Austria's side, if Prussia began the war.

The position into which Prussia had drifted was serious enough. In case of war, Austria, Russia, the four German kingdoms, and possibly Denmark, might be arrayed against her; and what France would do in that case no one could tell.

Count Brandenburg—who was ill at the time, and died shortly afterwards—came back from Warsaw with this news. The Prussian Minister of War said that the army was not in a condition to enter upon such a war, or rather, the army itself was efficient, but it was not armed sufficiently well to meet renowned veteran troops. The effects of the needle-gun were at that time greatly underrated.

A very good army, and in tolerable fighting order, was quietly concentrated in Bohemia. The veteran Field-Marshal Radetzsky was to command it. He is said to have asserted that he considered an advance to Berlin and its capture quite within possibility, but it would be difficult to hold it. Radetzsky was decidedly against a war with Prussia.

The King of Prussia had a liking for the Emperor and for Austria, and therefore he determined to do everything to keep the peace. Herr von Manteuffel arranged a personal meeting with Prince Schwarzenberg; it took place at Olmütz on the 28th and 29th of November. The Prince proved himself Manteuffel's master in diplomacy. It was determined that Austria and Prussia would bring about the final definitive settlement of the affairs of Hesse-Cassel and Holstein by the united decision of all the German Powers. A delegate was to be appointed by the Governments that were represented in Frankfort, and also by Prussia and its allies, in order to concert measures in common for this purpose.

In Electoral Hesse, Prussia bound herself to offer no hindrance to the troops the Elector might call to his aid.

Austria and Prussia were to send joint commissioners to

Holstein, and these were to demand from the Provisional Government, in the name of the Confederation, the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of the troops below the Eider, and the reduction of the army by a third, with a threat of execution in case of refusal.

The Ministers of the different Governments were to meet for consultation in Dresden. These were the conditions of the conferences at Olmütz, and many Prussians have looked upon them as a misfortune to their country.

Several of the conditions, especially those which related to Holstein, for which Prussia had voluntarily drawn the sword, were heavy sacrifices. The consequences of Olmütz were the re-establishment of the Diet, and, later, the war of 1866.

The Prussian troops in Hesse received orders to avoid a collision. It had notwithstanding almost come to one at Bronzell; but here, too, discipline prevailed over the feelings of the soldiers, who were very excited on both sides.

Austrian troops advanced to Holstein in order to disband the Schleswig-Holstein army, and three commissioners, Austrian, Prussian, and Danish, undertook the administration of the duchy. Schleswig was forthwith given back to Denmark, and in 1852 the Danish rule there was again in full operation. A number of officers, officials, clergymen, professors, and teachers, had to seek a livelihood in Germany, and through the generosity of the Governments, the towns, and many private persons, they succeeded in finding it.

From first to last the Schleswig-Holstein war is a sorrowful episode The German love of country must have been very strong in the Duchies, and the Danish Government must have acted with exceptional want of prudence and foresight; otherwise the Holsteiners would have had cause

enough to let their love of Germany grow cold, and to lose all faith in their Fatherland.

In 1850, Austria, Russia, England, and France had drawn up a written agreement to guarantee the integrity of Denmark.

In 1852 the Treaty was made which regulated the succession to the throne in Denmark,—a Treaty well known under the name of the London Protocol.

The Duke of Augustenburg, whom Denmark looked upon as a rebel, gave up his possessions, and received two million dollars as compensation. He renounced for himself and his descendants all claims on the succession in the Duchies; his two sons seemed to consent to the arrangement, and were silent about it. Prince Christian of Holstein-Glücksburg was recognised as heir to the whole Danish monarchy, and at once adopted by the King of Denmark.

Prussia signed this Treaty. The Confederation, which was then considered of but little importance, was not asked to do so. Denmark engaged to the German Powers that she would recognise the Estates of Schleswig and Holstein, and put no obstructions to the use of the German language. That, in her arrant folly, she did not observe these engagements, that the democratic Danish party behaved badly to the Duchies, especially to Schleswig, no one can deny; and it was clear that a new war would arise.

In the year 1851 Hanover concluded a treaty with Prussia, whereby she engaged to join the Zollverein in 1854. This was the last official act of King Ernest Augustus. He died on the 18th of November 1851. His successor, George V., was blind when he came to the throne; and in his time, fifteen years later, Hanover ceased to exist as an independent kingdom.

The question whether a blind prince is capable of reign-

ing, was much mooted at that time in and out of Hanover, and there is some ground for saying that there was a certain connexion between this question and the entrance into the Zollverein.

The Dresden Conferences led to the re-establishment of the Confederation, and Prussia relinquished all her schemes for union. Austria drew her pen through the new constitution without further ado.

The French Republic was drawing near to its end. On the 2d of December 1852, Louis Napoleon took possession of the Imperial crown; and an era of peace dawned upon Europe.

The German Powers tried to recover from the panic of 1848, and to undo much which in their over-haste they had done. The struggle between Prussian and Austrian diplomacy began again in the different Courts, and was quietly carried on.

The idea which called into existence the Confederation and the Holy Alliance, and which all conservative diplomatists have to the very last looked upon as the only means of securing the balance of power in Europe and the prosperity of Germany, the brotherly concert, namely, of Austria and Prussia, was never more than a pious wish, an illusion, and must so remain. History, traditions, interests, religion, education, everything severs these two powers from one another. They have nothing in common but their language in part, and even in this the difference is very great.

Up to 1848, the jealousy between Austria and Prussia did not reach the mass of the people, it was only a contest of statesmen at the Courts and the Diet. But from that time the discussions in the Frankfort Parliament showed that there was a Prussian and an Austrian party amongst the German people.

When the efforts that were made for unity between 1848 and 1852 remained fruitless, and all hope of it was gone, this contest was renewed at every Council-chamber and in the public Press. By the Revolution, and still more by the weakness of the Government, everything of a conservative nature, all the privileges of the nobility, and many too of the municipalities and corporations, had been violently suppressed; the Revolution was checked only at the foot of the throne. The States were shaken in their feeling of security. Every one, were he high or low, felt that the Confederation could not be maintained, that the struggle between Austria and Prussia must one day be fought out.

The conservative elements, the reigning houses, inclined to Austria, because they had the idea, in the north especially, that the Emperor was the natural protector of the small dynasties, and would cross the scheme of Prussia. Prussia was always looked upon as the aggressive Power, because every one felt that it *must be greater*, if it was not to go down entirely. The catastrophe of 1866 must be attributed very greatly to the want of self confidence amongst most of the other German Governments.

French Imperialism also exercised a detrimental influence upon Germany. Many a Government official pictured himself as a German prefect after the French pattern; and many a director of police took the arbitrary French system for his ideal. There were German statesmen in numbers who, with the conviction that order must be firmly established, would have copied the imperial model, and set up, under colour of the monarchical principle, a system of government as unwise as it was opposed to the German character.

In the year 1853, the King of Prussia, who could never get rid of the Holy Alliance notions, and thought it quite essential that the two chief German Powers should move and act

in concert, had some interview with the Emperor of Austria. In 1854 came the expansion of the Zollverein or Customs' Union.

The complications in the East became serious; the thunder-clouds which had been gathering there for the last twenty years threatened to burst.

Napoleon wanted to achieve for his dynasty and his country another position. The one which France had received by the Treaties of 1815, and every reminder of the Vienna Congress, which had declared his uncle an outlaw, could not be agreeable to him; it was quite natural therefore that his whole political action should be directed to cancel, as far as possible, the Vienna Treaties. Above all, the Holy Alliance, which showed already signs of dissolution, he must get rid of entirely.

Though a war for the Rhine-boundary would have tended directly to set the Vienna Treaties aside, and been more popular in France than a war in the East, it had a dangerous look about it. Such a war in the middle of Europe, provoked wantonly and without cause, might bring about a coalition, and remind people that the Napoleon family was under a ban of outlawry. The Emperor laid great stress on the alliance with England. The resources of both countries had immensely increased; together they had the undoubted command of the sea; and the French statesmen thought that if they gained such results with the help of England, the interests of France would be thereby materially promoted. At first this was the case, and after the Crimean War Napoleon held an important position in Europe, which has been very considerably modified by the war in Italy, the expedition to Mexico, and the war which was carried on in Germany without the interference of France.

Napoleon knew well enough that the jealousy of Austria

and Prussia had gone too far for them to act in concert in any war which was not a direct attack upon the Germanic Confederation, and that the political action of the Confederation itself was not to be thought of in any case.

If Austria and Prussia had been able to come to an understanding—and owing to the want of sincere co-operation, and the dissensions in the country, the power of Germany and her influence in the larger European questions had not been so insignificant—the war in the East would hardly have broken out.

The French diplomatists were clever enough to make use of the discontent of the Roman Catholic population in Turkey, and had made every preparation for the war. England's disinclination to see the Russian rule extended eastwards was an old diplomatic tradition, and notwithstanding the country was against it, an alliance with France was brought about.

When England and France allied themselves against Russia, and tried to bring Austria and Prussia into the coalition, Prussia remained so far firm to the alliance which existed between herself and Russia, as to observe a friendly neutrality towards this Power. Austria, on the contrary, was so short-sighted as (you may use a common saying) to sit between two stools.

The Austrian statesmen did not understand that the Italian provinces, and a predominant influence alike on the Danube and in Germany, were too much for Austria's strength. The stupid course which they pursued at that time laid the foundation for all the misfortune the poor empire had to suffer in the next twelve years. It cannot be denied that the interests of Austria clashed with those of Russia on the Danube, and that the question of the Principalities was a difficult one for Austria. The traditional policy in the East is very like that

of England—the maintenance of the power of Turkey at any cost. It is certainly not the right policy for either country, but for Austria still less than for England, as of the two her material and commercial interests are thereby affected to a much greater extent.

When peace was seriously threatened, the Austrian statesmen had to decide whether, true to the Holy Alliance, they would take Russia's side, and come to an understanding with her on the questions of Turkey and the Principalities, or make an alliance with the Western Powers, and get the Italian provinces guaranteed to them as a compensation for their assistance on the Danube. Had Austria taken and pursued one of these two directions, whatever the result of the war, she would have brought an important weight to bear upon the negotiations for peace. She would not ally herself directly with the Western Powers, and observed a hostile neutrality towards Russia. An army of 150,000 men was concentrated on the Russian frontier, but remained inactive. Prussia kept friendly to Russia, but neutral, and disapproved the policy of Austria.

German commerce flourished during and after the Crimean War, and a spur was given to German industry, especially in the States which had joined the Zollverein. There were many rash undertakings; a fever broke out for setting banks and ironworks on foot, which had something good and useful in it, but produced afterwards a terrible money crisis; and in the political world was observed a movement and restlessness hitherto unknown in Germany.

Prussia had to suffer another humiliation, viz., the defection of Neufchâtel. It was an old possession of the Hohenzollern, and Frederick I. had inherited it in 1707. A hundred years later it was ceded to France, and demanded back in 1814. In a sort of mongrel position it was added as the

Twenty-second Canton to Switzerland. But it kept its old government, which was administered in the name of the King of Prussia.

The waves of the Revolution of 1848 reached Switzerland, and the Republic was founded on new principles, the separate cantons being subordinated to the central government in Berne. The rule of Prussia was put aside, and her protests produced no effect. At the Paris Conferences in 1856 the plenipotentiaries of the Great Powers recognised the sovereign rights of Prussia in Neufchâtel.

As Switzerland took no notice of this, the adherents of the King of Prussia in Neufchâtel determined to take the matter into their own hands, and in the night of the 2d of September 1856 Count Pourtalès and Colonel Meuran hoisted the black and white flag, and organized a revolt.

Some battalions of Swiss troops that were exercising in the neighbourhood were called in to put it down, which they did, and captured the ringleaders, who were to be tried for high treason.

At this point the King of Prussia was obliged to interfere, and a Prussian corps was ordered to Switzerland. The Diet (and there is no stronger proof of the beggarly condition to which it was reduced) allowed itself to be overruled by Austria, and refused the Prussian troops the right of march.

The King accepted the mediation of the Emperor Napoleon. The prisoners in Neufchâtel were set at liberty, and the canton remained Swiss. The Swiss Diet offered the King a million dollars, but he refused to take them.

This sad affair, at which every German must blush, is said to have deeply affected King Frederick-William IV. After this no one either in or out of Germany could doubt for a moment that the contest between Austria and Prussia must be fought out. Prussia's not taking part in the struggle of

Austria with Italy and France three years later, must be attributed to the false policy, the sneaking enmity and jealousy, which marked the whole of Austria's conduct towards Prussia.

The King of Prussia was attacked by an affection of the brain. The Prince of Prussia assumed the regency of the kingdom, and great hopes were inspired by his rule. A liberal Ministry began a new system, called the New Era, which failed because the greater number of the representatives of the country lost themselves in theories, and would not be convinced of the necessity of a new organization of the army, and because the Government partly allowed themselves to be led away by the theories, whilst on the other side the Prince Regent persisted in what he regarded as indispensable for the reorganization of the army. The Ministry of the New Era awakened great expectations throughout Germany, and a feeling of unity and nationality was roused in all classes, though it assumed every variety of form and colour.

In Hanover, a short-sighted Ministry, which did great harm from a false zeal for the monarchical principle, had caused the various elements of the opposition to combine, and these founded the so-called National Society, which spread through the whole of Northern Germany. This Society declared at once that the Confederation did not satisfy them, and that a constitutional feudal State must be established under the headship of Prussia. It was a revival of the so-called Gotha party, with a somewhat deeper democratical colouring.

The National Society wanted first to hold a larger assembly in Eisenach, and, when that did not succeed, went to Frankfort. They also met in Coburg; were at first warmly supported there by the Duke of Coburg-Gotha, and might have become of great importance if the reorganization

of Germany had been destined to be brought about, not by war, but by revolution.

At a later period some short-sighted, well-meaning conservatives founded the Great-German Society, which was to stand by the rights of the Confederation, and support the influence of Austria in Germany. This Society has done much harm by drawing many peaceful elements into the whirl of political agitation. In Hanover especially it led to much political confusion, and to mistaken views on many questions of politics and political geography.

Subsequently, when a Ministry of action under Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen conducted the war in Holstein, and the struggle was raging with the House of Representatives in Berlin, especially that about the right of succession of the Augustenburgs, both these Societies, the Great-German one particularly, quarrelled amongst themselves.

Whoever has observed Germany attentively for the last twelve years must confess that things could not go on as they were. If there had not been so much material prosperity, and so much intelligence, especially in the lower classes, if society had not been in general in a sound and healthy condition, a revolution must have broken out.

On the 1st of January 1859, the Emperor Louis Napoleon addressed the Austrian ambassador in a manner that betrayed hostile intentions. The whole of Europe became alarmed; Austria armed, Italy made great efforts, and an army was got together in France to throng to her aid.

England and Prussia were eager to mediate; even Russia aided their endeavours; and it appeared as if the quarrel might be adjusted by a Congress.

Prussia had promised assistance to Austria under certain conditions. The Archduke Albrecht came to Berlin and negotiated. He gave his word, honestly on his part, that

no attack on Italy was intended; and yet Austria took the offensive.

There was great excitement in Germany, especially in the south; and in all the middle States war against France was looked on as a duty.

Prussia has been reproached over and over again for having betrayed the Fatherland, in that she did not at once take part in the war. We looked upon her conduct as quite natural at the time. Austria, in her blindness, obstinately refused to comply with the Prussian demand for the chief command of the German troops north of the Main. In the distrust which existed between Vienna and Berlin, Prussia must be assured that she did not bring war into her own territories, and then possibly have to look on whilst Austria made peace with France.

When the war in Italy threatened to enter the limits of the Germanic Confederation, Prussia and the other German States made serious preparations to meet it. Six Prussian divisions were in marching order, when, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, the peace of Villafranca put an end to the war.

The conduct of it by Austria has been already sufficiently characterized by military writers; in a political point of view, she made still greater mistakes. The peace of Villafranca could only be justified if it had been followed by an alliance, offensive and defensive, between Austria and France. Any one might easily have perceived that the state of things brought about by this peace, and that which followed at Zürich, was untenable for Italy. The state of illusion with respect to Italy, in which Austrian statesmen have always lived, is quite inconceivable.

Austria and her friends made Prussia responsible for her defeats and for this miserable peace.

The feeling against Prussia, in the Austrian army especially, was very hostile. After the war, the demonstrations in favour of German unity were renewed, and to a greater extent. Gymnastic and singing clubs, societies of naturalists and lawyers,—everything must be pressed into the national service; even the Schiller festival was in reality for no other purpose. The idea of the National Society was a constitutional federal State under the headship of Prussia, with the exclusion of Austria; that of the Great-German Association is more difficult to define. Around the maintenance and improvement of the Confederation hovered a misty and general notion of Austria's influence, and a German empire, under the headship of Austria. The basis of both these parties was the idea of unity, as well as that of the third, the Republicans, who were more numerous in Germany than was generally thought, especially in the south, and wherever there was much intercourse with America. In the Hanse Towns, consequently, this party was strongly represented.

After the war in Italy, Austria seemed to put forth new vigour; at least, this was carefully represented to be the case by herself and her friends. On the 20th of October 1860, the Emperor had once more given a common constitution to his dominions, and it was thought that a liberal Ministry would set everything to rights. Her credit rose for the moment, and throughout Germany confidence in the stability and the future of Austria increased to a remarkable degree.

Prussia was apparently much weakened by the conflict that was going on with the House of Representatives, the change of Ministry that it caused, and internal division. A Ministry under Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen succeeded that of Count Schwerin and Prince Hohenzollern. The conflict with the House of Representatives became still more bitter, so that in May 1863 it had to be dissolved. Moreover,

Prussia made a Commercial Treaty with France without the consent of the other States included in the Zollverein, whose assistance (it was to be renewed in 1865) seemed thereby endangered. Both at the Courts and amongst the people, Prussia was in very bad odour.

Austria tried her utmost to get the small and middle States on her side. The latter had at their head partly theorists, like Von der Pfordten, partly clever men, like Beust, who had, however, quite lost the measure of his own and Saxony's power, and partly statesmen utterly ignorant of their craft. Herr von der Pfordten, if he did not invent, made use of the idea of the Triad, *i.e.*, the theoretical division into three parts, which Prussia afterwards carried practically out in quite another fashion.

This idea, at variance as it was with the comparative strength of the different States, was such as a tedious professor might talk his pupils to sleep about, but which no wise practical statesman would entertain for a moment, because it was perfectly evident that so many German Governments would never hold actually together, and if they did so that they could never be strong enough to resist Prussia or Austria. Then Von der Pfordten thought that if the German States were divided into three groups, Bavaria would exercise the greatest influence in that of the small and middle States, and that this group would be able to bend Austria or Prussia to itself at will, and thereby gain great influence in Germany.

Conferences were held by the Ministers of the middle States at Bamberg and Würzburg, at which Baron Beust played a very prominent part. Hanover now joined, now stood aloof from this policy; and the consequence of this playing fast and loose was, that she had nowhere a real friend and confederate. We don't know all that was said

and done at these conferences; and this probably is lucky for the credit of German statesmanship and diplomacy.

On the 12th of August 1862 the so-called Delegate scheme was brought as a proposition before the Diet. Delegates from the different assemblies of Estates were to meet and discuss two Bills relating to actions in the Civil Courts and the rights of bond-holders, but without any power of making them law. This scheme was supported by Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Würtemburg, Electoral Hesse, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau.

Herr von Bismarck, on the other hand, got the minority to vote, in the sitting of the 18th of December 1862, that the new Federal Constitution satisfied neither the just wishes of Germany nor the claims which Prussia had a right to assert; and this was supported by a declaration of the Prussian Minister to the Diet on the 22d of January 1863. He represented that the Delegate scheme was a mere illusion, and as such nothing worth; if it were not so, then there was the danger of a large majority in population and political and military power having to submit to a combination of votes which represented a decided minority in strength and numbers. Their efforts should be directed, not to increase faults, but to remove them. As regarded the representation, only such a one could be considered by the German nation the proper instrument for dealing with the general interests, as was based upon the free choice and numerical strength of the population in each Federal State.

Against the insidious attempt of Austria and the Coalition to force their measures through by means of a vote of the majority, Prussia formally protested, on the ground that for such a resolution a unanimous vote was required. Bismarck had determined, if necessary, to recall the Prussian Envoy to the Diet, in order to guard the Confederation.

Hanover and Electoral Hesse separated from the Coalition; Austria meditated revenge for this defeat, and her next move was to summon the Congress of reigning Princes.

Never have Austria's statesmen shown greater incapacity than in the year 1863, when they advised the Emperor to call a meeting of the German monarchs in Frankfort on the 18th of August, without having come to an understanding with Prussia, and being sure that the King of Prussia would attend it. If they intended to exclude or isolate Prussia, they could not do it in this way without involving themselves in a war. They overrated Austria's political power in comparison with Prussia, as it appeared on their despatches, just as the Austrian generals did three years later on the battle-field.

The Emperor of Austria's playing the Emperor of Germany at Frankfort, without being it, and the German Princes debating and resolving on a reform of the Confederation, without carrying it through, was a hard blow for Austria's position in Germany, and a harder one for Germany's sovereigns. The King of Prussia refused the Emperor's invitation, which certainly came to him too late; neither did he accept that of the collected Princes, which the King of Saxony brought him to Baden. The resolution of the Congress was afterwards imparted to the King of Prussia, and he was asked to accede to it, but, as might be expected, he did not comply with this request.

He must be a mere child in politics, a visionary, an idealist, or a German professor, who could believe it possible, by peaceful means, without revolution or war, to reform the Confederation and put anything better in its place after this ill-advised and fruitless attempt.

Prussia answered Austria's project of the Delegates by bringing forward the plan of a Parliament based on uni-

versal suffrage—one of several schemes which Herr von Bismarck then announced and afterwards put in execution.

Soon after the Congress of Sovereigns this statesman did a master-stroke of diplomacy, by drawing nearer to Austria at the same time that he made use of her for his designs against Denmark. The blindness with which Austria fell into this snare is quite inexplicable.

Denmark had contrived to make herself very unpopular in the Duchies. The Democratical party in Copenhagen had the power in their hands. They wanted to incorporate Schleswig entirely, and to make the Eider the boundary of the Danish monarchy. The engagements which Denmark had undertaken were not kept.

Public opinion in Germany took the side of the oppressed Duchies, and the unpopular Governments of the middle States hoped to make themselves popular again by advocating the rights of the Duchies, with a certain loudness of manner, but without much success.

The Diet amused itself for ten years with this question, and only took it seriously up when, on the 30th of March 1863, Holstein was excluded from the common constitution of the Danish monarchy, and Schleswig actually incorporated with it. On the 1st of October the long-threatened execution against Denmark, of occupying Holstein with Federal troops, was formally resolved upon. Saxony and Hanover furnished 12,000 men, Austria and Prussia a reserve of 25,000.

On the 16th of November 1863, Frederick VII., King of Denmark, died quite suddenly. In compliance with the terms of the London Protocol of the 20th of May 1852, Christian, Duke of Glücksburg, mounted the Danish throne.

A rising of the populace in Copenhagen compelled the King, on the second day of his rule, the 18th of November, to confirm the constitution of the kingdom.

The Hanoverian and Saxon troops, under the Saxon general Von Hake, advanced into Holstein, and it was evacuated by the Danes as being a member of the Confederation.

To the question how far the Treaties of 1851 and 1852 had been observed was added that of the right of succession. According to German law females are incapable of reigning in any German State, consequently in the German Federal State of Holstein.

Herr von Bismarck, a man of remarkable gifts as a statesman, and, moreover, determined, regardless of all cost, to raise the position of Prussia in Germany, got the idea that a war about the Duchies would be the best means to gain his end. To get possession of Kiel harbour and the Eider Canal was ground enough to make him covet, and by all means in his power compass, the acquisition of Holstein; and we have never understood how Austria could be so shortsighted as to suffer herself to be drawn into this war. She did it with the idea that Prussia should not play the game alone, and that she could upset it when it was won.

The hereditary Prince of Augustenburg, notwithstanding his father's renunciation of his rights, came forward as a pretender to the throne of the Duchies, went to Kiel under a false name, with the help of some Hamburg merchants set up a sort of Court there, with a liberal Ministry, and acknowledged the Constitution of 1848.

The Diet appointed two Commissioners, one Saxon and the other Hanoverian, who were to conduct a Provisional Government in its name.

The Prince of Augustenburg was received by the people of Holstein with acclamation as Duke Frederick VIII., and deputations poured in to him from all sides. The nobility alone, partly not thinking him of sufficient importance, and

partly offended with him because he acknowledged the Constitution of 1848, and surrounded himself with persons whom they disliked, opposed him,—were in favour at first of a personal union with Denmark, but declared later for Prussia. Austria and Prussia, as subscribers to the London Protocol, had acknowledged King Christian, but the middle States stood upon the rights of the Confederation, and took most the Augustenburg side, though for very different reasons. The whole of the liberal and democratic press used the occasion for violent writing; it was a welcome theme for all popular speakers.

If it be true that the art of diplomacy consists in concealing one's real intentions as much as possible, this Holstein question, the war, the negotiations with the Diet, the negotiations in London, the peace—in short, everything relating to the Danish war—must be looked upon as a diplomatic master-stroke.

Denmark entered upon a war at such immense odds with a levity which would be utterly inexplicable, if she had not hoped for support from the great Powers, especially from England.

There was great sympathy with Denmark in England, particularly as the Prince of Wales had married the daughter of King Christian; and from the tone in which Lord Russell and the English diplomatists dealt with the question at first, it was impossible to avoid the conclusion that England intended to take Denmark under its protection.

Prussia and Austria determined, as the two leading German Powers, and without troubling themselves about the Confederation, to take possession of Schleswig, that they might have a security by means of which to compel Denmark to fulfil the engagements she had undertaken towards

Denmark could not stand against the allied troops. The war had begun on the 1st of February 1864; the Danewerk, upon which such large sums had been expended, had to be evacuated. The Prussian and Austrian troops everywhere did their duty; and the Danes fought with great bravery and endurance in the most unfavourable circumstances. The Danish navy did less than was expected.

After the storming of the fortifications of Düppel by the Prussians, an armistice was concluded, and then followed the Conference in London, at which Baron Beust represented the Confederation.

At this Conference, Denmark might very easily have saved the northern half of Schleswig, and made peace on much more favourable terms than she afterwards obtained. But the King of Denmark could not, as yet, emancipate himself sufficiently from the influence of the democratic element in Cophenhagen. The obstinacy of Denmark caused the negotiations to fall through.

The armistice had run out on the 20th of June, and on the 25th, General Herwath von Bittenfeld stormed the island of Alsen, which the Danes considered impregnable without a fleet. The Prussians would also have gone over to Fühnen; but Austria, who had already entered Jutland much against her will, refused to co-operate with them. The language of the Press too, in Austria and the middle States, showed with what an evil eye the success of Prussia was regarded.

Very pitiable was the position of the Saxon and Hanoverian federal troops in Holstein. They had to look on whilst the Austrians and Prussians were led past them to victory; and there were very unpleasant collisions in some places,—Rendsburg amongst the rest.

If Hanover had followed a different line of policy at that

time, and, as her wisdom would have been, taken the side of Prussia, she would have saved her troops the scenes in Rendsburg, and her brave army, at a later period, that saddest episode in her history, the battle of Langensalza. Instead of this, she played fast and loose by turns with Austria and Prussia, intrigued against the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg, and did everything she could to make her political position untenable.

The two Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and also the little territory of Lauenburg, were ceded by Denmark to Austria and Prussia, as co-ordinate possessors, in the Peace of Vienna, October 30, 1864.

This was certainly a peculiar relation for these two Powers to be placed in. For Prussia the possession of the Duchies was of infinite value, for Austria of none at all; she could not think of keeping a part for herself, and yet of all things she grudged them to Prussia. At first, too, Austria would not let the Diet have any say in the matter, and she kept many pretenders in readiness, intending to press their claims, if Prussia became too troublesome.

The whole of the liberal, democratic, and republican party in Germany, had for very different reasons given its support to the Augustenburg claims. The Parliament in Frankfort took the matter up, exercised a pressure on the different assemblies of Estates, and these again on their Princes.

The Grand-Duke of Oldenburg also put forward claims to the succession. Prussia made the following formal memorandum of its wishes with respect to Holstein on the 18th of February 1865 :—"The possession of Kiel harbour, and the power of making fortifications at Sonderburg and Düppel, as well as the right of cutting a canal from the Baltic to the North Sea, and that of uniting Holstein to Prussia."

The plans of Austria were not so clearly defined; but she seemed to incline by degrees to the Augustenburg claims. On the 5th of March she refused to accede to Prussia's demands of February, and added that she could no longer take part in negotiations which gave no hope of a definite agreement. The Duke of Augustenburg, encouraged by this declaration, also, strange to say, rejected the demands of Prussia.

Now the Holstein question retired into the background; Prussia had sent in her ultimatum, and been refused; the struggle for supremacy in Germany took the prominent place, and was inevitable.

The enemies of Prussia, and they had wonderfully increased of late, underrated her power. They thought that she would go on as she had done since 1850, make a noise with the sabre, and, if things became serious, sheathe it again; they calculated on her internal quarrels, and her apparent isolation in Europe.

Shortly after he took office, Herr von Bismarck determined either to come to an understanding with Austria about the affairs of the Confederation, or to do away with it altogether. Austria opposed him from the beginning.

Herr von Bismarck declared quite openly that the relations of Prussia and Austria must be either better or worse, and that Prussia could not allow measures directly hostile to herself to be brought forward at the Diet,—as the Delegate scheme, and the *ruse* of outvoting her,—would rather retire from the Confederation altogether.

Austria made the utmost efforts to scheme against Prussia at the German Courts. The middle States did not feel quite safe; but hoped with Austria's aid to weaken the influence of Prussia in Germany.

During the first three months after the refusal of Prussia's

demands, it did not appear from Bismarck's conduct that he had any plan ready for adoption.

The experiment of putting forward the Grand-Duke of Oldenburg as a candidate for the Duchies, the unwillingness to summon their Estates to meet, the offence Oldenburg took at the Duke of Augustenburg's mock rule, and consequent demand that he should leave the country, as well as the negotiations that were perpetually recurring on the basis of the February-demands, were all mere diplomatic contrivances; and they were put a stop to by the decided declaration of Prussia, on the 22d of July, that she intended to insist upon her demands of the 22d of February.

The breach was widened every hour, and the breaking out of the war was only a question of time. Strangely enough, the statesmen of the middle States did not see this, and most of them thought, as late as the spring of 1866, that the war would be avoided.

Count Bismarck—he had been raised by the King to this rank—looked to Italy. He saw that if he would carry out his plans for Prussia, he must pursue the policy of nationalities, and that this would draw Prussia and Italy together. There had been negotiations with Italy so early as 1863, and they had been interrupted by the war in Holstein: now was the time for them to be renewed.

It is by the conservatives that Count Bismarck has been most severely reproached for the Italian alliance; and the conservative press, which had formerly cried out against Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi as robbers, was quite bewildered when this alliance became a fact, and its advantage to Prussia could not be gainsaid.

That Prussia, if it came to a war, must wish to divide Austria's strength, and that Italy, which could no longer reckon on the assistance of France, should avail herself of a

war between Austria and Prussia to press forward to the Adriatic, was quite natural under the circumstances; and it is for the interests of both countries that the alliance should continue.

Prussia made no secret now of her determination not to give up Kiel harbour, and military preparations were gradually made.

In Salzburg, on the 25th of July, Herr von Bismarck spoke without any reserve to the former Professor and then Bavarian Minister, Von der Pfordten. If the rest of Germany would only be sensible enough to play the part of a passive spectator, the duel between Austria and Prussia might be fought out.

Austrian diplomacy succeeded for the moment at Gastein in putting off the struggle. The Gastein Convention surprised all the world, standing, as it did, in direct opposition to Bismarck's demands. It engendered the belief that his policy was one rather of menace than of deeds; and this conviction contributed very materially to the strange underrating of Prussia's power and projects.

Austria and the Duke of Augustenburg thought that it was still open to them to accept the conditions of February in the beginning of 1866. Austria went quietly on, and in her secret circular despatch of the 16th of March, called upon the middle States that were friendly to her to prepare at once for war. Saxony complied with this call.

On the 24th of March, Prussia propounded her ideas on the reform of the Confederation; and at the meeting of the Diet on the 9th of April she moved the resolution on the subject of which she had given notice.

The treaty of alliance between Prussia and Italy was concluded on the 8th of April. It did not bind either power to declare, but in case of war, both of them were to

carry it on in conjunction till Austria acceded to the Prussian proposals of reform, and to the annexation of Venice to the kingdom of Italy. After this, Austria and Prussia played a game of diplomacy about arming and disarming.

In the middle of May, Prussia was to have opened negotiations once more in Vienna, on the questions of Holstein and the Federal army. This overture for an understanding was most strangely rejected by Austria.

While both sides were arming with all their might, Austria made her well-known proposal of the 1st of June in Frankfort, and, as the Holstein Estates were summoned to meet at the same time, in the Duchies as well. Prussia replied on the 10th of June with her principles of a Federal Constitution, by which Austria was excluded from the German Confederation. On the 14th of June follows the dissolution of the Confederation, in consequence of the Diet's acceptance of Austria's proposal to put the Federal army on a war footing.

Many have denied it, but as the circumstances then were, this vote could only be looked upon as a party move in favour of Austria. The States that voted for this resolution must have known that the war would break out, and that they would be regarded as Prussia's enemies. Though one were ever so friendly or hostile to Prussia, one could not be blind to the fact that she declared beforehand most clearly and frankly in what light she would regard this vote, and how she would act in consequence of it.

The boldness with which the middle States suffered themselves to be drawn into the war, instead of letting it be a duel between Austria and Prussia, must be quite unintelligible to every one who did not know and watch public feeling in Germany at that time.

Prussia was still suffering from the consequences of the

weakness which the Government showed in the country itself in 1848, and afterwards in its foreign diplomacy. The various armings and disarmings, threatening, and not carrying out her threats, the illogical character of her representative system, the (as Count Bismarck himself quite rightly expressed it) most unwise and dangerous electoral law, the system of three classes, but united with a firm military rule, the old customs of all her officials, believing that they belonged to a purely absolute State, a liberal Ministry, which came into collision with the constitutional organization that had not taken root, and existed only on paper,—all this was prejudicial to the political credit of Prussia.

On the formation of a Ministry under Herr von Bismarck-Schönhausen, who was preposterously cried out against as a reactionist and ultra-conservative, mistrust and discontent increased in and out of Prussia. The liberal party were thoroughly opposed to Count Bismarck and his system of government; and hence the feeling which found its expression in innumerable addresses in deprecation of war.

The German States had all naturally taken part against Prussia, because they were afraid that her power would grow at their expense. One result of this was, that they accounted Prussia much weaker than she was, and thought that Austria, with their help, could conquer her.

By many, too, the probability of French interference was entertained. This we consider too humiliating for any German to think of; and every Government that cherished such thoughts, every dynasty that gave way to them, deserved to fall.

We can hardly conceive it possible, but Austrian diplomatists and agents had filled all Germany with the notion that the Austrian army surpassed the Prussian in every respect,—in numbers, capacity, and readiness for war; so

that those who voted at the Diet on the 14th of June were firmly convinced that it would be a short, and, for Austria, a victorious war. They forgot the war in Italy, the discontent and jealousy of the different nationalities that constitute the Austrian Empire, the superiority of the Prussian arms, and many other things which told against Austria.

If Austria had not so strangely overrated her own strength; if she had seen that it was impossible for her to retain Venice after its separation from Lombardy; if, before Italy made an alliance with Prussia, she had treated about its cession with Italy and France, and then united herself closely and energetically with the German middle States, she might have brought Prussia into the greatest danger, for in this case France would probably have come to her assistance.

Apart from other grounds, as difficulties in Algeria, the absence of her troops in Mexico, anxiety about complications with America, and the Emperor's state of health, the neutrality of France must be attributed to this especially—that the Emperor had no belief in what turned out to be the marvellous success of Prussia, that he reckoned upon a long indecisive struggle, upon civil war in Germany, and then hoped to come in with a decisive word.

Bavaria had zealously adopted the Triad policy of Herr von der Pfordten; and, notwithstanding that the Prussian reform propositions had given her an important position in the lead of the Southern States, and were very well received in the country, she did not like to separate herself entirely from Austria; and, in doubt about the seriousness of Prussia's intentions, she let herself be drawn into the war, but, as was afterwards seen, against her will.

Saxony had already engaged herself in close alliance to Austria, and fulfilled all her engagements; her whole army was fully equipped, and ready for fighting; and in case it

would have to leave Saxony, and, as happened shortly, retire into Bohemia, due measures had been taken for carrying on the government of the country. Saxony consequently is the only one of the middle States that pursued a definite plan and a definite policy, and every one must respect the bearing of her King both during and after the war. The Saxon army, too, won the greatest esteem by the Prussians who fought against it; and marvellous was the rapidity with which it was newly organized after its return home. Every one was surprised at the announcement made by the Crown Prince of Saxony at Berlin on the 1st of April 1867, that the Saxon Federal contingent was in a state of readiness and complete equipment.

Würtemberg showed a decided zeal against Prussia, which may be traced to the old antipathy of the Suabians, and anti-Prussian influence at the Court.

Hanover, alas! pursued a most short-sighted policy. No one has more deeply or more truly lamented the fate of the old Guelph dynasty, and of the country, than we. It is quite natural that the son should witness with most melancholy feelings the fate of the land to whose strength and symmetry his father so materially contributed. But pain and sorrow must not be allowed to dim our judgment.

When we think of the unfortunate summer of 1866, we sincerely regret that the advisers of George V. had neither the courage nor the political wisdom to save him from the destruction to which he was hastening with great infatuation, though with the firm conviction that he was doing his duty faithfully to his country and his family.

When the storm gathered in the spring of this year, the King was surrounded by a Ministry which was supported by no party in the country, and had no one's confidence.

Up to the middle of May the Government felt—and in

this they were supported by public opinion—that Hanover must remain neutral; and no one seriously thought that any other policy would be followed. In the beginning of May, Councillor Zimmermann, a person for many years of very considerable weight in political matters, was in Hanover, and a treaty of neutrality was almost concluded with Prussia, when Prince Carl Solms arrived, and the King went over entirely to the side of Austria. The negotiations about neutrality were given up; Councillor Zimmermann lost, we regret to say, all his influence, and returned to Hamburg.

The Ministers followed the King without opposition, and looked upon themselves only as his blind instruments, not as responsible advisers. Notwithstanding the serious look of the times, and that the Estates of the realm were now assembled, the King took no counsel with them, or with any other person of consideration.

It cannot be denied that Prussia very openly represented the danger to which the King would expose himself if he did not remain neutral. Afterwards Prussian statesmen must have congratulated themselves immensely on having gained so unexpected and important an addition to the kingdom. But at that time very great significance was attached to the neutrality of Hanover; and it would have been easy for her to make very good conditions as the price of it.

The contest was to be decided in Bohemia. Prussia was fully alive to the seriousness of the struggle. Her whole object was, not to dissipate the strength of her army, to defeat Austria, and to avoid a civil war.

The consequence of the defeat of Austria would be her permanent separation from Germany; and then Prussia could not be deprived of a preponderating influence in the middle States. Had Austria conquered, she would have demanded supremacy in the south, and probably the cession

of Silesia, and would have given Prussia the leading influence in the north, with Hanover and Hesse as a compensation for the loss of Silesia. If Hanover mixed in the war, having no allies, she could only be something for the others to dispose of. She could only get out of the reach of Prussian influence in case its power were utterly humiliated, and the King of Prussia reduced again to be Margrave of Brandenburg.

Many of the so-called Great-German party entertained the idea, very generally, that Prussia would again become a middle State; and that the other middle States, partly by getting bits of Prussia, and partly by the merging into them of small principalities, would be sufficiently enlarged to become formidable opponents to Prussia. The Emperor of Austria would then be the protector of these States. How such a mutilated, dismembered Germany could present itself as an ideal to the Great-German party, must be utterly unintelligible to every one who looks upon a great, compact powerful German State as absolutely essential, if the German race, its education and culture, are to contribute still to the welfare of Europe.

Shortly to describe the situation: before the vote of the 14th of June there was great bitterness, great mistrusting, and an utter ignorance of the power of Prussia and Austria at most of the German Courts; no one saw the situation as it was, and no one imagined that Prussia would take such quick and energetic measures.

It was clear to every one that Count Bismarck was only waiting for an opportunity to put an end to the Confederation, and that he would look upon the resolution of the 14th June as a declaration of war: he made no secret of his intentions. It is incredible how Hanover could give the vote she did, with a proviso that was intended partly to neutralize it, and prevent it appearing hostile to Prussia,

namely, that her troops, though put on a war footing, could not be joined to the Austrian contingent.

In consequence of this vote an ultimatum was sent to Hanover, in which it was required that she should give in her adhesion to the Prussian plan of reform, and reduce her army again to a peace footing; and if no answer came in twelve hours, she was threatened with the occupation of her territory. Everything was prepared for this; the Prussian troops in Holstein were in readiness, and when the given time had expired, the Prussian ambassador declared its mission at an end. The troops that were to cross over to Harburg, and those which were concentrated in and about Minden, received orders to advance into and occupy Hanover.

King George V. looked upon the Prussian plans of reform as a merging of the smaller States in the larger, and had no idea of voluntarily relinquishing any of his sovereign rights. If the King and his advisers really thought that they could carry on war against Prussia, they should at least have made the necessary preparations, and before everything else, allied themselves closely with Austria and the middle States. Had Hanover wished to pursue such a dangerous policy, she should have made with Austria a diversion in the war, and quietly strengthened the Austrian brigade Kalik; the Hanoverian troops concentrated on the Elbe, and acting in concert with the Austrians and General Gablenz, might have given Prussia a great deal of trouble in Holstein.

For a moment it was contemplated in Hanover, and war materials were sent to Stade; but the plan was given up before it was ripe.

Austria withdrew the brigade Kalik from Holstein. When the first Prussian troops entered Harburg, the last Austrian battalions were dining in the station at Göttingen.

The Hanoverian army was marching about the country in no condition for fighting, some battalions armed with bad practice-muskets. When it was determined on the 15th to fight, orders were sent to all the divisions to concentrate at Göttingen. The King went to Göttingen, with the Crown Prince, on the evening of the 16th, and the Austrian ambassador, Count Ingelheim, followed them the next day.

We are unwilling to describe any further the follies that were committed. Everything was neglected; no measures were taken for carrying on the government; and what is especially inconceivable, no message was sent, in the first instance to Bavaria, although the whole plan of operations was directed to the union of the Hanoverian with the Bavarian and Hessian troops.

Hesse-Cassel had pursued the same policy as Hanover, but provided much better for the efficiency and safety of its troops.

On the 17th, Hanover was occupied by the Prussians, and the telegraph and railway communication between Berlin and the Rhine, which had been destroyed, was re-established.

When we heard that Hanover had destroyed the telegraph line, we were afraid at once that she had cut her own throat; because Prussia, for the sake of her own existence, and at so dangerous a crisis, could not endure such a palpable severance of her monarchy by hostile elements.

The army had assembled at Göttingen, equipped and furnished as well as it could be in such haste. On the 20th, it marched in a southerly direction, with the intention of fighting its way through, and joining the Bavarians. Meanwhile, Prussian troops had occupied the whole country, and soon reached Göttingen.

When the army might easily have fought its way through

just in front of Eisenach, negotiation was begun, and a short armistice concluded. But nothing came of it, as the King could not make up his mind to accept the Prussian conditions of reform. So they marched back, fought on the 27th the battle of Langensalza, but were obliged, notwithstanding the defeat of the Prussians at all points, to capitulate on the 29th.

This was a sad misfortune, the end of the brave Hanoverian army, and with it many historical recollections have passed away! None who saw them return without arms and downcast, will ever forget the melancholy impression produced upon him.

All this time the Bavarian army was standing quite quietly at Lichtenfels, and did not even make an attempt to join the Hanoverians.

Let us throw the veil of oblivion over the mournful time that followed! Accusations and reproaches do not bring back the lost, cannot undo what is done.

A period of transition is always hard to bear for the generation that experiences it. For Hanover's having to pass through such a time, and in such a manner, they are responsible, to whom its fate was intrusted at so serious a moment.

The brave Hanoverian army, which did its duty in an exemplary manner under very difficult circumstances, deserves the deepest sympathy and compassion.

The battle of Langensalza is one of the saddest episodes; one of the bloodiest tragedies, of German history. Let us hope that we have seen the last war in which German will fight against German.

Meanwhile the eighth division of the Prussian army was concentrated in Frankfort, under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse.

After the battle of Langensalza, General Vogel von Falckenstein brought together the so-called army of the Main, and made a very bold and successful diversion with, at the most, 40,000 men, against an army that, if we reckon Bavarian, Hessian, Würtemberg, and Baden troops together, must have been 100,000 strong.

While this was going on, the Prussians had penetrated in three divisions to Bohemia. The Austrian army was not so strong, nor in such fighting order, as their agents everywhere asserted. It evacuated its position in Saxony, and did not occupy the passes into Bohemia. The surprising events that followed, and the momentous results of the battle at Königgrätz, are so well known, that we need not do more than thus allude to them.

After Königgrätz, Austria made a very mistaken diplomatic move.

The campaign in Italy had been successful for the Austrians; the Archduke Albrecht had completely beaten the Italian army in the battle of Custozza.

When Field-Marshal Benedeck announced the true state of the case, and the Emperor learnt in Vienna that the army of the north was completely disorganized, and in full retreat, and that the Prussians were marching upon him, he had recourse to the mediation of Napoleon, and ceded Venetia to him. In this way, Austria hoped to draw France into the struggle, to disengage the army of the south for the defence of Vienna, and to place a barrier for ever between Italy and Prussia; but it was too late!

Napoleon accepted the mediation, Italy held firm to her treaty with Prussia, and declined concluding an armistice, until Prussia did the same, and acted in concert with her.

Negotiations were opened at Nikolsburg, not far from Vienna, an armistice was concluded, and stipulations for

27445

peace drawn up. Then Italy also agreed to a cessation of arms.

Austria found that she had deceived herself, as France had no intention of taking an active part in the contest. His own failing health, the scattered state of his army, and the proof which had just been so brilliantly given of the superiority of the needle-gun, were all reasons that caused Louis Napoleon to abstain from going to war.

The stipulations of Nikolsburg are well known; they erased the last traces of the Treaty of Vienna, and gave Germany quite a different look, a new direction and new future.

Austria renounced all influence in Germany,—even withdrew from it, with her German provinces. North Germany, as far as the Main, was given entirely into Prussia's hands, and Austria consented, without making much difficulty about it, to the annexation of the States, and *the dethronement of the Princes*, who had risked their throne in her favour. Saxony has not to thank Austria that she was not annexed as well, though the Saxon army fought for her, and behaved much better than many of her own troops, but the intercession of the Emperor of the French,—perhaps simply the lucky accident that it took three days to telegraph between the Prussian headquarters and Paris. The Emperor only made the condition that Prussia should confine herself to the north, and not extend the sphere of her power beyond the Main. The South German States were to form a confederation among themselves, and might make treaties with Prussia. He gave his assent to the annexation of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Frankfort, and that part of Hesse-Darmstadt which lay north of the Main.

France certainly interceded for the non-annexation of Saxony; but we have heard it asserted that this point also

had been given up in Paris, without the King or Count Bismarck knowing it.

The fate of Saxony is remarkable. Twice, in the year 1814 and 1866, Prussia was on the point of incorporating it. The first time Prussia took from Saxony one of her best provinces; the second time, her territory, indeed, remained untouched, but she had to accept conditions which, in many respects, especially for her reigning family, are harder to bear than the loss of a province.

Austria gave up her rights in the Duchies in favour of Prussia, who immediately annexed them.

Peace was soon made with the South German States; they had to pay the cost of the war. Secret treaties bound them to Prussia in case of a war, and engaged them to bring their military organization into closer harmony with that of Prussia.

This was a master-stroke of Prussian diplomacy; and it is surprising that these treaties should have remained completely secret till they were published by Prussia at the end of March.

The Confederation has ceased to exist, three dynasties have been dethroned, a small republic has disappeared, and Prussia has become, what she was only in name before, a great Power.

With the States north of the Main, that remained neutral or joined Prussia during the war, a treaty was concluded for one year, giving Prussia the military leadership, and creating a temporary state of things, till the projected constitution for South Germany should be adopted and settled. A treaty was made subsequently with Saxony, by which Prussia resumed the right of garrisoning her fortresses.

On the 26th January 1867, the dangerous experiment was tried of direct universal suffrage for the South German Parliament. The result was better than one could expect; at the same time, it showed clearly to what excitement and

abuses this universal suffrage, combined with the ballot, may give rise.

On the 18th of April, the Parliament was closed, after it had accepted the projects laid before it by the Governments of the different South German States, without any material modifications.

Germany is beginning a new epoch of her history; it is a time of very important reforms, and presses hardly, and above others, on the inhabitants of the States that suddenly lost their independence, who saw many old and dear ties torn asunder, and the families that had long reigned over them and their fathers dethroned and exiled; they had to exchange a past that was endeared to them, for an uncertain, if a more splendid, future. The dynasties, too, that have outlived this storm, are hardly in a better position; they have lost a great part of their sovereignty, and been brought into a condition that might easily become untenable.

In the stipulations of Nikolsburg, Prussia went further than she intended; the annexations exceeded the object of the war. Its object was to eject Austria from Germany, to found a German federal State under Prussia, and to gain increased military power and security. At the beginning of the war, the Prussian statesmen did not think of the immediate formation of one large compact State. When they saw that Austria was not in a position, and not disposed to give her adherents energetic aid, and that they might, without fear of European complication, put Prussia in possession of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, Frankfort, and a part of Hesse-Darmstadt (the other part was relinquished afterwards to the Grand-Duke), they thought that they ought not to let this opportunity slip from them, notwithstanding the illogical consequence, that Saxony, which had shown itself the most hostile of any, was not absorbed.

Had Prussia imposed conditions on the States that were in her power, which would give her the complete control and disposal of their forces, had she taken them into the North German Confederation, and required their Sovereigns to acknowledge the King of Prussia as their Protector, under the title of King or Emperor of Germany, she would have done better perhaps, she would have had the same strength against foreign enemies, and saved herself and the subjects of the annexed States many difficulties, and she would have respected more those principles of legitimacy on which she herself must lay great weight.

Whether the experiment of a federal State that is now being made will answer, it is hard to say.

We cannot deny that we should have preferred more distinctness in the position Prussia has taken, a firmer, more visible, and definite central power; it is this *incognito* in which the central power is vested that we do not like. The whole mechanism of the new federal State is too complicated, and, therefore, for any length of time untenable. Federal Commander-in-Chief, federal Chancellor, federal Council and Ministry, Ministries of the separate States, Privy Council, in Prussia House of Lords, House of Commons, Provincial Diets, Municipal Assemblies, District Diets. This is rather too much!

This new creation, it is true, is called a Federal State; but the requisites of a State are not formally there. As matters, however, stood, the new constitution may be regarded as a successful experiment; ground has been won on which a structure may be built, and for this we ought to be thankful.

As regards the connexion between the Federal Constitution and the different States that composed the new Confederation, Prussia had it entirely in her power to dictate the conditions under which it should exist. Two courses

might be adopted. The one was this, that the bond of union between the South German States should not be drawn too tightly, so that the Southern States might be induced and be able to enter into the Confederation; the other, that this federal State should receive at once a form of greater unity, which might be given to it somewhat as follows:—

The King of Prussia might become actually and in name, what he is virtually already, Emperor or King of North Germany; and the other States might quite openly and formally cede to him a certain part of their sovereign rights.

Legislation on a large scale, *i.e.*, for all federal concerns, ought to be in the hands of the Central Government and the Parliament together; the Sovereigns being represented in an Upper House, which we look upon as essential, if the Parliament as it now is is to be permanent. The separate assemblies of Estates would then have come into the position of the Provincial Diets. This mode has not been adopted. The Sovereigns of the small States were naturally afraid of being merged in the large one; and yet the new constitution has really brought this about; and, we may be mistaken, but we think that a voluntary open recognition of a Protector, an Emperor, would have been preferable for the other dynasties as well.

The King of Prussia has the whole control of the military power, and that not only as regards the separate States; neither have the representatives of the people for a series of years any say in the matter. He is complete master of the army, and such an army as no other State can show. The diplomatic relations, and the right of making war and peace, are entirely in his hands; what sovereignty then is left for the other Princes?

We do not believe that the North German Confederation, as it is called, can fall to pieces,—the power of Prussia is too

preponderating for this; but we are of opinion that great difficulties beset the Governments of the separate States; especially as regards their finances; and the desire for one homogeneous state may be so great, as to cause the transition to it under these circumstances to be very sudden.

A more compact union of North Germany would perhaps have brought about a more rapid development of the whole country, and South Germany would not have been able permanently to withstand the force of its attraction.

The task of Prussia was a difficult one, we cannot deny it, difficult as regards the States that adhere to her, and her own State as well, whose bonds did not admit of being loosened, and which had already itself, by reason of its annexations, entered upon a period of transition.

Half measures are always followed by whole evils, and it cannot be denied that the annexation of some States, and continued existence of others, however political reasons may have required it, was a half-measure.

Hitherto Prussia had made the control of the army her chief aim; she wished to take it out of the power, at once of the separate States and of the representatives of the people. As matters stood, both might be necessary. Who can deny that Germany is threatened by many dangers, that the attitude of France implies the possibility of war, and that there is still much discontent in the country itself,—revolutionary ideas lingering in many heads? The withdrawal of the army-budget for a number of years from the reach and influence of the Parliament, may be a fortunate circumstance for the development of the country's resources, and its inner life during this period of transition.

The disgraceful conflict between the Prussian Government and Parliament is thereby terminated, and without making any prejudicial concession of its power, the Govern-

ment can relinquish to the Parliament a larger share of influence in all internal questions.

A great difficulty arises in the case of the annexed States, which cannot soon and easily adapt themselves to the new state of things. Here Prussia has its most difficult task; and we regret to say the Prussian officials have not in general the gift of making themselves liked, of adapting themselves to altered circumstances, and treating with consideration those who are subject to their power. The inhabitants of the new provinces have a right to claim considerate treatment, and were formerly accustomed to it.

It is the duty of the Prussian Government to take stringent measures for carrying out the King's words and intentions of respecting their just and several claims; the especial duty of the Government is it to make use of the services of all who have been in the habit, and are capable of rendering them in the newly acquired lands, for the general good; and above all they must avoid the mere appearance of *this* evil,—that the new provinces are to furnish a better livelihood, and a pleasanter occupation, for the old Prussian officials. And contrariwise, it is now the sacred duty of the new subjects to serve their great Fatherland faithfully, and not to let themselves be misguided, either by their own feelings, or by the suggestions or fear of the censure of others.

The difficulty of severing one's-self from an old dynasty, the sorrow with which every Hanoverian looks back to the past, no one feels more than we do.

Of all the German States, Hanover has been smitten the hardest. She had always lived in a seclusion of her own. Her connexion with England had marked out for her in many respects a peculiar course; the new provinces acquired in 1815 had been a great gain to her; and by reason of her commerce and the great extent of her sea-coast she was more

independent than the other middle States. The administration of the country was good, and though in the last twenty years many blunders may have been committed, which caused changes and derangements in its constitution, on the whole there was great prosperity. The courts of justice were excellent. Few lands have clung so closely to their dynasties as did the old province of Hanover to the Guelphs, and in the more recently acquired provinces also there existed many historical recollections which bound them to this family. The people are in general very loyally disposed. To this must be added, that by the occupation of 1806 Prussia had embittered the whole population against her, and the reminiscences of that time remained still in operation.

When, in consequence of the occurrences of June, the Hanoverians suddenly saw their country occupied by Prussians, it seemed to them like a dream. On the 13th of June, before it was known what had been done in Frankfort, no one believed that Hanover would vote as she did, and that it would really come to war with Prussia. The policy afterwards followed, and the battle of Langensalza, caused indignation and sorrow in the whole land, and they rose to the highest pitch when after the armistice of Nikolsburg it was positively asserted in August that Hanover had lost its independence, and was to become a Prussian province.

Painful feelings must come to every good Hanoverian; they are engendered by attachment to the old reigning family, by love to his own home, and to institutions, regulations, and customs that have become dear to him; but he should never forget that he has a great Fatherland and duties owing to it, and that the future of Hanover cannot be separated from that of the rest of Germany. No restoration of the former state of things and of the old dynasty could only then be thought of,

if in a war with France, Germany (we can only speak of Germany, no longer of Prussia, in this case) were completely conquered, completely subjugated to the French yoke, if the future adjustment of Germany were made to depend, not on Germans, but on strangers.

Some deluded people, who mistake their false sentimentalism for love of country, are not ashamed to give expression to such thoughts as wishes, and forget in doing so that they thereby commit treason against the nation to which they belong,—forget that they have ceased to be Hanoverians in order to become Germans,—forget that they are involved, though against their will, in the changes which have taken place,—that they share the fate of their country, and should bestir themselves for its welfare.

He must be completely blinded by political hatred and passion, who would implicate his own Fatherland in a most sanguinary war, a war whose limits, duration, and devastating effects no one can foresee. Such a war might bring about changes certainly, but not such as are expected, and German patriotism, saddened now by many recollections, would awake to new strength in the great mass of the people, and in the annexed States as well as the others; the soldier from these provinces, no less than his comrades from the rest of the country, will feel that he is called to fight for Germany's greatness, Germany's future, Germany's existence.

It should not be forgotten that the King of Prussia, if war were to break out, would be the commander-in-chief no longer of Prussia merely, but of Germany.

So far we have come; and, God be praised for it! a foreign foe cannot tear Germany asunder again; a common danger brings even enemies together.

Most politicians prognosticate with certainty a war with France, great difficulties arising from the relations between

North and South Germany, and internal revolution; and they look upon it as equally certain that these three accounts can only be settled by the sword. That there is danger in all these we cannot deny; but, notwithstanding, war and revolution are not such an absolute necessity.

In the present day, when national interests have such a decisive word to say, wars will only be undertaken for very pressing reasons: the evils must be so great as to admit of no possibility of being rectified in a peaceful manner.

It is difficult in our time to wage mere Cabinet wars, so to speak, wars as the consequences of alliances and treaties, that are begun simply in the interests of a dynasty that cannot be otherwise maintained; the principle of non-intervention, so often appealed to, and localized wars, follow from this difficulty.

France, as well as Germany, has no solid internal ground for war. The idea of the so-called natural Rhine-boundary has been carefully cherished in France since 1815, that it may be used at any time as a pretext for war. In most French school-books the boundaries of France are given as follows:—Atlantic Ocean, Channel, *Rhine*, Alps, Mediterranean Sea, and Pyrenees; but in spite of this, no rational educated Frenchman thinks that they are really entitled to stretch their limits to the Rhine.

When people speak of French supremacy as in danger of being superseded by the supremacy of Prussia, and there must be a war in consequence between the two countries, this is mostly mere talk, without any deeper meaning.

If France is set upon making encroachments, if she will arrogate a power in Europe beyond that which a Great Power can properly claim, not Germany alone, but the whole of Europe, will confront her, and Napoleon III. will have more regard for his dynasty in France than to provoke a

European coalition against it. If France does not disturb the peace of Europe, we see no reason why the torch of war should be kindled in it.

The commercial interests of France do not clash with those of Germany, and no one would be willing to assert that the trade and the material interests of both countries are not urgently in need of peace. This is also true, perhaps in a still higher degree, of Austria.

The separation between North and South Germany, the so-called boundary of the Main, is certainly the sorest point in the present conjuncture. Though it may be assumed in France that French sympathies exist, especially in Bavaria and Würtemberg, and that the Confederation of the Rhine has left its traces in men's minds, we do not believe it. We cannot deny that there is no great liking there for Prussia, as such; but the idea of a united Germany has struck its roots deep amongst the people, and they admit that this unity can now only be brought about in connexion with Prussia. It is very important that the Southern States should unite themselves to the South German Confederation, and the question of the Zollverein may help this on: the deputies from the South who were admitted into the Northern Parliament to discuss these Customs' matters, will soon wish to give their opinion upon other questions as well.

Though the character of the people is different, and different views and dynastic interests separate North and South Germany, yet commerce and intercourse, as well as the feeling of a common nationality and the desire for greater unity, draw them incessantly together.

As changes come over the Prussian administration, and Prussian specialties more and more disappear,—and this will happen as purely German elements obtain greater influence,—the Governments of the South German States will not be

able permanently to withstand the desire for union with the rest of Germany.

As regards revolutionary and democratic tendencies, every one must allow that the war of 1866 has wrested a great lever out of the hands of the democrats, and that in consequence of the greater union which their military power and commercial interests have given to thirty millions of Germans, many causes for discontent are removed. As after 1848 and 1849 many a demagogue lamented in his heart that the Game Laws were abolished and that thereby he was deprived the only pretext which he had for exciting the countryman against the nobleman, so are there now many friends of the people who are obliged, much against their will, to strike out of their speeches the weakness of the German Confederation, and the injurious influence of Austria and the Concordat.

Many a one who was drawn into the whirl of politics, and into democratic societies, because he felt mortified as a German, felt envious, when he was abroad, of every Frenchman, every Englishman, every Russian that he met with, entertains now very different views, sees a chance of realizing his ideal,—the ideal of a great German State, equal in rank and privileges to the other nations. We cannot but rejoice at the severance which has taken place place between the liberals and the extreme socialistic and radical party; it has proved that those who wish to upset everything in the State are, in proportion to the population, numerically insignificant.

We cannot deny that much discontent has arisen in the annexed States, and amongst those whom the Government was not wont to count as its enemies; but the persons who cling to the ousted dynasties, and keep aloof from the new order of things, belong mostly to the conservatives, and they

will not join the democratic, still less the republican, party.

Improvements will be made in the representative system, and it is to be hoped that a desire for law and order will increase and become more durable both in the Government and the people. It cannot, alas! be denied that such a desire has hitherto been largely wanting. How often have we seen the sad tragedy acted of Governments giving constitutions, and then trying by their own organs to explain away unpleasant paragraphs in them, and evade them; thus, partially at least, nullifying their own gift. Just as little, on the other hand, can we approve of Parliamentary majorities driving the Governments to straits. Constitutional excrescences and a mock constitutionalism have contributed much to upset sound political opinion in Germany. The German theorist easily makes too many laws, and the quiet observer who looks through the changes of constitution and legislative enactments of most of the German States, will be astonished and terrified.

The first necessity for our political life is a real conservative party, which shall uphold with impartiality certain fixed principles and institutions, a party which does not look upon itself as the blind instrument of the Government that may be guiding the helm of the State. Such a party must be thoroughly monarchical, and therefore in the very interests of the monarchy resist all breach of its recognised principles by the King's servants, and interpose when arbitrary will, and that in its worst form, as coming from official personages, threatens the King, his subjects, and the State. We need not add that this conservative party must make it its special aim to resist the pressure from below,—liberalism, falsely so called, and, yet more, all radical tendencies.

Undoubtedly the materials for such a party exist in Ger-

many, though not to the same extent as in England; but up to the present time, it has not had a large enough area to work in; often, too, it has lacked compactness, and often intelligence; consequently it has not found the power and the position that it must have in order to become really useful and influential. Let the elements of such a party be once united in sufficient numbers, and people will be astonished how strong they are, and what a hold they have upon the sound sense of the nation.

Really revolutionary, especially republican, tendencies, exist probably to a less extent in Germany than we are apt to think, but in the south more than in the north, and therefore it is well that the North German Confederation be first consolidated.

These lines were written in September last. Since then the first North German Parliament has assembled. The two Parliament Houses have just been closed, and the Zoll Parliament is now meeting at Berlin. The representatives of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt will meet the members of the North German Parliament for a special purpose.

We have said the machinery was too complicated; and since we have seen the different parts of it at work, we must say we are more than ever of that opinion. A foreigner would hardly understand the constitution of the North German Confederation, if he studies at the same time the constitution of Prussia and the other States, and sees that the Sovereign, who is at the head of the united Power, at the head of the German army and navy, and who treats with all foreign countries, is President of the North German Confederation, and only King of Prussia, instead of being, what in reality he is, and ought to be by name, Emperor, or King, of Germany.

When a sovereign travels for his amusement, and wishes to travel comfortably, without all the honours due to royalty, he assumes the name of one of his subjects; and that is called travelling *incognito*. The present state of things in Germany, the North German Confederation, is nothing but a German empire *incognito*, and the sooner it takes its real position and acknowledges its Sovereign as such, the better.

The German Parliament has been elected by universal suffrage; and every German twenty-five years of age, provided he has not been punished for criminal offences, has a vote. The whole country is divided into electoral districts, so that every 100,000 inhabitants elect one member. The mode of voting is by ballot; and we object much more to this mode of voting than to the fact of universal suffrage. If you give to the lower classes of society a vote, you had better take the people altogether, and the larger the districts the better. When Count Bismarck first came forward with this plan of representation, all those who were not out-and-out radicals were very much alarmed.

The result of the elections has surprised everybody, and every conservative must acknowledge that the German Parliament is as well composed as it can be. The amount of work which this Parliament has done in less than six weeks is astonishing, and the general spirit that was shown was most satisfactory. Military matters, the German navy, post, telegraph, and railways, commercial affairs, so far as they do not belong to the Zoll Parliament, are subject to the legislation of the German Parliament; and on all these important branches of the revenue Bills are passed. The different parties are the conservatives, the liberal conservatives, the national liberals, the radicals, and a party of some twenty members opposed to the Government, and con-

sisting of members of the newly-annexed countries, and the members of the Polish provinces.

In important questions the Government has had a great majority, as the three principal parties, the conservative, the liberal conservative, and the national liberal, were favourable to Count Bismarck's political views. Lately the conservative party, in the Prussian Lower House, has opposed Count Bismarck, and it is possible that this may have some influence on the conservatives of the German Parliament in the next session. The ultra-conservative party is losing ground every day; the liberal conservatives will gain what the others lose, and are sure to become the leading party in Germany.

This party is composed of independent members of the German aristocracy, with clever and conservative men of other classes. They are not so exclusively Prussians as the ultra-conservatives are. They have pledged themselves to support the national German policy, are conservatives in home politics, but recognising the necessity of reforms and a constitutional Government.

Many of the ultra-conservatives are absolutists at heart; hate all constitutional government; and many of them have ideas which would astonish a British mind. They are averse to any reforms. They sometimes speak of Germany, but always think of Prussia, and wish to treat the newly annexed provinces as conquered countries. Count Bismarck, who formerly belonged to this party, is much too enlightened a man to share such prejudices and ideas. He thought, however, his former party would support him, and the Government set all influence at work to have members of that party elected. The debate and vote on the Hanoverian Fund has shown this to have been a mistake. We shall try, in a few words, to explain what this Hanoverian question was. In August 1867 the Prussian Government summoned twenty-four members

of the former Hanoverian Chambers, to consult them on the future administration of Hanover. The Prussian Government, in accordance with the wishes expressed by all the members of this assembly, called a Provincial Parliament at Hanover, which assembled on the 21st of September.

Certain expenses for roads, hospitals, and asylums, which in the old Prussian provinces are defrayed by the province, were in Hanover provided for by the Government. Prussia, in taking possession of all the property of the State, had of course to take this burden upon herself. The province possessed a fund of about nineteen millions of thalers in cash, and the Provincial Diet wished to keep this fund for the payment of these expenses. In Hesse-Cassel a similar fund had been handed over to the province.

The King of Prussia having, by a vote of the Prussian Chambers, absolute power in the newly annexed provinces till the 1st of October 1867, might have granted this request without asking the Prussian Parliament. His Majesty was absent at the time, and the Prussian Government thought the claims of Hanover so well founded that it did not believe any objection could or would be made. Count Stolberg, the Civil Governor of Hanover, declared, before closing the Hanoverian Diet, that the absence of His Majesty had prevented the decree about the provincial fund from being given, but that the King's Government willingly acceded to the wish of Hanover, and would bring in a Bill to that effect at the next meeting of the Prussian Parliament. The Bill was brought in, and was principally opposed by the ultra-conservatives, who in this instance were supported by the out-and-out radicals.

Count Bismarck did all he could to carry the measure, and only obtained, by the support of the liberal conservatives, the national liberals, and all the members of the

newly annexed countries, a small majority, not for the fund, but for a sum of 500,000 thalers a year,—this sum to be given to the province.

The opposition of the conservatives in this question is incomprehensible to those who do not know that it was an intrigue against Count Bismarck. He is thought too German and too liberal, for few men are real statesmen, and see that the present state of things cannot last, that reforms are absolutely necessary. Had Count Bismarck dissolved the Chambers, had he made some changes in the Cabinet, a coalition Government, he would have obtained a considerable majority, and the ultra-conservatives would have had a poor chance.

The debate on this question was highly interesting, and proved that it will be quite impossible to go on with two Parliaments in the same country. The German Parliament must in future do all the general business, while the internal administration of the country ought to be put into the hands of the governors of provinces and a Provincial Diet. The smaller States still in existence could very well exist as they do now,—would be, what in reality they are already, provinces in a privileged position, and the Sovereigns recognising the King of Prussia as Emperor, would be in a better position than they are at present. Reform in this sense is generally thought necessary. A difference of opinion exists as to the best time, and many politicians wish the Southern States of Germany to enter into the German Confederation before any changes are made. Others, and we are of the number, think that the North German Confederation ought to be consolidated, that the central power ought to have greater strength, that reforms which are absolutely necessary in Prussia cannot take place, that Prussia cannot become Germany if this is not done.

The southern States of Germany are now united to the north, in case of war, by treaties; and as to Customs, they are completely united by the Zollverein.

We have no doubt that such measures as those alluded to would soon produce beneficial results; that the North German kingdom or empire would soon be looked upon with envy by the south of Germany; and that the tendencies towards union which already exist there would soon become too strong to be resisted.

The neighbouring States have no reason to be alarmed. Germany will never be an aggressive power; and we hope and believe that all those changes can take place without any danger to the peace of Europe, and that no power would venture to prevent Germany from doing as she chooses at home.

May God protect our Fatherland alike from the misery of war and from revolution, and inspire every German with a true and intelligent love of his country! If he feels this, and every one does his duty, Germany may look calmly into the future; then will she easily conquer every foe at home and abroad, acquire a might and a power that no other country possesses, and show what a hidden strength slumbers in the Teutonic race.

IV.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE EXISTING STATE OF POLITICS.

It is difficult for any one, remembering what he has learnt in the days of his youth at the university and otherwise, if he casts a glance over the present position of political affairs, to avoid a feeling of confusion when he sees how the whole state of Europe has changed, how both mercantile and military relationships have developed themselves, how in Germany public law has broken down, how the imaginary tie of German unity, and even the Bund itself, has ceased to exist, how Germany has been split into three divisions, Austria thrust out, and how Prussia, with the North German Bund, has undertaken the teaching of Germany, and with it the responsibility of making her a great and strong Power. We repeat, it is difficult to find in the chaos a steady point from which to form a quiet, clear, and impartial judgment on the existing state of affairs; but for a member of a newly annexed country this difficulty is doubled. The fundamental principle of legitimacy, the preservation of the equilibrium of Europe through the Holy Alliance, the utility of quadrangular fortifications for Lombardy, the danger of a united Italy for Germany, the necessity of making a line on the Po

as a defence for the Rhine,—all these rules, without faith in which a German diplomatist would have been considered by his colleagues as a heretic, are now worthless.

Through the last war, the Crimean war, the two in Italy, and the German war, both politics and diplomacy have made *tabula rasa.* All alliances are destroyed. The egotism which in these material times governs all men rules also in States. Each is for himself; no man trusts his neighbour. The principle of nationality, non-intervention, the sovereignty of the people, and the consequences of these ideas—universal suffrage and universal right of election—are teachings of the new times to which the diplomatist of the old school cannot accustom himself. These are principles which have been discovered for a certain purpose, generally only to mask transactions which are in direct opposition to existing laws, legitimate principles, and the rights of Princes. The principle of nationality, which, rightly understood, is a beautiful idea, the mother of patriotism, becomes through this a mere phrase, only made use of to adorn revolutionary and covetous purposes. Real nationality is rarely to be found. Similarity of speech alone is no sign of it.

Russia is truly in herself the greatest nation, yet she possesses many provinces of whose nationality as Russians it would be absurd to speak. Should Russia sacrifice the Baltic Provinces, Finland, the Caucasus, and other tribes which are not Russian? Should England, Ireland? Prussia the provinces of Prussia and Posen? Should France offer up Alsatia on the altar of nationality? What would remain of Austria if she acknowledged this principle!

But if this principle, as well as that of the rights of the people, is often diplomatically misused, we are far from decrying their real existence in their best and noblest sense. If history, recollections, sympathies, the same language, the

same material and commercial interests, draw a nation together, if it feels in itself the power to defend these interests, then indisputably nationality exists. The protection of the frontiers requires a much greater expenditure of power than formerly; but, on the other hand, public interests require, through the increase of trade and commerce, a greater number of men and a wider range of land, and hence arises the necessity of creating larger States. It is possible, in these days, that States of different nationalities, which were too weak to stand alone, when united, through their geographical position and their mutual interests, may endure; but it is also impossible, for the reasons already mentioned, that a people who have the same origin, the same habits, the same language, and whose interest it is alike to defend themselves from the same enemies, can long remain divided. The impulse for unity will become so strong that everything will yield to it. This has been the case in Italy, and will be so in Germany.

Dynasties who wish to take possession of the throne of another, or make a monarchy out of a republic, require some excuse for their claim. The right of the conqueror is generally acknowledged as sufficient, but where this does not exist another has to be found. In this way Napoleon discovered universal suffrage, and is highly delighted when he finds imitators.

A French diplomate once, in conversation with the author on the subject of universal suffrage, expressed himself thus, "Ce n'est pas un principe, mais un expédient quelquefois nécessaire"—It is not a principle, but an occasionally useful expedient.

If universal suffrage were really a principle and not an expedient, then each succeeding generation should have a right of exercising their prerogative, and, in the ordinary

course of events, this would involve a fresh election about every thirty years, and with such a principle all hitherto recognised dynastic laws must become of none effect. The comedy of the Popular Vote was played at the incorporation of Nice with France; and whoever observed the way in which it was put upon the stage will know how much such voting is worth.

Formerly, political changes were governed by the rights of dynasties, the right of inheritance and legitimacy, and the right of conquest; the principle of nationality, the rights of the people, now take precedence. It sounds better for the mass.

The rights of the people cannot be separated from those of the dynasty. In a sound state of things they go together; when they do not go together one side is certainly in fault.

If one look at the diplomatic correspondence of the separate Powers, and the official statements of the separate Cabinets, everything shows signs of peace. But if we look at the figures of the army estimates, if we read the report of the Austrian Minister for War, if we look at the military part of the North German Federal Constitution, at the new plans for military organization in France, and at the army estimates in Italy, we feel that we are standing on the brink of a European war. But again, the Exhibition, and the fresh impetus that has been given, though slowly, to trade and industry, are omens of peace.

Where shall we find the reason for this ruinous and dear luxury, the dearest that States can indulge in—an armed peace? Every political thinker must grapple with this question. When the reasons are discovered, they must be done away with. That this cannot be, that war is unavoidable, we do not believe. If we did believe it, we should say,

The sooner war breaks out the better. It is just from our German stand-point that we should have to say it.

France is looked upon as the Power that threatens us; and we cannot deny that the reorganization of the French army, and her constant warlike preparations, must be regarded as having a significance in them, much more so than orders for breech-loaders, which have become just as necessary for all armies as were fire-arms after the invention of gunpowder, and percussion-guns after the invention of the percussion-cap. Just as when practical inventions of undoubted value are made in the world of industry, competition obliges the manufacturers to adopt them, the same precisely is it with the arming of troops.

What the Emperor's motive is in this reorganization we cannot exactly determine, nor yet whether the reasons which have inclined him to it can be properly regarded as in the interests of his dynasty.

A lucky fact is it for Europe that France is no longer the preponderating military Power in it, and the recognition of this fact has contributed to the idea of her new military organization.

Apart from the vast efforts which Prussia and the Southern Confederation are now making, the relative population of the two Powers has changed very remarkably to the disadvantage of France. When the Germanic Confederation was formed in 1815, it had just as many inhabitants as France—about thirty millions. In 1864, the Confederation, and in its northern part especially, the population had increased with surprising rapidity, numbering forty-six; France, on the contrary, only thirty-six millions of inhabitants.

The population of Prussia rose from 1815, when it was little more than ten millions, to over nineteen millions in 1867. In 1815, Germany, without Austria, was weaker than

France by nearly ten millions of people; now the South German Confederation, and the States allied to it in the south, number as many inhabitants as France—about thirty-seven millions.

If the Emperor of the French intends to make use of his newly-organized army to attack Germany, and thinks that, by giving in to the unrighteous agitation for the Rhine boundary, he will thereby enlarge and strengthen France, and give his dynasty a firmer footing, he is much mistaken. And this our brave army, and the patriotism that would then be awakened in the whole of Germany, would prove to him.

We look upon Louis Napoleon as on the whole a good arithmetician. He has certainly often reckoned with dangerous factors, and therefore, in spite of all the preparations, which may have other grounds, he will, as long as he has the power in his hand, do everything to avoid a war with Germany. Napoleon knows that the surest means of uniting Germany would be an attack upon its boundaries. This was one of the most cogent motives for his peace policy in 1866.

A well-known French speaker remarked, it was a complaint of the Germans at present, that they would not give up a single foot of German ground. We consider this impertinence a compliment, and are glad that we are able to corroborate the fact.

France is menaced from no side, and will never be menaced in her present limits. We are quite aware that individual German enthusiasts, individual incorrigible nationality theorists, have looked for the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine; but they are mere enthusiasts, who cannot see that the principle of nationality has no meaning there, because the inhabitants are quite French in their ideas and their interests,

and have retained nothing German beyond a thoroughly debased language.

A war for the Rhine and for Alsace would have no definite results—would engender misery without effecting any permanent changes.

A war with Germany could only proceed from France; for Prussia and the North German Confederation, South Germany, whose separation from the North, if it came to a war with France, could not be thought of for a moment; Spain and Italy, on the other side, have no intention to take the offensive.

Should complications arise with the United States, and, which is very unlikely, with England, it would still be a naval war. With her splendid army, and the vast navy she possesses, with the patriotism which undeniably inspires her people, France is strong enough to defend herself on the Continent.

Whether the bond which unites France to the present dynasty has been drawn tighter by the new organization of the army,—whether the army will remain as compact in itself and as conspicuous for its military spirit and sense of honour as before,—whether the faults of the French people, from which the army is remarkably free, would not press in upon it and relax its discipline,—whether the people will come in to the change without further ado,—and whether, considering how slowly the population increases and how the field of industry is enlarged, so many valuable hands can be spared, —these are questions which the leaders in France must put to themselves. If they cannot answer them satisfactorily, this change may easily have unpleasant consequences for the reigning family.

We are almost tempted to believe that nothing so serious was meant in the first instance—that the Emperor wished,

by means of this organization, to show the army itself, and those who cried out against the danger which a powerful Germany would bring to France, that he neglected nothing which could insure the power and greatness of the country.

We consider that the universal liability to serve in the army could not be introduced into France; her power would be thereby broken, and the army would cease to be what it has been up to the present moment. The protector of order, it would become part of the people, and would be carried away by the currents of revolution with which France is threatened.

In Germany this is different. The people are more orderly and more submissive; besides this, the German soldier has a greater esteem for the King and the dynasty that he serves.

For Prussia to put her army on a footing that she would hardly wish to maintain for a permanency, is necessary in this period of transition. The position of Prussia is very different from that of France. Prussia must be prepared. It is clear that she may be menaced any moment on two sides, though a direct attack by France or Austria, perchance by both, is not probable at present.

Prussia will never pursue an aggressive policy *out of* Germany. In its present conformation it has excellent boundaries; by the possession of Hanover and the Duchies it commands the trade of the North Sea and the Baltic, and will unite the two seas of the Eider Canal. There are splendid naval stations at Kiel, and at the mouths of the Ems and the Weser; in short, the North German Confederation is a State equal in rank and vitality to all the other European Powers. Its internal consolidation must be compassed by peaceful means.

We have already remarked that it would be ruinous in

France to attack Prussia now; the same is certainly true of Austria.

A sincere co-operation of Austria with Prussia is certainly not easy to bring about; the experience of the summer of 1866 was too bitter for this. But still the mutual interests of the two countries will draw them together, unless (we hope it will not be so) Austria's looks, and, what we are more afraid of, Austria's intrigues, are directed again towards Germany.

In a material and financial point of view Prussia is stronger since the war than she was before; but she requires peace to gather the fruits of her victory and to give life and activity to the German Confederation.

Austria requires peace to heal the serious wounds which the war inflicted upon her, and to reconstruct the machine of the State, that was sadly damaged and at a complete standstill. The efforts that were made continuously since 1850 to form Austria into a compact and constitutional State fell through, in consequence of the opposition of the separate nationalities, especially Hungary, and the want of internal cohesion has brought Austria to the brink of destruction. Her own statesmen not being able to manage the task intrusted to them, Baron Beust has undertaken to reconcile her to Hungary and to give the whole country constitutional life. We heartily wish this genial statesman success in his difficult undertaking. The intention to conciliate Hungary seems to be seriously meant, and it is hoped that now, for the first time since 1850, Hungary will give Austria credit for sincerity.

To make a State in Austria's condition again *one*, to recruit its shattered finances, and regain for it the confidence it has lost, peace is an essential groundwork, and we may hope that Austria will put forth her efforts to replace herself, by peaceful means, in the position of which she was deprived

by her wars, badly begun, badly conducted, and ended, perhaps, at the wrong moment.

If we regard the situation of the separate European States, and the alliances that were brought about by the Congress of Vienna, we find that greater changes have taken place than appear at first sight.

Russia stands by herself, and, unconcerned about disorders elsewhere, gives her attention to her own internal development. Though she stands on the best terms with Prussia, there is, as yet, so far as we know, no close alliance between the two States. Her relations with Austria are such that no trace of the Holy Alliance can any longer be discovered. The time of the Holy Alliance is quite gone by.

Russia can never come into intimate relations with England and France so long as they insist upon neutralizing the Black Sea, and do not come to a proper understanding with her on the Eastern question.

Since the Congress of Vienna, Russia has so far experienced an internal change of territory, that Poland has ceased to be an independent country, and is now entirely incorporated with her. In Caucasus and Asia the boundaries of Russia have been much extended.

England has gone to war with Russia, and given up the former alliance with her. This has caused Russia to fraternize with America, and the mutual relations of these two Powers may be the means of proving to England that she ought not to have relinquished the most natural alliance that she has in Europe.

France, in the form she has taken as an empire, under a Bonaparte, comes most into collision with the conditions of the Vienna Congress, which puts Napoleon I. under the ban of Europe.

By the conquest of Algeria, France has derived a great

accession of territory, and after the Italian war, her limits were still further enlarged by the annexation of Nice and Savoy.

France stands pretty much as isolated now as she did after the great war-time in 1815; for the *entente cordiale* that was brought about between her and England at the time of the Crimean War has too little hold upon the national character of the two peoples to be permanent.

Whether she will succeed in uniting to herself Italy, the child of the Emperor's policy, and of his newly-adopted principle of nationalities, which, in its own interest, must endeavour to emancipate itself from France, appears to us still doubtful, as doubtful as the alliance with Austria.

Should France, Austria, and Italy really combine against Prussia, Russia and England would be obliged to support her; for in spite of England's unwillingness to mix herself up with Continental matters, she could not suffer the fall of Germany.

There is no likelihood whatever of its coming at present to such alliances. The material interests in all States have become too important, and the people have become too deeply versed in politics, to make it possible for wars to be engaged in, that are not absolutely necessary, and do not directly affect the interests of the States that carry them on. If it comes to war, which God forbid! France and Germany alone will fight it out.

All Europe feels that, since the Emperor said, "*L'empire, c'est la paix,*" peace is nowhere to be found in Europe,—feels that the germ of war lies hidden in the Napoleon system of government.

Louis Napoleon, who apparently has contributed to the greatness of France, will really leave behind him only disordered finances and the greatest demoralization, and his

successors, whether they belong to his own or the older dynasty, will long experience the consequences of a despotism which rests on the command of the army, on the police, on more or less scrupulous speculators on 'Change, and on the lowest classes of the people.

The war which seems to threaten Germany has its only ground in the untenableness of the present system of government in France; the spark to kindle it must be applied from without. France is justly regarded as the wanton disturber of the peace, and this accounts for her isolation.

The idea of the alliance of the small States—Belgium, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark—which Thiers suggested, can hardly be carried out; small States can gain nothing by a war, but may easily risk their existence.

England has not changed in her territorial area; but in internal strength, wealth, the education and morality of the lower classes, she has made marked progress. Population and capital have increased on a gigantic scale since 1815.

England gave the greatest proof of her power and vitality when she suppressed the revolution in India in the year 1857,—showed what civilisation, independence, strength, and self-consciousness can achieve.

The Crimean War had set all Eastern nations in a state of excitement.

India was somewhat bare of English troops, and the Indian Princes thought that they could rid themselves of the hated rule of England. A gigantic conspiracy was formed by a people numbering far more than a hundred millions, and amongst whom there was distributed a proportionally small number of Englishmen. Most of the troops were natives, the so-called Sepoys; these mutinied, and massacred the Europeans in the most horrible manner,—nothing was spared, neither women nor children. The achievements of

the English troops and commanders at that time are beyond all praise. Next year the conquest of the natives was complete, and order restored.

The East India Company was subsequently done away with, important changes were made in the administration of the country, and now England's rule in India is more firmly established than before.

As regards the present policy of England, her statesmen make a point of mixing themselves up as little as possible with Continental matters. The alliance with France exists in name, and the two nations may actually unite together for a definite purpose, but it cannot be a sincere, permanent alliance. It is worth noticing in this respect, that the Volunteer movement in England was set on foot during the time of the *entente cordiale*, and yet it could only be intended as a protection against France.

England has seen with pleasure the rise of Italy and the consolidation of Prussia; she felt that they would act as a counterpoise to French supremacy on the Continent. The navy of England is now more powerful than ever before, for the simple reason that it depends now upon coal and iron; and what country can ever approach to a competition with England in these two productions? Formerly she had to buy all the materials she required for her fleet,—wood, hemp, flax, and copper; now other nations buy of her iron and coal—yes, and their iron ships too. The political economist sees at a glance what this means.

England's most dangerous rival is America; and many people look upon a war between America and England, as between Germany and France, merely as a question of time. But the weightiest commercial interests on both sides of the Atlantic are opposed to such a war; and here too the prospects of peace outnumber those of war.

The Eastern question is that which might most easily involve England in a European war. Whether she would fight in the next war on the side of France, or on that of Russia, is as yet doubtful.

In a war between France and Prussia, England will at first be neutral; should Prussia be seriously menaced and defeated, we may then see the English banner once more waving by the side of the Prussian eagle. England cannot relinquish the dominion of Europe (and France would have it if Prussia fell) either to France or to Napoleon.

Austria has lost most, both in influence, power, and territory. In the year 1846 she incorporated the republic of Cracow. Twice already she has attempted to unite the different nationalities that are comprised under her rule by a common constitution, but has only thereby made contrarieties more contrary. By the Peace of Villafranca and Zürich in the year 1860 she gave up the possession of Lombardy, and in 1866 that of Venetia. At Nikolsburg Austria withdrew from Germany, and gave it up to Prussia's influence.

The possession of Italy and her own position in the Confederation did not contribute to Austria's power; and if her statesmen understood their task, if they have the wish to see that her centre of gravity is on the Danube and the Adriatic, Austria may become stronger and more powerful than she was really before.

Before everything else the Emperor must make Hungary again a source of advantage to himself and his realm, and Hungary must see that her future is wrapped up with that of Austria, who, the meanwhile, as mistress of the Danube and down to the Black Sea, will get additional influence and openings for her commerce as the Eastern questions are cleared up. There is an immense opening for her in this direction.

A railway from Cattaro, one of the finest harbours in the world, through Bosnia and Servia to Temesvar, must serve as her main line of communication.

Austria has at present no alliance.

Russia cannot forget her ingratitude; and though the interests of the two States in respect to Turkey, the Lower Danube, and the Black Sea, admit of being reconciled, there is material enough here for perpetual conflicts. Russia is powerful enough on the Black Sea to leave the Danube to Austria, and the two Powers united would be able to exercise an influence that the Western Powers, even if they come to form an alliance again, would be incapable of neutralizing.

It is quite clear that Austria cannot as yet be on friendly terms with Italy. A serious hindrance to this arises from their different religious tendencies, notwithstanding that both of them are Catholics. When the day of reckoning comes between the Popedom and Italy, it may easily bring about a collision between Austria and Italy; with this exception—both States might come to a good understanding, it would be their interest to do so, in case Austria has really given up all designs upon Lombardy.

Austria's natural ally is Prussia; and if there was a ground for their enmity in collision with their interests in Germany, this ground has been taken away; their commercial interests draw them together.

Austria is the connecting link between Germany and the States belonging to Turkey, as Russia is on the other side between Europe and Asia.

It is for the interest of Prussia that Austria should have command of the Danube, although she must be very cautious as regards Russia about the steps she takes to forward their interest. Prussia's position between these two Powers is a

very difficult one. This question is the touchstone of Prussian diplomacy, whose object it must be to mediate continually between the two, and yet to have an eye to Austria's interests upon the Danube, as being Prussia's as well.

An alliance between Austria and France is unnatural, and could only serve to insure the subjugation of Germany, thereby giving France an incalculable preponderance of power.

A strong German State is a life-question for Austria as well, though she is no longer in a position to found or to protect such a State. If the German elements in her empire can lean upon the Fatherland, this will be of service to her as against the many Sclavic, Czech, and Magyar elements.

Should war actually break out with France (and eventually it must come), a large party, especially the army, will court vengeance for Königgrätz; but we hope that calm reason will gain the upper hand, and that Herr von Beust will not again miscalculate, as he did for Saxony.

Those who in and out of Austria wish for a Franco-Austrian offensive alliance against the North German Confederation (this cannot any more be separated from Prussia) forget mostly what a side of danger such an alliance would have; they are carried away by their hatred of Prussia, and it is notorious that hatred makes people blind. The danger of such an alliance to Austria is under-estimated, and we do not think we take too dark a view, when we see the utter fall and ruin of Austria as its possible result. Russia, alarmed at the idea of the supremacy of France, would ally herself closely with Prussia, make a diversion on the Danube, and contemporaneously kindle a torch amongst the Sclavonian populations of Austria, that would burn with a vengeance.

What Hungary would do in this case no one can tell; but it is doubtful whether Austria could reckon upon her in every emergency.

If France were beaten on the Rhine, or the war remained undecided, Austria with her internal complications and divisions would find it difficult to come to favourable terms with Russia. If it were beaten on that side, the old empire would be undone.

On the other hand, and this is highly improbable, if France completely prostrated Germany, and Austria at the same time conquered the Russian army, Austria might possibly remain for a time in her present territorial condition, but France would claim the supremacy in Germany—Germany would come under a foreign yoke. The German people are too powerful to endure this. England could not consent to it for a permanence. Endless European complications would follow, and Austria undoubtedly would have to be the victim at last. Probabilities are always more or less uncertain, especially in political questions. But that the present position of European affairs supplies factors for such a computation, no impartial person will deny.

Austria is passing through a very dangerous period of transition, has two States for neighbours which are powerful by virtue of the adhesion that belongs to one nationality—and powerful at Austria's cost. In consequence of this there is a stir amongst the different nationalities, which are partly emboldened, and partly dispirited, by the pangs of giving birth to a constitution which Austria has had upon her for eighteen years. We hope the clever doctor whom the Emperor has called in may succeed in delivering a healthy child at last; we wish it in the interest of the old venerable Imperial family, which has experienced latterly such bitter blows of misfortune, and in the interest of Germany, which would be no gainer by the fall of Austria.

Austria is in more urgent need of peace than any other State. To be able to maintain peace, and make use of it for

the strengthening of her monarchy, she must make a point of keeping on friendly terms with Prussia, and seek at the same time a good understanding with Russia. If she does not do this, but lets herself be led away into an alliance with France, and consequently into war, then nothing can save the old Imperial State, its dissolution will rapidly follow. The Holy Alliance was of especial advantage to Austria, and her era of misfortune begins from the moment when, inconceivably too, she began to be untrue to this Alliance.

As regards the plan which is to govern the present reconstruction of Austria, we do not know the secret threads of it. From what we see as distant spectators, we look upon it as full of risk to attempt a constitutional separation of the component parts of the monarchy in its present state of disunion. At present the different nationalities have only the State-debt in common, and that is not the pleasantest bond of unity. Italy, from being a chaos of badly governed States and a vassal of Austria, has become an independent nation, with power in herself to play an important part in Europe.

Her territorial condition has quite changed since the times of the Vienna Congress. Tuscany, Naples, and the small States have ceased to exist. Rome alone, and the small Papal territory, retains an independent existence out of the pale of the kingdom of Italy; the King of Sardinia has become King of Italy. At that time there were ten States in the Peninsula, now there are hardly four; for Monaco and the little republic of San Marino cannot be seriously counted as States.

The French Revolution of 1848 found a sharp and loud echo in Italy. There was open revolt in Milan; the veteran Field-Marshal Radetzky had to leave the town with his troops. The King of Sardinia gave a liberal constitution, and inscribed the unity of Italy on his banners. He declared

war against Austria; volunteers flocked to him from the whole of Italy. In June, Radetzky advanced to meet him, and defeated the Piedmontese at Custozza. Charles Albert was obliged to flee from Milan in the night. Radetzky entered it again on the 6th of August, and the whole of Northern Italy was soon in the hands of Austria.

An insurrection broke out in Rome against Pius IX. The Minister Rossi was murdered, the Pope fled to Gaeta, the Revolution in Rome assumed dangerous proportions, and the Pope called in the aid of the Catholic Powers. On the 3d of June 1849, the French occupied Rome, five thousand Spaniards landed, and the Austrians took Bologna and Ancona. A French garrison remained in Rome, and the Pope returned in the year 1850.

It was in 1830 and 1831 that Louis Napoleon, with his elder brother, who died afterwards, entered into a conspiracy for the liberation of Italy, and fought at Bologna; he was afterwards in close confederacy with the Italian Carbonari; and it is asserted by many that it was Mazzini who contrived his escape from Ham.

When he became Emperor, the Italian democrats looked upon him as a traitor to their cause, resolved to murder him, and thought that the European complications to which his death must give rise, would offer the best opportunity for liberating Italy. The different attempts to assassinate him, Pianori's, who shot at him in 1854, and afterwards Orsini's, sprang from this source.

The agitation in Italy continually increasing, and Piedmont beginning at the instigation of her great Minister, Cavour, to prepare in good earnest for war with Austria (Cavour had joined in the Crimean War against Russia, simply that he might have a voice in the negotiations for peace), when Napoleon saw that the National party was getting more

excited against him, and heard from his police agents that many daggers still threatened him from that quarter, he determined to give his support to Italy, concentrated an army in the south of France, and marched into Piedmont, when the Austrian troops crossed the boundary.

The Proclamation, from the Mediterranean to the Adriatic, is as well known as that Napoleon made peace long before he reached the Adriatic. He did this, because he saw that the Italians were in earnest about their unity, and feared complications on the Rhine, should he, in case the war went on, be obliged to attack the territory of the Confederation.

The intention in Villafranca, and in Zürich as well, was to create a federal State, similar to the Germanic Confederation. But the Italians did not wish this; they had the German model before their eyes, and it was not very inviting.

Cavour had only apparently given up the idea of a united Italy, and with the help of the Revolution he succeeded in driving out the reigning Princes. The Grand-Duke of Tuscany succumbed without making an attempt to defend his crown. Naples showed fight at first. Garibaldi landed from Sicily, where the Revolution had been successful, and entered Naples with his volunteers. The troops withdrew with the King and Queen to Gaeta, and remained there for some months, but were obliged to yield to the superior numbers of the Piedmontese army. The fate of the royal family found the warmest sympathy at all the old Courts; many and just complaints were made of this breach of the principle of legitimacy, but no State would go to war for it.

The articles in a well-known conservative Prussian newspaper at that time are interesting. *Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis.*

Rome was occupied by a French garrison, which only left

it in 1866. Italy seems inclined to wait for the solution of the Romish question till the death of Pius IX.

Though there are many difficulties in Italy to overcome, especially that of Rome, and the financial embarrassments, still we believe that she will remain united, and gradually become consolidated. Political life has been opened up and developed in the higher ranks, and the patriotism which pervades the whole nation will seek its improvement and welfare.

In a political point of view Italy has not yet the position in Europe which it will take eventually. Prussia is its only ally, and if Ratazzi, with his Napoleonic inclinations, should succeed in giving up this alliance and throwing the country into the arms of France, he would do it a disservice. Prussia and Italy must hold firmly together; this alliance is the surest means to keep things balanced in Europe. As long as these two Powers remain friendly, an alliance between Austria and France, the most dangerous for the quiet of Europe, is impossible. England knows this too, and will always try to remain on a good footing with Prussia and Italy.

At the present moment there certainly seems to be a party in Italy that is agitating strongly against Prussia, and dreaming of a union with the Latin race. The race-idea is the *beau idéal* of national enthusiasm, and yet practically it has no great significance. If the material, geographical, commercial, and dynastic interests of people of the same stock are divergent, the hatred between them is greater than if they were of an entirely different race.

Immediately after the war of 1860, the Italians were much more hostile to France than they are now to Prussia. At that time France conquered Lombardy for them, and in 1866 Prussia conquered Venetia for them. Both times the national

vanity of the Italians was hurt by the lie being given to their "*Italia farà da se*"—"Italy will do it herself."

An alliance with Prussia does not exclude good neighbouring relations between Austria and Italy; on the contrary, it is for the interests of both nations.

Spain, from its geographical position and incessant political storms, has hardly any influence on the politics of Europe. This unhappy country, which, as regards resources, situation, and climate, might be the fairest and richest country in Europe, suffers from the bad example of its upper ranks, an unfortunate royal family, bad priests, a bad administration, and, above all, a delusive constitutionalism, which admits of the most outrageous abuses.

The Spanish army, which as regards endurance and material has very much that is good in it, is, alas! constantly implicated in revolutions, and so long as it is not brought to the point of unconditional obedience to the reigning family and the Government appointed by it, Spain will never be at rest.

Portugal has also suffered much from internal unrest; but it is unquestionably improving under the rule of the present king.

In both these countries there is a party which would like to unite the whole Peninsula in one kingdom under the headship of Portugal; but hitherto it appears to have no great significance. It is quite patent, too, that the Spanish and Portuguese have no liking for each other, but the contrary. We don't know what changes railways may bring about there, as in other places.

There is not much to say about the alliances of Spain. England and France find an innocent diplomatic pleasure in neutralizing each other's influence in these countries.

Greece, a creation of European diplomacy, has not, so far, given much joy to its parents, the protecting Powers.

In consequence of a revolution and the intervention of a French force, which Charles X. had sent there with the intention of making himself popular in France, Greece was liberated from the Turks and Egyptians.

Count Capodistria was chosen as President; he was to prepare the ground for a king, whom the protecting Powers would appoint. This excellent and energetic man ruled the country, which was thoroughly disordered, with remarkable wisdom up to the year 1831. He was murdered by two assassins when he was going out of church, on the 3d of October in that year.

After the refusal of Leopold, the future King of Belgium, Otho, son of the King of Bavaria, who was sixteen years old at the time, was chosen to be King of Greece. On the 6th of February 1833 he made his entrance into Nauplia, which was the capital then, but afterwards he made Athens his capital.

He tried, with great self-devotion, mistaken perhaps in the means he made use of,—too much mildness for such a deceitful people,—to promote the best interests of his realm, but reaped only ingratitude, and left it, in consequence of a revolution, in the year 1862.

The protecting Powers could not allow the fall of Greece, nor that it should become an untenable Republic.

Russia seems to have thought of the Emperor's nephew, the Prince of Leuchtenberg, as successor to King Otho. But when England especially opposed this, from fear that Greece would become an advanced Russian outpost, Russia, with great foresight and prudence, receded into the background.

England wishes to make Greece to a certain extent an independent Christian country, and relinquished with this view Corfu and the Ionian Islands, which, in consequence of the change steam-power has brought about in the

navy, were no longer so important to her as before, and taxed her finances pretty heavily.

The Greeks thought that they would do best under English protection, and therefore chose the Queen's second son, Prince Alfred, as their king. But he refused the crown, and then the second son of the King of Denmark was proposed and elected. He ascended the throne as King George.

Accidents often determine the fate of individuals and of States. The following is related in connexion with this at that time quite unexpected choice. The veteran Lord Palmerston was standing in his drawing-room on one of his reception days,—this was every Saturday,—and was speaking to several of his friends about Greece, when the brother of the Princess of Wales, who was then in London with his parents, came in. Palmerston observing him said, after one moment of thought: "Look at that nice boy, he might do for Greece!" This idea, which no one had thought of before, was followed up, and King George lives now in Athens.

Whether Greece can gain independence and vitality, it is difficult to say. The hope that it may at some time throw the Turks back into Asia, and form the nucleus of a Christian State, with Constantinople for its capital, lies yet in the womb of an uncertain future.

Greece is one State more that has come into existence since the Vienna Congress; but it is also one diplomatic difficulty more,—it has increased the perplexity of the Eastern question.

Another State that has been formed since the Congress is Belgium.

In August 1830 a revolution broke out in Brussels against the King of the Netherlands, and spread over the provinces

that had been united to the old State of Holland by the Vienna Congress. The Dutch were defeated in an attack upon Brussels, and the Netherlanders showed the most determined opposition to the Orange rule. The other Powers were afraid of a European war, and preferred founding an independent State, which they called, in the language of modern diplomacy, a neutral State. In 1831 the Belgians chose for their King Prince Leopold of Coburg, who had refused the throne of Greece. Holland would not abandon the struggle. They held Antwerp; but the French came to the aid of the Belgians, besieged, and took it.

Under King Leopold Belgium made enormous progress in material and industrial pursuits. In spite of its being asserted in France that the Belgians long to become French, the people have a very keen sense of independence.

Holland has become reconciled to the loss of Belgium, and a good understanding now exists between the two States. Newspaper politicians have often fancied that Holland was threatened by Prussia, and talked as if there was an agreement between Prussia and France, according to which Holland should fall to Prussia, and Belgium to France. This could not well be without a European war, and if it did take place, both States would get very reluctant subjects.

Prussia is strong enough at present without incorporating Holland, and has a great task before her, if she means to give Germany a real unity. An intimate alliance between France and Holland, with practical results as respects Belgium, is not to be thought of without war.

Denmark has suffered much through the last wars, in loss of territory as well as of political importance.

Before 1846, when the quarrels with the German Duchies began, all the diplomatic posts and higher offices of State in Denmark were filled by members of the noble families in the

Duchies. When these families fell into disfavour, the appointments came into the hands of persons who were not suitable for them. If hatred to Germany had not been so artificially cherished, if the inhabitants of the Duchies had not been so exasperated by bad treatment, if the democratic Danish party had not committed such great faults both before and after the death of the last King, it could not have come to war. The Duchies would have remained united to Denmark, though by personal union.

For Germany it is better as it is, and Prussia will know how to protect and make use of this valuable acquisition.

The Eider Canal may do serious injury to Denmark, as it deprives the Sound of much of its importance; and Denmark may be glad that the Sound dues are done away.

Whether Denmark will continue as an independent country the future only can decide. The Scandinavian idea, which a few years ago had many supporters, especially at the Swedish universities, and had reached Denmark as well, seems to have fallen again into the background. A Scandinavian kingdom, consisting of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, would have no great political importance; the countries are not rich enough by nature, and the population is too small. Sweden's recovery of Finland is not to be thought of. Russia has shown her wisdom in retaining the old institutions and the old constitution of Finland; and this province would not itself desire to be separated from Russia; besides this, Russia is too powerful for Sweden, though strengthened by Denmark, seriously to think of going to war with her.

If we examine the present condition of Europe, we find that deeper, more penetrating, and greater changes have taken place than appears at the first look. The most sensible have been those in Germany and Italy.

The process of consolidation, alike by war and in peace,

through which both countries have so remarkably passed, is very full of importance. The wars which followed the first French Revolution, and the Vienna Congress as well, brought about a diminution in the number of the small States, mostly in favour of the middle ones; in the year 1792 there were 304 quite small and fourteen middle States in Germany; after the Congress there were thirty-five monarchies and four republics. By the abdication of the two Princes of Hohenzollern, and the extinction of four dynasties, the number sank down to twenty-nine Sovereigns and four Burgomasters. By the war of 1866 three dynasties were driven from their thrones, in Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau, and the free town of Frankfort lost its independence.

The North German Confederation embraces twenty-one States, of which no one would assert that they are still in possession of the sovereign rights which the Congress of Vienna conferred upon them.

The South German States, since their severance from the original confederation, have gained perhaps in sovereignty, but they feel themselves that they must for this very reason lean on a more powerful State, and sooner or later will have to become members of the German Confederation.

Count Münster said of Poland, at the Congress of Vienna, that whatever form and position were given to it, the results would be war, revolution, and misery. He was right. He said further, quite openly, that if the Confederation was really to unite Germany and make it strong, the Princes must keep the promise they gave to their people after the war of liberation, by giving them representative constitutions. In this too he was right; only the development has not gone on so quickly as he expected.

Whether the immediate future carries peace or war in its lap no one can say beforehand with the certainty of demon-

stration. Every State has developed its material resources in a surprising manner; in political and social matters the development has not gone on at an equal pace, and every State finds itself consequently more or less in a period of transition.

If we compare the Europe of 1868 with Europe in the year 1815, we find that in respect to their material development, the increase of their population, and actual strength, England and Germany have made the most gigantic steps in advance. We have already touched upon England's superiority at sea, and the Volunteers are not, as many suppose, a child's-play, or a dangerous institution, like most national guards; they are a very important body for the defence of the country.

The organization of the old Confederation seemed to give Germany more military strength than at present; but every one knew that the army was constituted on a bad principle, and was convinced that, if the country was actually attacked, the enemy would be in the heart of it before a federal commander-in-chief could have put himself at the head of the army.

Germany's central position in the railway system of Europe is of immense importance to her both in a commercial and strategic point of view.

As we have already seen, the population of Germany, without reckoning the German provinces of Austria, has come to be equal to that of France; and as regards taxation, capital, and national debt, the balance is in favour of Germany.

France since 1815 has not gained so much in power and strength as superficial observers are wont to suppose. The revolutions of 1830 and 1848, three changes of dynasty, with several years of republican government in the midst of them, and the employment of quite different systems of administra-

tion, have had no good effect upon the country. Absolute imperialism has done much in the way of art and material improvement, and France has risen apparently to a high degree of power. But, if there should be a change in the system of government, many a new creation might fall to pieces.

A centralized and centralizing Government like the French has great power, but involves great danger as well. Steam can do more than water-power and hand-labour; but if the boiler bursts the power ceases, and the machine stops.

The wars which Louis Napoleon has brought about and conducted have brought some new victories, some laurels, to the French army. The real benefit of France was mostly a mere illusion; she has got no increase of territory and population, but her national debt has been swollen. The Crimean War brought her nothing but an unimportant diplomatic preponderance for a few years. The war in Italy laid the foundation for the rise of a great Italian State, which in course of time may become inconvenient to France, and the annexation of Nice and Savoy is but a poor recompense for her losses in men and money.

A terrible episode is the war in Mexico, which the French statesmen entered upon in a light and inconsiderate manner, and have brought to a close in a way one would not have expected from a people like the French, who have always made so much of the code of honour and chivalry. The Archduke Maximilian of Austria, who, relying on the Emperor Napoleon's assurances, embarked in this noble indeed, but somewhat adventurous enterprise, has fallen a victim to a confidence which, alas! was so little justified. Europe could not help the unfortunate prince.

France made sacrifices for this war, whose extent the French Government only knows; and a great part of the

activity in the military department, which was looked upon as directed against Prussia, was only intended to cover the great losses which the army had sustained.

The questions which, during the last ten years, threatened the peace of Europe, were the relation of Austria and Prussia to one another and to Germany, having its necessary issue in a struggle for the supremacy, the internal discords of Italy, and Austria's rule there, the question of the German Duchies, and the Eastern question. These have been decided by the sword, and in such a manner that, with the exception of the Eastern question, they may be regarded as permanently settled. We quite believe that war will break out again in the East, but how soon is as yet very doubtful; and it is probable that, when it does arise, it will not affect Germany directly.

War can only come upon Germany from France or Austria, or both, and could have no other real aim than to hinder and destroy its unity. If, as we hope, peace is maintained, this work of cohesion will go on, though slowly, and prosper; but if war is in the immediate future, it will be more rapidly completed.

Germany—in war or peace—will have a great destiny.

Let her enemies know that the first gun fired by an invader, will be answered by a Royal salute for United Germany.

V.

DESPATCHES FROM PARIS.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

PARIS, *April* 20, 1814.

SIR,—I have had the honour of announcing to your Royal Highness my arrival in Paris. You are aware of the circumstances which led to the separation of the generals from the Cabinets of the Allied Sovereigns. It is to this that the turn which the affairs of France have taken is in a great measure to be attributed; for I venture the belief that, if the Ministers of England, of Austria, and of Prussia, had been present at the taking of the capital of France, they would not have agreed to the declaration made, in name of the Allies, by the Emperor Alexander, on the 31st March.

This declaration (made by M. de-Talleyrand) is a veritable Pandora's box. We shall probably have to regret for long the consequences which it may produce. Our immense success had put us in the position of giving laws to France, and of securing her peace and that of Europe.

The arrangements made with the Emperor of Russia at the time of his first departure from Troyes ought to have served us for a guarantee as to the measures which he would take in existing circumstances. It would be superfluous to

analyse all the evil which the declaration of the 31st March may yet produce. Suffice it to observe that it has unsettled the very equitable conditions under which the Allies had offered peace to France. These conditions already admitted of modifications.

Now they seem likely to make more, and whilst they offer what the Kings of France have previously possessed, compensation on the Continent for the colonies England desires to keep, must, amongst other things, be provided.

What is more dangerous to the peace of the world is the manner in which they have compromised the question of the supreme power. The Senate of Bonaparte arrogates to itself the right of deposing it for deeds which it had itself approved as so many proofs of wisdom. The new constitution, emanating from the Provisional Government named by this Senate, instead of returning to the principle of the right of the Bourbons to the Crown, claims to call them to it whilst obliging them to retain the existing Senators, and to render them hereditary, and to secure to them their revenues.

PARIS, *April* 21, 1814.

SIR,—I have had the honour of announcing to your Royal Highness, by M. de Best, my arrival in Paris. No one renders thanks to Providence more sincerely than I do for the very brilliant success which has been granted to our efforts. I am desirous of being able to say, that we have profited, in as far as is possible by the means put into our hands, to secure the peace of France and of the world, but I cannot conceal from myself that very grave errors have been committed, and that we shall have many difficulties to contend with. The moment when I shall be able to explain myself on all these subjects orally is so near, that I limit myself to the single observation, that we have (through, as

I think, ill-advised philanthropy) allowed the tyrant, who possessing a very powerful party, retains ample means of injuring us, to escape, and that we have, on the other hand, failed to secure the very important object of a return to legitimate sovereignty.

The Bourbons are called only by a political corps created by Bonaparte, which arrogates to itself the right of dethroning for deeds which it had formerly approved as the acts of a wisdom almost supernatural. The Senate, which contains the accomplices of the most atrocious acts of the Revolution, is constituted hereditary, and the Bourbons will be constrained to rule along with the instruments of Bonaparte's tyranny. It is, nevertheless, this egregiously impudent act which has most outraged the people, and they labour to return to this point. It is desired that the King of France, in accepting the constitution, should except the article which decrees the permanence of the present Senate, and that he should send it back for the decision of the nation. The manner in which it is desirable that the nation should declare its wishes is not very apparent. To consult it would not certainly at all times be safe. I believe the observations contained in my preceding reports, on the spirit which prevails in France, cannot be gainsaid. It must not be concealed that the Bourbon party is feeble, whilst that of their adversaries joins to strength indefatigable activity. The derangement of the State finances which caused the Revolution will, without doubt, lead to fresh difficulties. The two last campaigns cost Bonaparte fifteen thousand millions of francs; the public treasury is empty; there are three hundred millions of pressing debts; and, above all, there are the complaints of officers who cannot live without their pay. The number of officers in France amounts to fifty thousand. Now the public will complain of a deficit which, though caused by Bonaparte, will only be felt under Louis XVIII.

Paris, that grand focus of troubles, has gained prodigiously by the magnificence to which the rapine of Bonaparte conduced, and the embellishments which he made, with as much profusion as taste, have maintained a crowd of people, who will become dangerous when the means of supporting them shall fail. It will be difficult to find the sums necessary for the Government. When they shall have reduced the combined claims, too onerous to be continued, the revenue of this empire will not exceed five hundred millions of francs. It will remain under this sum as long as our armies occupy half the territory, and until the provinces ravaged by the war shall have somewhat recruited. The evils inseparable from war have exasperated the people, and the Parisians, in spite of their levity, see with regret the bivouacs of the Allies, which disfigure all the avenues and promenades of the capital.

It is in this state of matters that Bonaparte has been left for twenty days to intrigue with his partisans, whilst they have signed with him that memorable act by which he obtains the sovereignty of the island of Elba, with a revenue for himself of two millions of livres, and four more for the Archduchess Maria Louisa and the rest of his family. They preserve to him the title of Emperor, and the right to have a guard and 400 men, and a corvette. The Archduchess, after visiting her father, the Emperor of Austria, is to bend her steps to Vienna, where she intends to reside. The Duchies of Parma, of Piacenza, and of Guastella will remain for her and her son. The wife of Jerome Bonaparte, who is *enceinte*, has persisted in accompanying her husband, in spite of the entreaties of her father to return to him. It is very remarkable that the report seems to be confirmed that Jerome and Joseph Bonaparte are at the head of a troop which refuses to surrender, and which infests the neighbourhood of Orleans.

These two brothers being little renowned for their personal courage, it is very reasonable to suppose, that if their party was not strong they would have preferred entering into the same negotiations for pensions as Napoleon. The latter has carried his want of delicacy to the point of haggling over his wines and the carriages he has left. A certain amount of military display is also granted him in the island of Elba. I do not know if it is true, as is maintained, that he insists on being conveyed there in an English man-of-war. It was indeed only yesterday at nine in the evening that he quitted Fontainebleau to proceed to his destination. He is accompanied by the officers of the different Allied Powers, and by detachments of cavalry. But I should not be surprised to see him carried off *en route* by the numerous partisans he must have in the army.

The Allied troops remain meantime in the cantonments assigned to them. I wish that this measure may not prove premature. Negotiations are even going forward for the final evacuation of the territory, which ought to take place in proportion to the delivery, by the French, of the fortresses of the countries which they ought to abandon. After the proposed arrangement, the fortresses on the Elbe which are so onerous to us would be evacuated during the twenty-five days.

To-day I have consulted Lord Castlereagh on the march of our troops. He advises that they should remain where they are at this time, and I shall consequently write to-morrow to the Duke of Cambridge. It is necessary besides that his Royal Highness should be on his guard when the terrible Davoust will be traversing the country with the garrison of Hardenberg. The return of the Swedish troops will be a new calamity for the States of your Royal Highness. We may flatter ourselves that the Prince of Sweden will not

renew the war in Holstein on account of this unfortunate Norway, of which he has only the half.

I have waited to-day on this Prince. But I think under present circumstances I ought not to deliver to him the letter with which your Royal Highness intrusted me.

The affairs of Germany are in train, but they are rendered very intricate by the difficulties resulting from the large demands that Russia makes on Poland, and by some other plans that this Power desires to carry out, but of which I must reserve my very humble report for the next courier. I confess I find myself in a painful position between the desire to obey as soon as possible the order of your Royal Highness to return to London, and the fear of neglecting your interests at headquarters. Thus I am kept here from day to day indefinitely.—I am, with most profound respect, etc.

PARIS, *April* 27, 1814.

SIR,—The negotiations for peace, and the arrangements which will necessarily follow, begin to proceed more promptly. The treaty of armistice, signed on the 23d April, between the Allies and France, established the great principle of the surrenders which the last-named Power will have to make. She gives up the fortresses of the States which are no longer to be hers. I have regretted much that the general interest of Europe did not admit of a more prompt evacuation of Magdeburg and Hamburg, the continued occupation of which, even to the end of May, will be especially burdensome to Hanover. In existing circumstances, whilst foreign troops flow back from the interior of France towards Germany, it seems to me that the march of our troops towards the Rhine has become useless. After having come to an understanding on this subject with Lord Castlereagh and the Chancellor of Prussia, as senior member of the

Committee of Ministers, I sent off the letter, of which I annex a copy, to the Government of Hanover, for the purpose of arresting the march, not only of the Hanoverian Contingent, but also of the second corps of the German army. Meanwhile, there are far too many seeds of disunion in Europe, and the state of Germany is too insecure to allow us to think of disarming as yet. I have therefore thought it my duty to request his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge to continue the organization of the corps intrusted to him, and I intend to-morrow to repeat my request that the staff of the second corps of the army may be formed. I have felt particularly interested at this time in the recent discussions on Norway. Your Royal Highness knows my mode of thinking on this matter. It is quite certain that the Prince of Sweden has not contributed, as he was bound by his engagements to do, to the attainment of the great end at which we have now arrived, I venture to say, in opposition to his wishes. It is proved positively by the French officers set at liberty by him in order to make partisans for himself in the interior of France, as well as by intercepted letters (amongst others by a letter from General Maison in the possession of Marshal Wrede), that the Prince of Sweden had promised to the party then governing France, not to agree to the contraction of the frontiers of France on this side of the Rhine, and that he was prepared to set aside the Bourbons, and to possess himself of the supreme power, under the title of Protector.

The Prince of Sweden insists on resuming the positions in Holstein which he held there before the Peace of Sicily, and he wishes the King of Denmark to declare that the Prince of Hesse has forfeited his right to the Crown, if he persists in supporting Norway. The Danes represent that they pre-

dicted to the Prince of Sweden what has happened in Norway, and that they cannot force the country to yield; that the Prince of Sweden had undertaken that duty; that finally, in virtue of signed treaties, they have sent the artillery of Rindsburg to besiege Hamburg, and their best troops to march on the Rhine. So far from this being listened to, the treaty which requires Norway, Sweden, and the Allied Courts to send a joint mission to Denmark for this purpose, has to be fulfilled, in default of which it is resolved that the corps of Bennigsen shall occupy Holstein.

Perceiving that it was possible that the Prince of Sweden might wish to make use of our troops for the invasion of Denmark, I addressed the annexed note on this subject to Lord Castlereagh. It appears to me very important for the German interests of your Royal Highness that we should not be more entangled in this war, which does not concern us; and I am very glad that I have received a reply from the English Minister, which is also appended to this despatch, which secures us from such a result. Although the greater part of the Swedish troops return to Sweden, I am not sure that the Prince Royal would have spared our troops on that account; for it is known that the Swedes have scarcely been employed against the enemy.

I ought to observe on this occasion, that I have had an audience of the Prince of Sweden. I did not think it expedient to deliver the letter intrusted to me by your Royal Highness for him under other circumstances. The Prince begged me to commend his interests to your Royal Highness, by supporting, as he expressed himself, his rights of primogeniture, he having been the first to oppose Napoleon, at a time when it was still dangerous to do so. I am very ready to acknowledge his merits at that time. He did not speak to me of what has occurred more recently.

The conferences which have taken place between the Chancellor of Prussia and Count Stadion on matters respecting the new boundaries of the Powers between them and those which shall be fixed for Germany, have enabled this Minister to complete, this morning, the plan he will propose for adoption. I respectfully communicate it to your Royal Highness, in a few words, as a simple project, which, however, seems principally endangered by some ideas entertained, or perhaps by promises made, by his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, with regard to a provision which this monarch wishes to bestow on the *soi-disante* Queen of Westphalia, or even on the grandson of the Queen Hortense. I cannot say if this monarch is willing to lower the demands which he makes on Poland; this is the subject of frequent conferences betwixt Prince Czartorysky and Baron de Stein. According to the plan referred to above, Russia would gain two and a half millions of subjects in Poland; she would then possess there a population of nine and a half millions, —a portion large enough to form a separate kingdom, if his Imperial Majesty thinks that it would be most beneficial for his States. The point specially contested is, that Austria wishes to recover Cracow and the territory ceded to Russia at the Peace of Vienna. Austria would obtain by the new arrangements an augmentation of population above what she had before the Peace of Luneville of nearly one million and a half; for what she requires to repair her losses includes seven millions. This monarchy would then have twenty-seven millions of subjects. Austria would have among her other possessions in Germany, the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and part of Breisgau, the remainder would come to her from Italy, the Viceroy of which is about to submit and throw himself on the generosity of the Emperor. He cedes in succession, Venice, Legnago, Peschiera, and Palma Nuova. Piedmont

is given up to the King of Sardinia. Count St. Marsan proceeds there as Governor-General. Prussia, renouncing Anspach and Bayreuth, would give the south part of Munster and Paderborn to the King of Saxony, and would obtain Saxony and the territory which was reserved for her in the plan of which I have given an account to your Royal Highness, from Langres, restoring the possessions of the Princes of Nassau between the Meuse and the Rhine. Prussia would then have a population of eleven millions of subjects, and would gain above what she possessed, 700,000 inhabitants. Bavaria would recover the Palatinate, as indemnification for the Tyrol. There need be no scruple about curtailing the Grand-Duke of Baden a little, unless the Emperor of Russia protects him. The frontier of Hanover should comprise, in accordance with the first plan, the line which passes above Munster. But as Prussia cedes Paderborn we shall be quits by giving her a military route through the Principality of Göttingen. Further, Prussia cedes to her East Friesland, but she retains Minden, reserving the right of exchange by mutual agreement, her constant desire being to acquire Luxemburg and some detached portions of the Duchy of Lauenburg. We should thus gain a population of more than 300,000 souls, without losing anything.

The plan of the German Constitution remains nearly the same as that prepared at Langres; the only alteration is the willingness to admit Würtemberg to the Directory. I have this morning remitted to the Allied Camp the joint note on the pecuniary interests of Hanover. I flatter myself that the contents of this despatch will prove to your Royal Highness that my continued absence from London is not voluntary.—I am, with most profound respect, etc.

PARIS, *April* 27, 1814.

SIR,—Flattering myself that I shall at length be able to return to London at the end of eight days, I delay the relation to your Royal Highness of a number of curious facts, which explain the manner in which the Bourbons and the satellites of Bonaparte begin to oppose each other. I confine myself to-day to observing that the Emperor of Russia has decorated M. La Harpe with the cordon of St. Andrew, and that he has shown a desire that the King of France should send M. de Caulaincourt as ambassador to him. It is this request which has moved the latter to make the singular apology inserted in the political papers on the abduction of the Duke of Enghien. Bonaparte, after some days' chaffering, during his sojourn at Fontainebleau, over the wines and carriages left at Paris, has at last set out some days since for his island. The Princess of Würtemberg, wife of Jerome, has not consented to leave her husband, as the King, her father, wished. She has followed Jerome into Switzerland, being *enciente* for the first time since her marriage. The jewels, and there were many apart from the Crown, have been reclaimed *en route* by a French officer, who has restored them to the Tuileries. I know, Sir, that Lord Castlereagh has represented to Lord Liverpool how desirable it would be that your Royal Highness should invite the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia to come to London when his Majesty the Emperor of Russia pays his visit. I cannot too highly commend this proposal. And I take the liberty of respectfully reminding your Royal Highness, as I have it on good authority, that the King of Prussia is beginning to be uneasy on this subject, and that the Emperor of Austria has little desire to go to England, because he fears that he might not be as well received as the other monarchs. Both are worthy of the highest regard,

and their perfect concord with your Royal Highness ought to secure the peace of Europe. I respectfully request the consideration of a few words, which you might perhaps address to me in private on this subject, serving to point out to these sovereigns the personal anxiety your Royal Highness feels to make their acquaintance.

Amongst other strangers, the Prince of Hardenberg is here. Esterhazy will be Austrian ambassador at Paris.—I am, Sir, with most respectful submission, etc.

PARIS, *May* 5, 1814.

SIR,—The Chevalier Syrevith having offered me a safe opportunity of addressing a despatch to your Royal Highness, I avail myself of it to add some remarks on Chancellor Hardenberg's plan for the general arrangement of the affairs of Europe. This negotiation keeps pace with that which has for its object definitive peace with France, which it is hoped will be ready for signature in fifteen days. The existing Government of France cannot be excluded from taking any part in the arrangements made to settle the relations of the different Empires of Europe, as it was formerly intended that Bonaparte's should be. I have read with attention this plan of the Chancellor's, which he himself considers only as a simple proposition, in order to have a basis which may give a more definite character to the negotiations. Having seen the great difficulties of conciliating so many opposite interests, as well as those resulting from a number of special treaties, perhaps too hurriedly engaged in, this plan merits much praise. As I have had the honour of giving your Royal Highness a general idea of it, I think that will suffice for the present. The Chancellor is invited to-day to wait on the Emperor of Russia, to communicate his plan to him. It is on the part of this Prince that we expect

difficulties to arise. I believe, however, it may be relied on that his Majesty projects the re-establishment of Poland, and that he is to be declared King of it.

Looking at it from this point, it seems desirable to re-unite in one man as large a portion of this country as can be obtained. But Austria absolutely demands back Cracow, the circle of Gamosk, and the 400,000 souls which the Peace of Vienna caused her to cede to Russia. This point may lead to serious misunderstanding between the two Emperors. Austria looks on Cracow as a military position indispensable to the defence of her frontiers; the Emperor of Russia seems to set a great value on the place where the ancient Kings of Poland were crowned. I know that his Majesty is piqued at the interposition of England on this matter, and certainly it is a question of too much general interest to Europe for a Power like Great Britain to leave it alone. I am anxious, in the meantime, to represent as strongly as possible the necessity of avoiding at present, almost at any price, a new war, which would embarrass everything, and which will be kindled less easily when all the military have returned to their homes, and all the States feel the effects of the extreme exhaustion produced by their late struggle. I have had a conversation with Count de Stadion on the subject of the Chancellor of Prussia's plan. It seems to me that Austria has difficulty in consenting to see Prussia seize on Electoral Saxony. She fears that after a time this possession may cause misunderstandings with Austria, and she still regards the despoiling of the King of Saxony, and the small portion assigned him in Low Münster and Paderborn, as an injustice. The advantages that Austria will obtain in Italy are, however, too important not to make her shut her eyes to these considerations. Her own territory will not only be largely augmented, but the possessions of other branches of

the family will be increased by the re-establishment of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, and the acquisition of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastella, by the Archduchess Maria Louisa.

The state of Italy appears to me, however, the least secure, and this is in a great measure owing to that unhappy treaty concluded with Murat, which grants him, besides the possession of Naples, an indemnity of 600,000 souls from Sicily. This usurper will thus obtain compensation for having received from Bonaparte the promise of an island which was not his; and the legitimate Sovereign of Sicily, who has lost his kingdom for having resisted Bonaparte, will not have the half of what has been so unjustly snatched from him. Sooner or later sins of this sort against political morality avenge themselves. Italy desires a free or a federal Government. It is divided afresh by assigning new masters to the newly formed territories. In the north the Italians have opposed the system of Bonaparte more strongly than even France herself; yet it would be bold to maintain that this man, placed at present on the coast of Italy, may not some day become very dangerous in countries where the passions are so inflammable, and where he still has very enterprising partisans who could easily join those who remain to him in France. The protection which has been awarded to all his accomplices, the pensions preserved to them, form an example which may in the future incite the factious to enrich themselves in like manner. Independently of the six millions of livres granted out of the French treasury to Bonaparte and his family, Austria has consented to secure twelve millions of francs annually in name of pensions for the Legion of Honour, and for several marshals and generals in the provinces which formed the kingdom of Italy. The plan of which I am about to speak is occupied by the details of the indemnification of Austria and Prussia in

Germany. It will cause great changes in the south of Germany, since Bavaria must cede the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Salzburg, which contain 700,000 inhabitants, to Austria. They give to Bavaria in restitution part of the Palatinate, and of the possessions of Baden. The Grand-Duke of Baden in like manner must cede Breisgau to Austria as a result of the exchanges with Würtemberg. Prussia would obtain a considerable extent of country, which would extend her ancient possessions on the Rhine below Munster, even to Mayence, and on the left bank of the Rhine towards Luxemburg, whilst restoring the Princes of the house of Nassau between the Rhine and the Meuse. Russia has assigned to her 300,000 souls as her share of population, which she must cede in strict accordance with existing treaties to the Electorate of Hanover. But she reserves the detail of these cessions to be arranged between your Royal Highness and her in private. I have had the honour of saying that she destines East Friesland, the counties of Tecklenburg and Lingen, and all that remains of the bishopric of Munster, between these provinces, and Holland for us. Prussia has reserved besides a possession of 100,000 souls, for the purpose of making exchanges with Hesse. The country of Pluse and the bailiwick of Frendenburg, both surrounded by the possessions of your Royal Highness, are assigned to Prussia, evidently for the purpose of inducing or obliging us to consent to the exchange of territories. Prussia aims especially at Lauenburg, and seems to design Minden to facilitate this arrangement. The Prussian Chancellor proposes to enter into negotiations for these purposes, even in London, whither he will accompany the King. I spoke to him again yesterday of how impossible I found it to await here the conclusion of peace, in view of the order of your Royal Highness to return as soon as possible to London. The

Chancellor thereupon begged me to wait at least till the conclusion of his labours on the German constitution, of which it is wished to fix the general basis here, which may serve afterwards to guide the labours of the Congress which is expected to assemble at Vienna. As the preliminary work on this matter has been executed by Baron Humboldt and me, I think of deferring my departure for some days. We received yesterday accounts of the journey of Napoleon. By a singular chain of circumstances, he had to embark at the same place where he landed in returning from Egypt. The route by St. Tropez, by which it was intended to conduct him, being impracticable, he had to go to Fréjus. Nothing could have lowered Napoleon more than the pusillanimity he displayed on the journey. In Provence the people were much exasperated against him: he saw himself hang in effigy; he was loaded with insults, and his life was threatened. At Avignon he had to intrust Cæsar and his fortunes to a hired pony, to escape being stoned. Several times he changed clothes with the commissaries who accompanied him; he took their names, and even the white cockade, to disguise himself. He only felt himself at length in safety when on board the English frigate, which received him on April 26th, at nine in the evening. Once on the way he said that this same popular hatred had already pursued him fourteen years before; then it had changed, and that it might yet change again. A reply also has been intercepted to a plan communicated to Bonaparte, in which the writer said that he could not explain himself till he arrived at Fréjus. He had likewise spoken of his former plans against England, one of which was to form a great maritime arsenal in the Elbe, and to make Hamburg a second Antwerp! Now he speaks only of his desire to proceed to England; and he said to Colonel Campbell, that

in the island of Elba he should regard himself as an English subject. By a note addressed on the 25th April to all the mayors of the district through which Napoleon had to pass, holding them responsible for his safety, the four commissaries have secured themselves. Your Royal Highness will find in all the public papers details of the entry of the King of France into Paris, which took place the day before yesterday, at one o'clock. It was brilliant, and the people showed a tolerable amount of attachment. His Majesty was escorted by French troops only. The National Guard of Paris cried "*Vive le Roi;*" the troops of the line preserved a gloomy silence. In the evening the town was badly illuminated; however, they say it was no better in Bonaparte's time. To make amends, the illumination of the public buildings, of the Tuileries, and the fireworks let off on the Pont-Royal, were extremely paltry: this was undoubtedly ill-judged economy. The manner in which the King has extricated himself from the constitution is generally approved. Yesterday the Emperor of Russia caused all his troops in garrison here to file off before the Tuileries. It is not yet known when the King will receive strangers.—I am, with the deepest veneration, etc.

PARIS, *May* 9, 1814.

SIR,—Having received Mr. Best's letter, in which your Royal Highness has done me the honour of charging me to repeat the invitation which you have given to the Emperors of Russia and Austria, as well as to the King of Prussia, to proceed to England, I have obtained the information necessary to enable me to execute, as wished, the orders you have deigned to intrust to me. Their Majesties the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia having decided on going to England as soon as the Peace with France is signed, I

have thought it my duty to confine myself, as regards them, to repeating to their Ministers the anxiety which your Royal Highness has shown to make their acquaintance. Having learned afterwards, on the contrary, that the Emperor of Austria could not resolve to cross the sea, I sought the advice of Count de Stadion, who, after consulting Prince Metternich, has recommended me to demand an audience of his Imperial Majesty, that I may fulfil my commission. It seemed to me that Count de Stadion was convinced of the beneficial effects which the Emperor of Austria's journey to England might have on public opinion, and he said to me that the audience which the Emperor could grant me would at least give his Majesty an opportunity of explaining freely the reasons which deter him from undertaking the journey in question. Thus it would be in my power to combat his doubts. His Majesty received me this afternoon, and after I had said all that I was instructed to say, he replied in the kindest manner that nothing could have given him more pleasure than to have been able to profit by your Royal Highness's invitation, and to have been introduced to a Prince for whom he avowed the highest esteem, but after so long an absence from his States, affairs had become so pressing, that he dared not permit himself to prolong it further. His Majesty added that the negotiations with France would be well advanced towards the end of the month; that Italy, the northern part of which will fall to the share of Austria, is in a state of disturbance which only his presence at Vienna can reduce to order; that he has resolved to put an end to the Senate and to the Legislative Corps still existing in Italy, and that he has no one to whom he could intrust the management of his affairs in his absence. I took the liberty of representing all the reasons which seemed to me to render the presence of the Emperor in London desirable, but I could

not succeed in inducing his Majesty to change his mind. He charged me expressly to convey to your Royal Highness all his regret, and to repeat to you anew how much he would have wished to acknowledge afresh his gratitude for the justice which in time past has attributed to him uprightness of intention, when obliged by circumstances apparently to follow a course quite opposed to his real principles. To-day the first conference between the Ministers of the Allies and M. de Talleyrand has taken place. As yet, Spain has not been admitted to these conferences, which they designate as only *Parleys*. I hope that the opposition which Spain will offer to the recognition of the miserable Murat on the throne of a branch of the house of Bourbon may furnish us with the opportunity of getting out of the scrape into which we have been dragged in regard to Naples.

My predictions about Poland are fully confirmed. The Emperor Alexander will yield nothing to Austria of the claims. He wishes to keep Cracow, Zamosk, and the 400,000 men ceded to him at the Peace of Vienna. What is more astonishing, he does not keep his promise to Prussia, and instead of increasing the communication between East Prussia and Silesia, he wishes to encroach further on the line of Thorn on the Warta, promised at Basle. Now Russia demands not only Thorn, but also a radius of 300,000 souls further on. The position is very dangerous for the neighbours of Russia, and Austria is seriously vexed by this new claim: There are, however, most urgent reasons for avoiding a new war at this moment. One point on which the policy of Russia and Austria might agree, is the project of giving Archduke Charles an establishment in Italy, in order to enable him to marry the Grand-Duchess Catherine. It seems to me that this union cannot be agreeable to his Imperial Highness, but I am assured of the contrary. In

regard to the affairs of Germany, the Emperor Alexander made no other remark than that he wished to see his way to an establishment for Eugene Beauharnais.

The command of the troops in the Low Countries is in singular disorder since the Prince of Sweden threw it up. I have conferred with Lord Castlereagh on this subject, and we have agreed to write a joint letter to Lord Graham to-morrow.

I will give an account of this matter to your Royal Highness when it is well concerted, entreating you, meanwhile, to accept the assurance of deep respect, etc.

PARIS, *May* 15, 1814.

SIR,—Your Royal Highness's equerry, M. Quentin, brought me, the day before yesterday, letters of the 10th curt., in which your Royal Highness has commanded me to continue my stay in Paris. I am much flattered by the gracious manner in which you have deigned to consider the reports which I have laid before you. The approbation with which you have honoured me will redouble my efforts to watch over your interests.

The negotiations are carried on now with vigour. It has been proposed to defer those relating to Germany till the Sovereigns' visit to London, or till they meet at Vienna. This idea has been especially suggested, because of some difficulties which have arisen between Austria and Prussia, about the possession of the fortress of Mayence.

Prince Metternich has thought this point important enough to wish a quarrel with Prussia, by proposing that Bavarian troops should occupy it, without consulting this Power. Prussia, however, has succeeded in causing her troops to take possession. But I think it will be difficult to settle the matter, since, according to the proposal we are

about to make, Mayence is to be erected into a fortress belonging to the German line in general. And its garrison consequently ought to be composed of troops of different corps. The affairs of Germany thus become more complicated, and the French Government, resuming by degrees its restless character, I am not altogether opposed to the opinion of M. de Stein and General Pozzi, who have counselled the Emperor Alexander to insist that the affairs of Germany, in as far as the limits of the different States are concerned, should be decided here.

In the meantime, the negotiations with France are progressing briskly. To facilitate this rather complicated business, two commissions are appointed to discuss and prepare points difficult to arrange,—to wit, one to fix the frontiers of France, and a second to settle the repartition of the debts of the counties ceded by France, and for the sums with which this Power will have to reimburse the Allies. Lord Castlereagh has named me to assist in both these commissions, in name of your Royal Highness. That which discusses the limits is composed of the Minister of State, Baron Humboldt, for Prussia, Baron de Wessenberg for Austria, M. d'Anstaedt for Russia, Marquis d'Osmond for France, and me for your Royal Highness.

The settlement of Finance is discussed between Count de Laforest and Baron de Durand on the part of France, Minister de Bulow for Prussia, De Wessenberg for Austria, and me. As I shall have the honour of speaking in two separate postscripts of the discussions which we have had on this subject, I limit myself here to the general observation, that there is a party, not friendly to the Bourbons certainly, who try to induce them to heighten their tone. This party probably only wishes for new troubles in order to advance its private ends. It is in this sense that we have already

heard say, in regard to the Government of Louis XVIII, that the Marshals of France assured his Majesty that he had 450,000 men at his disposal, ready to defend his cause. The day before yesterday the Emperor of Austria visited the King. On returning, his Majesty complained of the tone which the King had wished to take with him, and had said drily, that if France wished a new war, she could easily rekindle it, but she perhaps did not foresee when it would end. The Emperor said that after this apostrophe, the tone of the King of France was much softened.—I am, etc.

PARIS, *May* 15, /14..

P.S.—The great evils of which they complain in the Low Countries and on the banks of the Rhine, caused by the want of order which prevails in the march of the troops, has induced Lord Castlereagh and me to address to Lord Lynedoch the letter of which I here respectfully annex a copy. Its contents will, I venture to flatter myself, justify the step of having intrusted to him the command of the 2d corps of the Germany army. I could have so much the less doubt as to the command of Hanoverian troops as the treaty of subsidy gives to Great Britain the right to disband 15,000 men, and that is nearly as many as actually remain in the country. The corps of the Duke of Brunswick, after internal management, is placed under the rule of Lord Lynedoch.—I am, etc.

P.S.—I have thought proper to address the annexed letter, in the interest of the German States of your Royal Highness, to the Chancellor of State, Baron Hardenberg. I flatter myself that your Royal Highness will approve of the observations which I have made to him on his plan. He appears, according to his verbal replies, to wish to have it considered. —I am, etc.

PARIS, *May* 15, 1814.

P.S.—The departure of Count Orloff, who politely offered to take charge of this despatch, having been delayed till this evening, I add some details of the negotiation designed to settle the new frontiers of France. This negotiation has been rendered more difficult than it would otherwise have been, by the declaration made by the Emperor of Russia, in name of the Allied Powers, before he entered Paris, in which he said that the Allies would respect the integrity of ancient France, and that they would even do more than this, since it is essential to the happiness of Europe that France should be great and powerful.

In fulfilment of this promise, the Allies have proposed a frontier which would add to France an increase of population which we estimate at more than 500,000 souls, by granting to her several territories lying within other States, formerly German, and others, as Avignon, Montbelliard, part of the department of Jemmapes, Sambre-and-Meuse, De la Sarthe, and part of Savoy.

At the Conference of Saturday, the Marquis d'Osmond presented a verbal note, setting forth that the King of France, according to the promises of the Allied Sovereigns, thought himself entitled to expect an augmentation of a million of subjects, therefore his astonishment was great on seeing that he was offered only acquisitions which he valued at 212,611 inhabitants, leaving out the part of Savoy which was offered him, and which he could not accept, as it formed part of the States of a Prince who is nearly related to him. It will thus be impossible to proceed until we have received instructions from our superiors on this point. We declared our ignorance of any such promise as that to which the Marquis d'Osmond alluded; that the proposed boundary had been traced in accordance with principles which must secure

peace to France and her neighbours, and that the increase which would ensue was the result, and not the object, of the line laid down. The Marquis d'Osmond thereupon entered into an explanation of the King's wishes, and insisted on a line which, commencing at Nieuport, passes along the Canal, then into La Lysse, below Warenton, whence in descending this river, above Coutrai, it would bend on the Escaut, rejoining the ancient frontier of France near Philippeville.

Another addition was demanded near Landau, taking the line of Tolly, Mons, and Charleroi, and a considerable and important portion under the military port near Landau. A proposal which would have surrendered a great part of Belgium to France, and left the rest defenceless, had to be declined. I will not weary your Royal Highness by the details of all the arguments which were used in the discussion, and will confine myself to the observation that the reunion of Landau to France, because it is isolated on the German territory, has been proposed. This firmness has had a good effect, and this morning we have finished the drawing up of the articles on the frontiers. They are what were proposed. The King had also overcome his repugnance to the article on Savoy, having considered that Sardinia would be indemnified otherwise. On carrying the articles to the Conference at Prince Metternich's we met M. de Talleyrand, who again made claims on Luxemburg, but to this Lord Castlereagh refused to listen. It will be necessary to delay if the French should wish to break up the article on this point.

It seems to me that the compliment wished to be paid to France is already dearly purchased. The cession of Landau, which forms a dangerous point of attack on Germany, would have to be insisted on. The cession of part of Savoy is also, in my opinion, ill advised. For the dismemberment of

this province will cause discontent. And the inhabitants of the mountains, depending for their subsistence on those of the plain, the influence of France will extend beyond her avowed limits. Our conferences on financial subjects show symptoms of discord. I am, however, obliged to postpone my humble report on this point till another day.—I am, etc.

PARIS, *May* 23, 1814.

SIR,—The negotiations with France are not yet concluded. The article on the frontiers has been the subject of two conferences of the Commission named for this purpose. We have at last agreed on every point except the cession of the Pays de Gex, an ancient French domain on the northern shore of the Lake of Geneva, to give her a communication with Switzerland. The commercial route which leads along the Lake has been constructed at the expense of Valais. These considerations, in addition to the importance of the military position, had induced Russia and Austria to promise the reunion of the Pays de Gex to Switzerland. At the Conference on the 19th, the Marquis d'Osmond declared that the King of France had decided on not giving up this territory. On our part, we have (after having sought instructions from the Plenipotentiaries) insisted on the surrender of this country, excepting the Canton of Cologny, which may be left to France. This Power having, notwithstanding the repugnance she at first showed to the cession of part of Savoy, exacted all the southern shore of the Lake, which forms the Duchy of Chablais, we have been instructed to refuse this demand. The Marquis d'Osmond has yielded this point, and declares himself contented with every part of the frontier except that of Gex, which has arrested our negotiations. I respectfully subjoin the pro-

tocols of the Commission on the limits of 19th and 21st, by which your Royal Highness will also learn what has passed regarding French Guiana. I observe that the Ministers of Portugal and Spain have been present at the later sittings of the Commissions, both on the limits and on financial matters. As for the Minister of Holland, I consulted with him on the interests of the Low Countries, and he declares himself quite satisfied with the principles adopted by the Commission. Your Royal Highness will find appended to this the articles which have been prepared, especially that which concerns finance. The one regarding restitution of the Hamburg Bank is still the subject of lively discussion. At the sitting on the 20th M. the Count de Laforest declared that the King of France thought that the article added for this purpose to the Convention of April 23d answered the purpose sufficiently. We observed to him that this was not the case at all, that a military convention could not extend to the question of the restitution of sums which the French generals had appropriated, that it was now known that Marshal Davoust had coined all the silver and gold in the Bank of Hamburg, that he had paid with it the arrears of his army, and even three months' pay in advance. We tried to make him feel that by this operation the treasury of France was effectually enriched by the spoils of the Bank, and that, besides, only the French Government could oblige Marshal Davoust to account for the sums on which he had seized. We represented to him also the interest which Europe in general, and France herself, ought to take in the preservation of so important a commercial establishment as the Bank of Hamburg was (which was, besides, entirely the private property of individuals), but all was in vain. Count de Laforest made a long speech to us on the resolution of the King, his master, to do justice to every one, and even to

deprive himself of necessaries to satisfy the desires of his Court, but he remained no less resolute in his refusal to enter on our arguments. The discussion on the demands of Prussia took a yet more disagreeable character. This Court, during her alliance with France, had entered into contracts for productions of all sorts, of which the price was to be deducted from the contributions to the war. This last stipulation had not been carried out, and, at the time of the rupture between the two Powers, France owed 130 millions of francs to Prussia. On this sum being demanded, M. de Laforest declared, in the King's name, that the war had annulled this debt, that the hostilities of the King of Prussia had restored the two Powers to their original positions, which was entirely to the advantage of Prussia, that the King of France would rather deprive himself of necessaries than not satisfy a just demand, that his Majesty regarded what was here in question as unjust, and that sooner than satisfy it *he would submit to be arrested and kept shut up in his palace*, and that he would resign himself to his fate, as the Holy Father had done. M. de Laforest added also, that the King, his master, had consulted the *Emperor of Russia* on this subject, and that it was after this conversation that he gave him the order which he now executed.

This speech, which, in a certain manner, unites the King of Prussia to Napoleon, at least by supposing that he could act in accordance with a system permitted to him alone, has embittered Prussia much.

French diplomatists have in general adopted the principle, or at least they constantly repeat that of Louis XVIII., that though his succession is nineteen years old he is still in the first year of his reign, and that all that Napoleon had done does not affect him. Consequently they say that the empire of Napoleon has crumbled with its author, and that France,

reduced to her ancient limits, ought not to be responsible for that which would have affected the *ci-devant* French empire.

If this principle were generally adopted justice would not be offended, but they are not willing to apply it except in favour of France. When the question regarded restitution of pictures, statues, and so many other articles, which the Pope, Austria, Prussia, Belgium, and a number of private individuals, rightly and importunately demanded, they refused; and the effect which it was feared the removal of the greater part of the Museum of Napoleon—amassed by spoliation committed over all Europe—would produce on the Parisians served as a specious argument for withholding what was incontestably due.

In the last conference of the Plenipotentiaries the two points of which this report treats remain undecided. But the Allies have generously offered to renounce all their pecuniary demands, provided that France is willing to do justice to the private persons who have claims to make. France ought to arrange, in like manner, with the Commissioners on the revenue of the provinces occupied by the Allies. As to objects of art, etc., public exposure will be avoided by allowing each State to arrange with the King of France about what is yet to be found in lumber-rooms and magazines.

I reckon, under this head, on reclaiming the netting and hunting apparel carried off from Hanover, these being articles of considerable value. I have been charged by Lord Castlereagh to negotiate separate articles on the claims of the English and on the excessive expenditure of England on the prisoners of war. I have succeeded in this affair, and I add hereto the note by which I communicated to M. de Laforest the articles inserted in the private treaty between Great Britain and France. There are only a few words

altered in the proposed articles, to which France maintains that England will renounce her claim, providing that the expenditure for the prisoners of war could be easily satisfied. I hope that your Royal Highness will approve of the articles on financial matters which have been at last prepared by the Conference, on the 20th May. The first seven provide for the interests of the restored provinces and for those of private persons. I had great trouble in obtaining the seventh. The following was abandoned, after warm discussion—that which relates to the re-division of a sum of two millions and a half of livres over the provinces to which Napoleon and his family have renounced all claim—a proof of the carelessness with which treaties are made. Certainly no one thought of burdening the countries ceded with this pension. But the Convention of April 11th was so constituted that the right would have been on the side of France if M. de. Talleyrand had not renounced his claim. The French *employés* of the *ci-devant* kingdom of Westphalia have made every effort to obtain their pensions, and purchases should be confirmed by the Allies. We have successfully resisted these demands, which seem to interest France much. As to Hanover, I declared at one of the Conferences to M. de Laforest that I looked on all that had been done as a usurpation, seeing that the Royal House had never compromised its rights. He acknowledged that what I said was in conformity to the rights of nations, observing, however, that Great Britain herself had broken this law by disposing of the Isle of Guadaloupe in favour of Sweden, before the peace. On my reply that this measure of restitution, far from destroying the law, had served to strengthen it, and that, besides, England had given up the article of Guadaloupe, the question dropped.

PARIS, *May* 23, 1814.

P.S.—The question raised on the retrocession of Oliyenza and the other Portuguese possessions on the Guadiana has been deferred till the Congress of Vienna. The affairs of Germany will be discussed there. France will by that time have recovered her tranquillity. And as the same persons are in power who in the time of Bonaparte sold their places, we have much intrigue to fear. It is always in contemplation to fix the principal boundaries of the German States here, in order to put an end to the uncertainty which agitates the public mind in this country. I would insist strongly that we can take possession of the portion which ought to return to your Royal Highness when Prussia shall occupy her new possessions.

Baron de Hardenberg Reventlow has arrived here, charged to negotiate peace between Prussia and Denmark. His instructions authorize him to offer Swedish Pomerania in exchange for the Duchy of Lauenburg. It will be necessary to wait till a proposition on the part of Prussia to cede the Principality of Minden against this Duchy as soon as Denmark shall have acquired Swedish Pomerania.

M. Reventlow has assured me in confidence that the Prince of Sweden negotiated secretly to obtain Holstein, and that it *was* still in contemplation to *place* the Queen of Sweden and the son of Gustavus Adolphus again on the throne. I am not in a position to say if the Emperor of Russia, who would have favoured the return of the Royal family of Sweden to the succession, participates in this plan or not.

The Sovereign Prince of the United Provinces and of the Low Countries has arrived here incognito with Lord Cloncarty.—I am, etc.

PARIS, *May* 30.

P.S.—The signature of the Peace has been deferred till after midnight, all the copies of the instrument not having been ready in time. This note ought therefore to be dated the 31st May. M. Planta will set off about three in the morning to carry it to London.

PARIS, *May* 30, 1814.

SIR,—The Peace will be signed this morning. The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts will each sign separately what is common to all. And to which will be added the six secret articles to which they have agreed. Afterwards to the different instruments each Power will add the separate articles, patent and secret, which are required by its peculiar interests as opposed to those of France.

In the recent Conferences, which have been extremely long, and sometimes very disagreeable, the special subjects of dispute were the restitution of the funds seized in the Bank of Hamburg, the sums which ought to return to be as arrears of ordinary contributions of the French provinces occupied by the Allied troops, and the surrender of the works of art carried off by the French. On our part, they have ended by our yielding in a great measure. As to the Bank of Hamburg, the King simply promises that he will order the strictest search for the holders of the abstracted funds, which will probably lead to nothing. For the arrears of contributions, it is arranged that the Allies shall receive twenty-five millions of francs, over and above nearly five or six millions which have been paid already for the use of the armies. I hope that out of this sum we shall manage to obtain our eighteenth part, which is due to us by the treaties, and according to the principle recognised at the Conference of Chaumont, on which I have made my humble report. As to the works of art, the

articles which are exhibited in the museums are no longer insisted on, but the King declares himself ready to sell those which are found yet accumulated in the magazines. It remains to be seen what degree of good faith will be shown in this affair. I have heard that the Director of the Gallery of Cassel, who came to examine the works of art belonging to the Elector of Hesse, at Malmaison, has found nothing. Everything has been hidden, and bad pictures have been put in the places which the masterpieces of art occupied.

I do not think it necessary to enter here into the analysis of the Peace which is just concluded.

Your Royal Highness knows the contents, which are in general very glorious for the Allies, and even this will leave a germ of discord in France. In a few days I flatter myself I shall submit my ideas on this subject *viva voce* to your Royal Highness. The share which I have taken in the negotiation enabled me to watch over the interests of Germany, and especially to avert the adoption of any stipulation which might expose us to fraudulent proceedings, resulting from the usurpation of the Electorate of Hanover. The article of pensions was very interesting to your Royal Highness, since all the estates of the King had been given to the French Generals. The French and Westphalian *employés* are only too anxious to oblige us to guarantee the breaking up of the royal domains, and to secure to them their pensions or retiring allowances. The Westphalian pensioners especially have moved heaven and earth to preserve their alleged rights. Independent of the interest that they have acquired in the different Courts of Europe, Count de Laforest has not ceased to tell us that the King laid great stress on the satisfaction of these claims, being anxious to avoid the effect their complaints might produce on the public. We have eluded this danger, and your Royal Highness is not compro-

mised in aught that regards your States in Germany.—I am, etc.

The instrument of peace will be communicated by the Allied Powers to the great Courts of Germany. I think this should be limited to those formerly Electoral. The note which will accompany the act will point out that the principal Courts have made this peace for themselves and their allies, and that those who have not signed the Peace will have to produce their act of accession to the Congress of Vienna, which will take place in about two months.

P.S.—After the Conference on the 28th, I had a conversation with Prince Metternich and Chancellor Hardenberg on the affairs of Germany. The two Ministers feel the necessity of putting a stop to the agitation resulting from the state of uncertainty in many of the provinces that are likely to change masters, and of hindering the small Princes of Germany from the arbitrary acts of which they are every day guilty.

The principal difficulty which arises between Austria and Prussia is in regard to the line of the Maine. Austria wants Mayence and all the Grand Duchy of Frankfort to be given to Bavaria. She makes less difficulty about Saxony. The King of Prussia has consulted his generals, who have decided that the King could cede Mayence, provided that neither this fortress nor anything belonging to it on the right bank of the Maine be given to Bavaria. It seems that Prussia will not insist any longer on Luxemburg, provided they leave her Juliers. It is then probable that the two Powers will agree, and that they will forthwith take possession of the countries that fall to their share. I have, for this reason, insisted, and I have requested the support of Lord Castlereagh, in order

that we may put ourselves in possession likewise of what is our due. The arrangements which will have to be made with us are yet to be determined, and I maintain, with reason, that the arrondissements are due by the same treaties which grant to Prussia her new acquisitions, that it would not be just that she should take possession of a portion which contains 200,000 inhabitants which ought to be ours, whilst we shall lose the advantage of possession during the time which will be required to determine it.

I learn this morning that the Emperor of Russia insists that the affairs of Poland shall still be arranged here. Thus the greatest interests have to be decided hastily. I immediately informed Lord Castlereagh of the state of matters, and I flatter myself that he will delay his departure so as to be able to give his advice in arrangements which will be of the highest importance to all Europe. I entertain the hope that Lord Castlereagh has seemed to be more pressing than he is to avoid deferring the signature of the Treaty of Peace for a day; this would bestow on Great Britain a month more of subsidies.

For myself, I shall await the *dénouement* of this affair, which will, however, only delay my departure a day or two.

It is said to-day that the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia will only set out for England on Saturday.

The Empress Josephine expired yesterday of malignant fever, at Malmaison, where she had had the honour of several times receiving the Emperor of Russia, who always gave her, as well as her daughter Hortense, the title of Majesty.—I am, etc.[1]

[1] These despatches have not been published. As the negotiations at Paris were preparatory to the Congress of Vienna, the author thinks that they will not be misplaced in this volume.

VI.

DESPATCHES FROM VIENNA.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *Sept.* 17, 1814.

SIR,—I arrived at Vienna on the evening of the 12th. Lord Castlereagh and Count Nesselrode came here on the 13th, and on the day following Prince Metternich returned from the baths of Baden. I had an interview with him immediately, and though the Chancellor of Prussia was yet waiting on him, he transacted business both with Lord Castlereagh and Count Nesselrode. The latter has just obtained the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in Russia.

The form to be given to the negotiations has been the principal subject in this first conference.

It is agreed that the Ministers of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as well as France and Spain, shall unite in a committee to arrange the business, that these Powers shall, in approaching the different questions, invite the Ministers of the Courts particularly interested in such and such matters to join them, and that finally the result of their labour shall be presented to the general Congress. If your Royal Highness deigns to recall my very humble report from Paris on 2d September, you will have foreseen that the question of the admission of Murat to the Congress, and the

dangers to be feared from the sojourn of Bonaparte in the island of Elba, would early claim the attention of Ministers. I believe that Europe has much cause to rejoice at the manner in which these important objects are about to be considered. It is agreed not to admit Murat. The Court of Austria, the only one who may be compromised by a formal treaty which recognises him as King of Naples, will extricate herself from the affair by saying that she is not obliged to defend him against the unanimous voice of Europe, and especially of the house of Bourbon. He will be advised to withdraw from his usurped throne. The same unanimity exists on the necessity of placing Bonaparte at a greater distance. But I doubt if it will be so in regard to the means to be employed.

I am agreeably surprised to see that the Minister of Russia complies with these measures, which are not, however, absolutely in accordance with the famous treaty of April 11, which was principally the work of this Court. Count Nesselrode said to me only this evening, that he was delighted to see that Prince Metternich, in abandoning Bonaparte, flatly contradicted those who believed that Austria dreamt of preserving him to bring forward in the proper time and place.

He added that this Minister appeared to him to be rather too much afraid that Murat might stir up a war on his account in Italy.

The decease of the Queen of Sicily, who died here on the 7th current, of a stroke of apoplexy (brought on, it seems, by the joy of seeing the King her husband re-established in the exercise of his royal functions, and the tidings that he was about to be invited to return with her to Sicily), will diminish the fear which the Neapolitans would have experienced from the recollection of the vengeful acts of the

Sicilian Court on its first return to Naples. The popularity of the legitimate King will doubtless gain much by this death, which I consider, from this point of view, as a fatal blow to Murat.

The Emperor of Russia is expected on the 28th current. Her Majesty the Empress, his wife, the Grand-Duchesses Catherine and Maria, the Princes of Baden, the Kings of Denmark, Bavaria, and Würtemberg, will all be guests in the Imperial palace. Several of the Archdukes and Duchesses have had to remove to make room for these illustrious strangers.

Count Stadion re-enters the Ministry, and will have at first the direction of the finances, a department which requires great reform.—I am, etc. E. G. M. MUNSTER.

P.S.—19*th September.*—I learn that Count Nesselrode has made a statement which proves that the Emperor of Russia will yield nothing, at least with respect to the boundaries which he demands in Poland. He wants Posen, Cracow, Kalisch, and it is said that he even demands Memel from Prussia, saying that the latter can indemnify herself in Germany, seeing that the King of Saxony ought to be established in Italy.

VIENNA, *November* 27, 1814.

SIR,—If I have seldom entered into details of the general business of the Congress, it is because their progress has in reality been so slow, and the way of treating matters so little calculated to lead to their final decision, that it seemed to me better to give your Royal Highness an account of the different ministerial conversations, or even of the correspondence by which it has in vain been tried to bring them to a favourable conclusion.

With respect to the great interests of Europe under review, there are those of the *ci-devant* Duchy of Warsaw and of Saxony. Almost all the others are involved in these two, since it seems to depend on them whether the Congress will produce any result whatever; in short, whether there shall be war or peace. I suspect that the condition of Naples may prove of like importance to the peace of Europe; but unfortunately it is not treated as if it were so. On the contrary, the discussion on the possession of Mayence is associated with that on Poland and Saxony. The unhappy Polish question has threatened the tranquillity of Europe for almost a year. It divides itself, in its turn, into two distinct propositions, which are equally alarming:—1. The reunion of the Duchy of Warsaw with Russia, which would menace the frontiers of Austria and Prussia; 2. the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, the existence of which would compromise the tranquillity of the Polish provinces still possessed by Austria and Prussia. The reticence of the Emperor Alexander caused on this point the greatest part of the doubts and false steps of the last conference. The Congress of Vienna has, from its commencement, found itself in a difficult position, owing to the manner in which his Imperial Majesty of Russia has expressed himself on this subject. Instead of laying it before the three neighbouring Courts for discussion, the Emperor, and all around him, intimated that his Majesty would be like *a bar of iron* on this point. The conferences that he has had on different occasions with the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Austria, on this subject, have generally ended in a declaration that the Emperor would not cede a village to Austria, that he had 400,000 men assembled, and that they had only to come to dislodge her from Poland. My Lord Castlereagh had undertaken a direct mediation with the Emperor. The two memorials exchanged have

only irritated them, without bringing the matter nearer to a decision. The principal arguments used on our side were the appeal to the sanctity of Treaties; firstly, to a secret article of the Treaty of 1797, in which the three Powers stipulated that a kingdom of Poland should never be contemplated, and then to the stipulations concluded at Reichenbach, to the secret article of the Treaty of Alliance, of which the first statute says that the fate of the Duchy of Warsaw would be amicably arranged by the three partitioning Courts; the second, that they would act in concert on the affairs of Poland. Lord Castlereagh thereupon called the attention of the Emperor to the danger which resulted to Austria and Prussia from the arrangement which he aimed at in regard to the frontiers, and reminded him that England had of late years favoured the encroachments of Russia on Persia and the Porte, as well as on Finland, which was the reason why Great Britain had allowed herself to become a party to the painful question of the cession of Norway to Sweden. The Emperor's reply was that the circumstances under which these treaties had been concluded were no longer the same; that the second treaty mentioned spoke in more general terms than the first; that the aggrandizements which Russia had obtained were only points of defence, and that what she sought in Poland was hardly in proportion to the advantages enjoyed by Austria and Prussia. The mistaken nature of these arguments has been proved anew by a second memorial of Lord Castlereagh's, who has especially observed, that even though the encroachments of Russia should be only points of defence, that still the error which would result from it on three points constituted the offensive on the fourth, by enabling it to act with an army of 400,000 men against Germany before the latter could reassemble her forces. This memorial, again, has produced a

mischievous enough refutation, in which a pompous picture is drawn of the advantages which the other Powers, namely, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, have won by the Peace of Paris, and which established the principle that Russia needed the aggrandizements she lays claim to, to maintain the balance and the safety of her own frontiers. This memorial was accompanied by a letter from the Emperor to Lord Castlereagh, stating that this document contained the direct correspondence with the Emperor, and that this Minister would do well in future to pursue the ordinary course in his communications.

It would have been desirable that the Emperor should have intrusted his interests to one of his Ministers from the commencement, rather than have negotiated in person.

This style had very great disadvantages, the interviews with Lord Castlereagh, Talleyrand, and especially with Prince Metternich, having usually terminated in an ungracious manner. Observing afterwards that these Ministers avoided him, the Emperor manifested bad humour, and he has recently caused Prince Metternich and M. de Talleyrand to be again invited to his presence.

In the meantime, the Ministers have discussed amongst themselves the contested points, namely, those of the Polish frontiers and of Saxony. Austria at once offered terms in regard to the first of these, which even went beyond what she had already yielded. She proposed even the complete re-establishment of Poland under a free and independent Government. I pass over these details in silence. As to Saxony, it is certain that Austria has, by a letter from Prince Metternich to Prince Hardenberg, of 20th October, and another to Lord Castlereagh, of the 23d of the same month, consented to the cession of the whole of Saxony, on condition that Prussia would act in concert with Austria

and England on the Polish question, arrange respecting certain frontiers and fortifications, among other things as to Dresden, and not go beyond the right bank of the Moselle. It is noticed that these matters are again alluded to in a subsequent letter of the 12th November, in which Prince Metternich complains of the conduct of Prussia with regard to the Polish question, that she has not acted in accordance with Austria and England, the condition which the Emperor Francis had attached to his consent to the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia.

The affairs of Saxony are perhaps at present of more importance to the peace of Europe than those of Poland.

It is certain that the opinion of the Cabinets on the latter have undergone remarkable changes. What seemed most dreaded at first was the reconstruction of a kingdom of Poland, not independent, but under the sway of the Emperor of Russia. It is not doubted that this project would turn after all against Russia herself. But it was foreseen that the name alone of a kingdom of Poland would put the Austrian and Russian provinces wrested from this ancient crown in a state of insurrection. France especially apprehended that the union of Poland with Russia, though she did not look on it as durable, would give the latter, in the meantime, the means of overthrowing the Ottoman Porte. Now it is seen only too clearly that the Emperor Alexander aims at establishing himself as a conqueror in Europe, it seems that these same Cabinets look on his plan of giving to Poland a separate constitution independent of that of Russia, as nothing more than a snare which he lays for himself, and which, while ruining him, will at last establish a salutary barrier between conquering Russia and the rest of Europe.

Prince Metternich has several times repeated to me, that Austria would constitute herself the principal protectress of

the liberty of the Poles at present, and that she would yield more in the question of frontiers in proportion as the Emperor Alexander should guarantee the independence of Poland more substantially. He added, however, that the more Austria yields on this point, the less accommodating she will be in regard to Saxony. The most skilful military men are of opinion that Bohemia would be ruined, and the centre of the monarchy menaced, if they could be attacked at once from Cracow and Dresden.

Prince Talleyrand declares on his part, that though the King of France took a particular interest in the liberty and restoration of Poland, he regarded the frontier of this country as a secondary matter, seeing it is chiefly interesting to Austria and Prussia,—but he never fails to intimate that France assigns the most prominent place to the affairs of Saxony. He supports this resolution by all the arguments that morality and policy can furnish. He represents the conduct of the King of Saxony as constrained by imperious circumstances. He even refers to a letter from the Duke of Weimar, who pointed out to him the absolute necessity of returning from Prague to Dresden, to wait on Napoleon, in order to save Saxony from being laid waste by fire and sword, and in fine, he compares the error committed on this occasion by the King of Saxony, to those of which the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, and Austria herself have been guilty. In the sketch which he drew, he did not spare these Sovereigns, and cites very remarkable facts,—amongst others, the project of Alexander and Napoleon, discussed at Erfurt, for overturning Austria, and sharing it between them,—on the other hand, a letter from Prince Metternich, of the 23d April last, by which he invited Napoleon to renew negotiations for peace, the same day that the latter hastened his ruin, by throwing himself on the

route from Metz, and forcing the Emperor Francis to go to Dijon. From a political point of view, Prince Talleyrand considers the incorporation of Saxony presaging infallibly, sooner or later, the subjection of the north of Germany. He proves by this fact even, that the politics of the Cabinet of Berlin have changed in nothing, and he considers it so much the more dangerous, because the King of Prussia places himself, by his personal arrangements, and by the measures he is willing to consent to in Poland, in absolute dependence on Russia. Finally, he says it would be impossible for the King of France to consent to the spoliation of an ancient dynasty at the moment that he has agreed with the Powers of Europe to insist on the re-establishing the principles of the rights of nations on the basis of equity and justice.

Bavaria places herself decidedly on this side, and does not conceal that she would be ready to uphold Saxony, sword in hand. This Court in general shows as much rancour against Prussia as can be observed towards Francis. Prussia herself sets an infinite value on the acquisition of Saxony. She feels at once (independently of the danger to which her Polish possessions will henceforth be exposed) the immense advantage of obtaining an equal number of German subjects in exchange for the Poles she will give up. This is one reason why she evinces so little anxiety on the Polish question; the second is the absolute submission with which the King places himself in reference to the Emperor Alexander. A third is the constant desire of Prussia to extend her possessions in Germany. The awkward geographical position of her States does not lead *her* to the conviction which the history of the past should have forced on her, that the security of Prussia and her power must be founded on a federal system, and on the union of interests amongst the Princes of Northern Germany. The notion of placing her in

the same rank with the great monarchies of Europe, which the greatest part of her officials aim at carrying into effect, will rather *accelerate* her ruin than the subjection of Northern Germany. There is another class of people who labour secretly in the same cause; these are the revolutionists, who only aim at uniting Germany into one or two great masses, without troubling themselves as to the results which the attempt to bring about such a revolution would produce.

It is evident that the slow progress made by the negotiations must awaken the fear that they are about to be broken off, and that the Congress will separate without having sanctioned a definite agreement. It is scarcely to be doubted that the state of matters which would result from that would soon lead to a war. Those who are anxious to avoid this busy themselves in attempts at conciliation. The Chancellor, Prince Hardenberg, has now taken charge of the negotiation on the Polish question, and he had a long conference, on Wednesday last, with the Emperor Alexander, who is confined to the house with erysipelas in his foot. He represents to him all the misery which a new war would bring on Europe, the light in which Alexander would appear as the cause of this war, whilst hitherto he has been admired as the restorer of continental liberty. Finally, with the consent of Austria, he proposed to the Emperor to cede to this Power Zamosk and its district, as well as Cracow as far as the Warta. Prussia asks for herself Thorn and the territory as far as the Warta, which would adjoin the Petiza to the Austrian Polakai territory. Prince Hardenberg entertained great hopes from the manner in which the Emperor listened to him, and to-day he expects an answer.

I confess that I augur ill of the matter, so long as Prussia will not yield regarding Saxony. In order to bring about this do-

sirable end, which might calm all discontents, I endeavoured to convince the Chancellor of Prussia of the necessity of making this sacrifice. I was obliged to make him perceive that it would be better for Prussia to have a large part of Saxony with the consent of Europe, than to possess the whole as a usurped province, which would turn against her at the first opportunity. But I think I may omit all the arguments which would recommend a division satisfactory to Austria, and likely to obtain the assent of France, since the Chancellor has gone back to the notion that Prussia must insist on the whole of Saxony. It is probable that Baron de Stein has exercised a very injurious influence on this point, which at present threatens to set Europe on fire. The Emperor of Russia is quite willing to support this plan, since he has the King of Prussia under his banners!

Prince Adam Czartorysky, who ought, at this time, to be considered as the veritable Minister of the Emperor, though he is not nominally in office, invited me to a conference yesterday. I exhausted every argument to engage him to make the Emperor yield. But all that he could propose in regard to Cracow was to erect this city and its territory into a neutral possession under the protection of the three Powers, or to give it to an independent Prince. He even begged me to sound Prince Metternich on this proposal. But this Minister entirely rejected it. I have no doubt that the Emperor and a portion of the Austrian Cabinet are much more decided as to not yielding, than Prince Metternich was at the commencement of the negotiation. Under such circumstances, the circular letter from Prince Repnin, of 31st October, in which he intimates the occupation of Saxony by Prussia, announcing this measure as almost final, has produced a very bad effect here. Prince Hardenberg repudiates it, and Baron Stein lays the blame on Prince Repnin.

Count de Schulenbourg-Closterode, furnished with full powers by the King of Saxony, has addressed to all the Ministers of the Congress, on the 18th November, a protest in his Sovereign's name, which ends with the declaration that his Majesty would never consent to the cession of his States, and that he would never accept indemnities.—I have the honour to be, etc.

Private.]

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, 17*th December* 1814.

SIR,—Having only heard of the departure of the courier despatched by Lord Castlereagh on the 7th current, at the moment of his setting out, I must limit myself to informing your Royal Highness, in great haste, of the state of affairs. I beg leave then to take up the thread at the time when Lord Castlereagh withdrew, so to speak, from the mediation of the affairs of Poland, and Chancellor Prince Hardenberg took charge of them.

It must be confessed that no good result could be looked for when this mediation was intrusted to a Prussian Minister. The personal disposition of the King of Prussia does not permit us to expect from him any resistance whatever to the wishes of the Emperor Alexander.

The State interest of Prussia is besides, in all that concerns Poland, in direct opposition to that of Europe. Polish possessions seem to Prussia insecure since the Emperor Alexander, by his plans for re-establishing a separate kingdom for this nation, has sown there the seeds of a future insurrection. Moreover, the principle seemed to have been established that Prussia is entitled to claim reconstruction on the scale of her possessions in the year 1805, without

regard to the efforts that she should have made, or neglected to make, in order to preserve her share of Poland. It became evident that all the loss she suffered on this side would in the end turn to her advantage, since she would have to reclaim, from the mass of unattached possessions, a number of German subjects equal to what she would lose in Poland. The result of this mediation has equalled our expectations. I reported that Chancellor Hardenberg, at his interview with the Emperor Alexander, had, in the name of Austria, asked Zamosk and Cracow as far as the Nidda, and for Prussia Thorn and the line of the Warta. The question of Saxony, which ought never to have been separated from that of Poland, is naturally linked to this proposal, especially since it is represented thus,—the incorporation of Saxony can alone satisfy Prussia from the moment that the Polish possessions rest in the hands of the Emperor Alexander.

The matter being thus nearly decided, Baron de Stein, who until then had combated the Emperor Alexander's plans on Poland, saw in this only a means of bringing about the incorporation of the whole of Saxony with Prussia. He appears to hold to this plan, whether because it tends to realize his old idea of making Prussia share the protectorate of Germany with Austria, or from some other motive, and he pursues it with ardour. He has joined with Prince Czartorysky, and it is in concert with this Minister that he has conveyed to Chancellor Hardenberg the reply of the Emperor Alexander to his proposals. This response, as it has been condensed by the Chancellor of Prussia in a note addressed by him to Prince Metternich, states that the Emperor of Russia felt the necessity of taking up simultaneously the subjects which are linked to the affairs of Poland, that as a proof of his desire to remove difficulties he would resign Thorn and Cracow, but this would be for the purpose of erecting them, with

a radius to be assigned to them, into free towns, which would enjoy, under the protection of the three bordering Powers, a neutrality which must be respected even in time of war! There is no mention in this reply either of the line of the Warta, or of the Nidda, or of Zamosk and its district. On the contrary, the Emperor, making a merit of having given up the two towns above mentioned, attaches to this condescendence the *conditio sine qua non* of the cession of the whole of Saxony to Prussia, and of an arrangement in pursuance of which Mayence would remain for the defence of Northern Germany. The promise said to have been made by the Emperor to the Saxon people, that their country should not be dismembered, as its commercial and political interest and that of Prussia would be opposed to the division, is the reason assigned for the total incorporation of Saxony.

This same note of the Chancellor of Prussia is accompanied by a sketch which presents his plan for the reconstruction of Prussia. I have the honour of annexing a copy for your Royal Highness.

You will remark in it, that Prussia, independently of the number of subjects that she claims, wishes also to attach to herself the greater part of the possessions of the small Princes and Counts of Germany, the population of which is calculated at 627,400 inhabitants. The term *s'attacher* is not explained, but it is obviously tantamount to a species of interposition, even if she would not aim at the suppression of all the rights exercised by the Rhenish Confederation, exercised over the Princes whom they have restored to their States. Her rule in these territories being so imperfect, the Chancellor has refused to take into account this population as a veritable increase of subjects. Prince Metternich, in showing me this plan, pointed out to me that by the dispossession of several

Princes the Austrian dominions would not in future be contiguous to Prussia and Bavaria, by which means Austria would lose, still more than she has done already, her influence in Germany. He added that the project of dividing Germany into circles over which the directors should exercise a species of supremacy, would accomplish the plan of Prussia, of arrogating to herself in reality the protectorate of all the northern part of the ancient Empire. It is for this reason that Prince Metternich now opposes in the German Committee the idea of forming circles, for which he wishes to substitute other expedients, in order to give stability to the military and political arrangements of the future Germanic line. The danger with which this Prussian plan threatens us seemed to me so evident, that I accept, as Bavaria has done, the opinion of Prince Metternich, to abandon the project of forming circles,—an idea which on all other accounts appeared to me advantageous. The new chart projected by Prussia would give to this monarchy a form somewhat resembling that of America, being composed of two large masses joined by a species of isthmus. The first would comprise all the Prussian provinces to the right of the Elbe, with Saxony, the other would be formed by a considerable portion of Hesse-Darmstadt (the possessions of which would be transferred between Trèves and Luxemburg), the country between the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Moselle, the Grand Duchy of Berg, and the Westphalian possessions. The junction would be by a line which would cut off from us the southern part of the principality of Göttingen from Dransfeld.

I allowed my recital to be interrupted by these observations on the plan of Prussia, relating to her future reconstruction, as much because this plan is blended with the response that Russia has given to the proposals made by

Chancellor Prince Hardenberg, as because these considerations have had an important influence on the reply of Prince Metternich to the Prussian Minister. This reply begins by evincing indifference in regard to Poland; it insists, however, on the restoration of Thorn to Prussia, and of Cracow to Austria. It rejects the proposal to make them free towns. Austria, moreover, reserves the right to treat with Prussia on the free navigation of the Vistula, and on the form of government which the Emperor Alexander would be willing to introduce into Poland. It passes next to the question of Saxony, professes that Austria does not hesitate to co-operate in restoring the portion destined for Prussia, complete according to all that the treaties had assigned to her, and in consideration of the services she had rendered to the common cause; but it declares that Austria would never consent to the incorporation of Saxony, as much because this measure appears to her unjust as because several of the Great Powers would never agree to it, and the greater part of those of the second order have made the strongest representations against it; moreover that this measure was not at all necessary, seeing that Prussia can obtain elsewhere all that she has a right to exact. To substantiate this argument Prince Metternich has made a counter project, of which I subjoin a copy. This sketch assigns to Prussia only 432,400 souls in Saxony; the note which accompanies it states expressly, however, that there would be means of augmenting the share of Prussia, either from the parts of Poland still disputed with Russia, or by taking a larger portion of Saxony. The latter alternative does not seem to have been observed by Prussia. The refusal to give her the whole of Saxony has embittered her exceedingly. This Power hints that she will force on war at once. She complains bitterly that all her allies, except Russia, have abandoned her. The Austrian

note had been delivered on the 9th of December, in the evening; at the same time the report was spread abroad that Great Britain was displeased with Lord Castlereagh for having so readily yielded to the cession of Saxony, and that he was about to receive positive instructions to oppose it.

I learn that this statement had come from General Merfeldt. Perhaps the Austrian Cabinet has been more severe on what this ambassador has written of it, in order to give more weight to its resistance. It is certain that this intelligence has greatly augmented the uneasiness of the Prussians. Lord Castlereagh has, however, communicated to Chancellor Hardenberg Lord Liverpool's letter, which seems to have reassured him. It has been publicly circulated that I have, for my part, presented a very energetic note against the incorporation of Saxony. I have entered into explanations with the Chancellor, with whom I have had several conversations on this subject. I have always felt the extreme importance of the annihilation of Saxony on our future existence and on the independence of Northern Germany, but I have been careful not to draw the hatred of Prussia on us, persuaded that the incorporation of Saxony would find insurmountable obstacles elsewhere. Having been obliged, from time to time, to take an active part in this negotiation, I have in doing so always declined to engage in the discussion of the arguments alleged by Prussia in its favour. I have, on the contrary, commenced by admitting them, and I have then discussed the matter in the following manner:— Acknowledging all the advantages imagined as the result to Prussia, or even to Saxony, of her incorporation, would these be commensurate to the dangers of a war under existing circumstances? Unhappily the Prussians persuade themselves, but very wrongfully, that they would have Germany, and even Saxony, with them in this question. To judge accu-

rately of the crisis into which this affair has plunged us, an act of treachery, perpetrated by some Prussian diplomatists on this occasion, must be known.

The affairs of Poland and Saxony having been hitherto confidentially negotiated between the Ministers of England, Austria, and Prussia, the two first, as your Royal Highness will recollect, had tried to demonstrate to Chancellor Hardenberg how important it was that Prussia should act in concert with their Courts in sustaining the rights resulting from concluded treaties in regard to Poland. The cession of the whole of Saxony had, under certain modifications, been granted to Prussia as the reward of the firmness she had displayed in this cause, then regarded as of the utmost interest to Europe, and especially to the Powers bordering on Poland. Now, all these confidential letters have been communicated to the Emperor Alexander, to prove to him that Prussia could have obtained Saxony by declaring against him. Amongst the letters thus communicated there was one of a still more delicate nature. The Emperor Alexander having said one day to the King of Prussia that Prince Metternich had offered to concede all his demands if Russia would declare itself against those made by Prussia, Prince Metternich, informed of this conversation, wrote to Prince Hardenberg, formally denying the assertion of the Emperor Alexander, and offering to repeat this disavowal in his presence if he persisted. Even this letter has been betrayed.

The effect has been as the Prussians wished, in so far that the Emperor Alexander has redoubled his ardour for the support of the pretensions of Prussia, and his coldness towards Great Britain and Austria. He has had a very sharp conversation with Metternich, and even with the Emperor Francis, but he has failed in his design of making mischief between this Minister and the Sovereign. The Emperor

Alexander made this affair the occasion of a personal quarrel with Prince Metternich. The latter at first thought of warding off the blow by communicating, in his turn, the confidential letters of the Chancellor of Prussia. They could not have failed to ruin him, and it is very probable that this has been one of the objects of the person who so indiscreetly at least advised the communication of this confidential correspondence. Those who think themselves initiated into the secret of this plot accuse Baron de H. of it, attributing to him the design of supplanting the Chancellor. The letters of this Minister contained very severe strictures on the Emperor Alexander; above all, they advised that every facility should be afforded him for putting into execution his plans with reference to an independent constitution for Poland as the most certain means of raising up difficulties serious enough to produce in favour of the other Powers opportunities of opposing Russia with success, especially after his troops should have been disseminated over his vast empire, the finances of which would not permit of their immediate recall.

The Emperor Francis has nobly declined to avenge himself by causing these letters to be produced, a measure which Lord Castlereagh has also strongly discouraged, as it would have produced a rupture. If Austria has disdained to use this means, she has not the less sought to guard against a quarrel with Russia, by yielding unexpectedly, and almost without reserve, on the question of Poland.

Prince Metternich has totally changed his tone on this head. He said to me yesterday morning that the line of the Vistula was lost; that Cracow and Zamosk were of little importance to Austria; that she would rather see Cracow and Thorn into the hands of Russia than erected into independent towns, which would only be centres of discontent; that the

relations between Austria and Russia were thus perfectly settled; that Russia was ready to come to an understanding in regard to mixed subjects and the navigation of the Vistula, and that the question of the Polish constitution was no longer interesting to Austria. This has placed the Emperor Alexander in a dilemma, from which he will have difficulty in extricating himself. In carrying out his plans, he would have the Russians against him; and in not executing them, the Poles. He added that the Emperor Alexander had, of his own accord, restored to the Emperor of Austria the district of Tarnopol, containing the 400,000 souls ceded to Russia by the Peace of Vienna, feeling that it was an ill-acquired territory; that the Emperor of Austria had accepted it, expressing himself delighted at the disappearance in this manner of a just subject of dispute between him and the Emperor of Russia, but that this surrender could not change his resolution regarding Saxony. Upon which the Emperor replied that he had no doubt this affair would be arranged. Indeed, I concluded, from several conversations I have had with Prince Czartorysky (to whom I have endeavoured to hint that the Emperor is wrong in attaching importance to the *soi-disant* promise that M. de Stein gave to the Saxons as to the indivisibility of their territory), that his Majesty would be well pleased if Prussia would desist from her claims on Saxony. Prince Talleyrand said to me that Prince Czartorysky had spoken to him in the same style, but I learn that the Prussians devote themselves to their object, and will defend it to the last extremity. The Chancellor is indisposed to act further in concert with Russia; and he told me yesterday, when I was speaking to him in Lord Castlereagh's behalf about an interposition, that Prince Metternich had asked of this Minister, that he had always the greatest confidence in him, but that he could

decide on nothing till he had had a new conference with Czartorysky and Stein. At present the Chancellor of Prussia confines himself to saying that Prince Metternich, in his tables, has been mistaken to the extent of 1,200,000 souls. He has appointed Councillor of State Hoffmann to compare his calculations with those of M. de Wessenberg. The result of their interview is, that the Prussians, as Wessenberg insists, are no longer willing to admit the tables communicated by them last winter, saying that the population of the provinces referred to has diminished. This alleged diminution amounts to 700,000 souls. On the other hand, the Prussians are not willing to take into account the mediatized whose incorporation they demand, *though* the Austrians consent to deduct one-third on the population in consideration of the rights that the mediatized Princes would preserve under the Prussian sovereignty.

For the rest, Austria does not consent to new mediations. I had, however, reason to complain, that she has placed in the portion of Prussia the county of Bentheim, over which the rights of your Royal Highness ought not to have been disputed. They have only been so on account of the liberation that the Count of Bentheim claimed to have obtained by his contract with France. I have thus had doubly cause to contest this point, as your Royal Highness would learn by my postscript.

France has endeavoured to pledge the Princes of Germany to a protest against the annihilation of Saxony. But the Emperor Alexander upon that had a violent scene with the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, who sustained with dignity the rights of his family. The opposition of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar and the menaces of Prussia have arrested the projected protest. It is sad to remark the position taken by the Emperor Alexander in wishing to decide the affairs of Europe as

Dictator. In the conversation which he had with the Emperor Francis, the latter asked him if he would not have willingly granted all the points under discussion, if they had been demanded when he was canvassing for the adhesion of Austria. The Emperor Alexander replied that he was too frank not to say yes, but that he must add that circumstances have changed so much that he would not regard himself as bound by such a promise. He said, amongst other things, to the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, that he counted dynasties and so-called hereditary rights as nothing when the interest of States was in dependence. This overthrows one of the strongest guarantees of the tranquillity of the States. In this distressing crisis, however, all the blame must not be laid on one side. Much reproach is due to Austria for not having from the commencement expressed more clearly her opposition to the annihilation of Saxony as a State, and for having limited herself to vague and very doubtful reserves. She has especially fallen into a great error by separating the question of Saxony from that of Poland, and in supposing that she could influence Prussia to a course of conduct differing from that which she pursued.

Still further, Austria is reproached with aiming only at private advantage, whether by favouring Bavaria unduly, in order to obtain cessions from her, or by throwing the affairs of Italy into confusion, by the demand, contrary to the meaning of the Treaty of Paris, of Sesia as her boundary. She defers the evacuation of Alexandria to obtain Piacenza, saying that this is the only point which offers a defence of this side from Italy.

Moreover, France is very jealous on account of the route of the Simplon, which Austria desires to acquire. The cardinal error, for which nothing, in my opinion, can excuse Metternich, is the support which he gives to Murat,

who quietly occupies the frontier, and who has recently bought 25,000 muskets in Austria! So, that whilst this matter is undecided, France will have a grievous source of complaint against Austria, and even against England, and we risk the misery of seeing her unite with Russia and destroy Europe.

I must not forget to say that Metternich has communicated officially his note addressed to Prussia to M. de Talleyrand. The latter said to me this evening that he would send his reply the day after to-morrow, that he would repeat the assurance that France remained unshaken in her policy, that she would have willingly co-operated in re-establishing an independent Poland, but that she resigned herself to a secondary position in this question; but that, in regard to Saxony, she would not succumb, and that the inquiry is not what the King of Prussia is willing to restore to the King of Saxony, but, on the contrary, what the latter would consent to cede to Prussia. He added that the King of France could march 150,000 men to support this view of the question; but that he had it also in his power not to send one, the feeling of France being perfectly calm and tranquil.—I am, etc.

Dec. 18, 1814.

P.S.—The Chancellor of Prussia has just sent a new plan to the Emperor of Russia, which the latter has asked the Emperor of Austria to discuss with him immediately in person. This plan still does not renounce Saxony, and only contains an offer more advantageous than the former one for the King of Saxony. Prussia destines for him the country betwixt the Rhine and the Meuse, comprising Bonn, Liége, Luxemburg, and containing a population of almost 800,000 souls. Luxemburg would be reserved to become a fortress

of the Germanic League. This plan does not seem likely to facilitate the future settlement of affairs.

Private.]

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *Dec.* 17, 1814.

P.S.—Your Royal Highness will have observed what is stated in relation to Hanover in the sketch presented by Prussia. I have examined this important point, comparing it with the geographical chart which the Prussian Chancellor communicated to Prince Metternich under the seal of secrecy. This chart gave me only vague information in regard to the sacrifice of the 71,200 which Prussia asks from Hanover, if her plans should be carried out, and as to the 391,500 new subjects which she proposes to give us, which, according to her calculations, would produce an augmentation of 320,000 souls in our favour. I spoke to Chancellor Hardenberg on this subject. He promised me an extract from his detailed plan, but I have not yet received it. This is all I have been able to learn, either by examining his map, which he caused Metternich to return, or from his conversation. He asks from us all the Duchy of Lauenburg on the right bank of the Elbe, the bailiwick of Klotze, and some enclosures, as well as the southern extremity of the principality of Göttingen, according to a line drawn from Duderstadt to below Dransfeldt. It seems to me also that the Duke of Brunswick would obtain from us, in accordance with this plan, the bailiwicks of Hildesheim, which would unite the bailiwicks of Brunswick on the Weser with the rest of the Duke's States. This cession would probably be demanded to indemnify the Duke for ceding the Principality of Blankenburg.

In return for these cessions, and to fulfil the treaties, East Friesland, the Duchy of Arenberg, Lingen, and Tecklenburg, the remainder of Hildesheim, and part of the county of Schauenburg, belonging to Hesse, as well as the enclosed territories of Plesse and Freudenberg, would be assigned to us. According to this arrangement, the Principality of Minden would remain in the midst of the Hanoverian possessions, a disadvantage from which the cession of Lauenburg ought to free us, if the first notions of Prince Hardenberg were executed. I repeat that I cannot as yet judge of the details of the calculations.

As to the cessions, on the one hand we must consider that it will be of the utmost importance to our future political existence no longer to have Prussian possessions between us and Holland, and to obtain East Friesland. On the other hand, we would perhaps have the right to exact an augmentation of 250,000 to 300,000 souls, without submitting to painful cessions. On the one side, existing treaties guarantee these possessions to your Royal Highness, but Prussia has alleged that, before granting us anything, she should be reconstructed herself on the scale of 1805, and that the same treaties secure the districts to her. It is difficult to treat the whole of this matter. It is noble to be content with one's possessions; not to abandon ancient subjects is almost a duty. But again, whilst the dimensions of all the German States will be enlarged, we shall become relatively less, if we remain shut up within our borders. The possession of Hildesheim is imperative. Moreover, even that would be compromised if we do not arrange amicably on the future condition of possession. Your Royal Highness will deign to rest assured that I would act in this affair as my conscience and my sacred duty to you shall prescribe. I flatter myself that I shall at last bring the matter to a final conclusion by

signing the agreement as to future possession only *sub sperati.*

At this crisis Prince Metternich yesterday made a proposal which has not failed to embarrass me.

The conferences of the German Committee have been interrupted since the 17th of the past month. From time to time we met, Austria, Prussia, and Hanover, to come to an understanding amongst ourselves on several important points. I have already mentioned the proposal to divide Germany into circles. It is obvious in all quarters that there is no great desire to take in hand a constitution which would be stifled in its infancy by the misunderstanding which threatens us. Notwithstanding that, I was surprised when M. de Metternich asked me yesterday if I would accede for Hanover to a Germanic League at the head of which Austria will be placed as *primus inter pares,* and which would be composed of Bavaria, Baden, Hesse, and the other German Princes. He added that these Princes would assemble as a Chamber, acknowledging the Director, and that they would adopt the liberal principles of the plan on which we had wrought. The idea of Metternich was to conclude the league without including the King of Würtemberg, saying that he was persuaded that he would be obliged to accede to it, by the fear of exposing himself to the vengeance of his own subjects if he attempted to stand aloof. I asked if Prussia would be excluded from the League. Metternich replied, No, that she would be left at liberty to join it; but I saw distinctly that his conception was to form an alliance of all Germany against Prussia in case she should wish to assume Saxony *de facto.*

Requested to give my opinion on this plan, I represented to Prince Metternich that he must not abandon the hope of arranging the affairs of Saxony amicably, and that if

that was accomplished I saw no motive for excluding Prussia from the League; that I did not deny, however, that if the business were not settled, and if the Congress separated, Prussia holding Saxony purely *de facto* and against the will of the other Powers, war would appear to me then sooner or later inevitable; that we must hold ourselves strictly bound to the system of England; that I did not doubt that this Power would be forced to take part in the war because France would not remain tranquil; that the course was too clearly indicated to leave any room to doubt that Hanover in the extremity would not hesitate about entering under such circumstances into a defensive league with the rest of Germany. I further pointed out to Prince Metternich, that it would be in any case necessary to guarantee to us the districts which were due to us as indispensable to our political existence. He seemed to think this request very natural, and said to me that I should make it a condition. I fear that this Minister enters with too much eagerness into this plan, in order to secure allies against Prussia, and to procure in point of fact for his master the advantages of the Imperial dignity of Germany, which he too lightly sacrificed when he might have obtained them. E. G. M.

Dec. 18th, 1814.

P.S. 3.—I have had a conversation with Count Nesselrode as much on the subject of our demand of nearly 4000 rix-dollars advanced by us for the maintenance of the Russian troops, as in reference to the royal title to Hanover. I reminded him that he had promised a favourable response on these two points. He did not hesitate to avow that the state of irritation subsisting between Russia and England hindered him from obtaining what I asked. My remonstrances, that this state of irritation, to which England had not at all con-

tributed, had no connexion with our demand, and that it appeared to me unjust in Russia to make England pay her, and then refuse to liquidate the debt, under pretence of grievances against this Power, made no change in the state of matters. Chancellor Nesselrode importuned me to do all I could to remove cause of coldness between the two Empires when the business of Congress should be settled. He reminded me especially of the demand of Russia to be freed from her debt to Holland. As to the title of King of Hanover, I represented to the Prussian Minister that this seemed a purely personal affair, to which he replied that it would be easily arranged when the rest was finished.

To me it is apparent that we have only ill-will and bad treatment to expect from Russia.—I am, etc. E. G. M.

VIENNA, *Dec.* 18*th*, 1814.

P.S. 4.—The Bentheim affair gives me much trouble. I have the honour of communicating to your Royal Highness the annexed note which I have given in reply to that of Prince Talleyrand, as well as another to the Ch. of Bentheim, who insists that the ancient relations between the county and the regency of Hanover be re-established.

Several French pensioners have also had the impudence to apply to me to engage your Royal Highness to restore the pensions assigned to them by Bonaparte. I hope your Royal Highness will approve of my reply under No. 3.—I am, etc.

E. G. M.

VIENNA, *Dec.* 18, 1814.

P.S. 5.—Our treaty of subsidy with England for the 15,000 troops composing the Allied Army under His Royal Highness the hereditary Prince of Orange in the Low Countries, terminating on the 24th January next, I have

several times observed to Lord Castlereagh that it would be well in existing circumstances to prolong the term of this treaty under the same conditions. Lord Castlereagh having obtained the necessary authority for this purpose, I have this morning agreed with him that he should address an official letter to me demanding that the Hanoverian Government leave the troops in question at the disposal of the British Government on the same footing, in as far as present circumstances render it necessary, and reserving the right to give notice of the treaty a month beforehand, in order thus to furnish the expenses of the return of the troops. Lord Castlereagh will be charged to write to the Government of H. R. H. the Sovereign Prince of the United Provinces to obtain his consent, for he is interested in this arrangement. The prolongation of our treaty of subsidy being favourable in all its details to Hanover, and almost necessary in existing circumstances, I shall not doubt it will be graciously approved by your Royal Highness. If I receive Lord Castlereagh's letter in time, I shall not fail to communicate it to you. The reply which I received yesterday from Hanover to my despatches of the 28th November informs me, to my great astonishment, that we have there only a battalion and a half of regular troops, 1400 men of various battalions of Landwehr, and a regiment of hussars scattered over all the country for the maintenance of the police. Not having received the reports on our corps, it is impossible for me to judge how and why it has been dispersed to such a degree, especially as the treaty of subsidy freed them from the expense of the corps in Flanders.

I confess that this diminution appears to me not at all consistent with circumstances. At the present moment any movement resembling a new armament would be dangerous.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, 24*th Dec.* 1814.

SIR,—The great question of the partition of Saxony remains yet undecided. As the Emperor of Russia has linked it with that of Poland, the arrangement made in this respect with Austria, amongst other things the retrocession of the circle of Tarnopol, is also in suspense. Prussia is now so closely united to Russia that no more is heard even of the line which will be formed between the Polish possessions of this Power and those of Russia. Whilst I was the other day with Chancellor Prince Hardenberg, speaking to him on Lord Castlereagh's behalf of the mediation on this matter, which Prince Metternich had begged the British Minister to undertake, he at once replied that he had the greatest confidence in Lord Castlereagh, but that he would be obliged to confer with Prince Czartorysky and M. de Stein before he could decide. It seems they had agreed amongst themselves that the Prussian Chancellor should address a memorial on the reply of Prince Metternich to the Emperor of Russia, which this monarch undertook to discuss with the Emperor of Austria. This document has been drawn up and communicated confidentially to Lord Castlereagh. It recounts what has passed since the reply of Prince Metternich to the declaration of Russia transmitted by Chancellor Hardenberg, and then enlarges on the pretended necessity that all Saxony should be left in the possession of Prussia. It represents the calculations contained in the counter project of Austria as erroneous. The aim of this memorial proves, on the one side, that the just demands of Prussia could only be satisfied by obtaining the whole of Saxony; on the other, demonstrates that nothing but this possession could give real consistency to the Prussian monarchy. The Chancellor observes on this

occasion that the treaties concluded with the Allied Powers would give him a right to aspire, independently of the reinstatement of the rate of his population of 1805, and an enlarged and suitable geographical position. He adds also that it would be for the interest of all the Powers to put Prussia in an attitude so favourable as not to induce her to think any more of aggrandizement. To prove the importance of the possession of Saxony to Prussia and the desire of this Power to satisfy the King of Saxony, she proposes to ameliorate his condition by assigning him all the country between Bonn, Liége, and Luxemburg, comprising a population of 800,000 souls. It is even understood since that she would yet add willingly to this portion some hundred thousand souls. Well-informed persons say that the Emperor of Russia is not satisfied with this memorial, which in the main offers no facility even on the question of Saxony. It is probable that this Sovereign, after having obtained all that he asked in Poland, would not make war to sustain Prussia in so impolitic a matter.

In the meantime, Prince de Talleyrand, to whom Prince de Metternich had officially communicated his reply to the Prussian Chancellor, has responded by a long memorial, in which he recounts the principles which guide his Most Christian Majesty, who claims nothing for France but to be contented and happy,—reduced within her ancient limits. He proposes, on the whole, the same principles enunciated at the commencement of the Congress, declaring that in regard to Poland the King of France would have desired to aid in re-establishing the plenary independence of this nation, whose unmerited calamities have been a source of the miseries which have convulsed Europe. Since, however, the neighbouring Powers have found it impracticable to unite for this end, France, less interested than they, will raise no obstacle to their arrangement.

That at present the Saxon question has become the most important for the peace and balance of power in Europe.

That the King of France took, besides, a special interest in it, because justice and principle were at stake, which it was particularly necessary to re-establish in Europe as the most powerful means of restoring peace. That the King of France would be exceedingly pleased to learn that the Emperor of Austria looked on the affair in the same light as he did. That his Most Christian Majesty would, however, only admit that this question may be treated, not as an inquiry of what the King of Prussia is willing to restore to the King of Saxony, but, on the contrary, as to what this Prince could resolve to surrender in order to facilitate the general arrangements. That France herself will endeavour to induce her to submit to what circumstances would exact; and that France judged that Prince Metternich had indicated in his counter project the just measure of cession which could be exacted.

Prince Metternich, whom I saw the day before yesterday, in the morning, intended to reply to the memorial of Prince Hardenberg, that the Emperor of Austria could not consent to this new Prussian project.

In this state of affairs, Lord Castlereagh has addressed a proposal to Prince Metternich, as well as to Prince Hardenberg, to appoint a commission, composed of the delegates of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to make a report on the claims brought forward by the different Powers, whether in regard to indemnities or to promises founded on treaties, and also on the means existing for their satisfaction. Your Royal Highness will find his proposal annexed. It has been agreed to by the above-mentioned Courts, and it is hoped that this judicious suggestion of Lord Castlereagh will bring this knotty matter to an end. The Commission will be composed of Lord Clancarty and

myself for your Royal Highness, the Duke de Dalberg for France, Baron de Wessenberg for Austria, Baron d'Anstaedt for Russia, Councillors of State De Jordan and Hoffmann for Prussia.

P.S.—The first sitting of the Commission has taken place. It was doubted if the Plenipotentiaries of France should be admitted to this work, in order to avoid mixing this Power with arrangements which ought to be terminated without her intervention. It is on this account that Prince Metternich has changed the instructions to the Commission, substituting those under No. 2. It would be a pity if a purpose so contracted as that indicated in his note deprived us of the effect which ought to result from the labours of the Commission. I suppose that this matter will be reconsidered at the sitting to-day. Russia has intrusted her interests to the Prussian Commissioners. M. d'Anstaedt has not appeared.

There was a grand concert yesterday at the Court, in honour of the fête of the Emperor Alexander. His Majesty appeared in Austrian uniform.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *Dec.* 29, 1814.

SIR,—I have just learnt that a courier is about to set off for Holland. I will avail myself of the opportunity, so as to keep your Royal Highness informed of what goes on, though I have nothing very interesting to add to my very humble report of the 24th current.

The Emperor of Russia has given full powers to Count Rasoumowsky to treat with the Court of Austria, and to try to induce her to yield on the Saxon question, that is to say, on the only point on which she has not already submitted to

the wishes of the Emperor Alexander. On this condition he hopes to form a strict alliance between Austria, Russia, and Prussia, an alliance which he considers the surest pledge of peace for Europe,—when, according to what his Majesty has said, a cannon will not in future be fired without the permission of the three Powers. I am assured, on good authority, that this monarch, when a memorial was presented to him on the guarantees to be offered to Austria, requiring that she should submit to his will, has only written at the top of the document—that his word sufficed.

Austria, being of opinion that the Emperor has failed in all his engagements relating to Poland, will not comply with his proposal. The conference of Count Rasoumowsky with Prince Metternich, in which Prince Hardenberg will take part, should take place to-day. Prince Metternich has assured me that his negative response to the Chancellor of Prussia would be very categorical. But what struck me, and my inference from what he said, is, that in case Prussia will not give up Saxony her possession of it will not be recognised by Austria. It would be very strange if the Austrian Cabinet was thus to manifest beforehand a resolution which would prove to Prussia that she was determined to be sulky. I have represented to Prince Metternich that such a declaration would give Prussia the advantage. She, without doubt, would maintain her point, expecting that the future would bring about the recognition of her usurpation. It is impossible to foresee accurately in what manner this affair will end, —the issue depending on the Congress. Prince Talleyrand assures me that the Emperor of Russia, after having obtained his end in Poland, would desire to see Prussia give up Saxony. Prince Czartorysky is without doubt of the same opinion. Count Nesselrode has lost his master's confidence. Pozzo has maintained a tone too loyal and independent not

to have displeased him. It is especially Stein, Czartorysky, and Capo d'Istria, who approach the Emperor.

Only the first, by his violence, would fan the flame of war. Those around the King, and several Prussian diplomatists, have arrived at the same conclusion. But it would be too absurd and too immoral to risk the fate of Europe and of Russia herself for this matter—not if Prussia shall have the increase she demands, but if she shall have it exactly in the style which none of the other Powers will agree to.

I spoke in my last report of the letter of Talleyrand to Prince Metternich. He has communicated it officially to Lord Castlereagh, with a note, which says that it is equally important to Great Britain and France to put an end to revolution and re-establish order in Europe; that two subjects have caused her troubles—the struggle betwixt monarchical and republican principles; that the force of circumstances and of reason made the former triumphant; that the second struggle has been between the old and the new dynasties; that the cause of justice had triumphed equally in France, but that he saw with regret two dynasties threatened, that of Sicily by the existence of Murat at Naples, and that of Saxony by the claims raised by Russia and Prussia; that it would be of importance for France and England to make order be restored everywhere, and to sustain the laws of justice. Our German affairs are still unsettled. Prince Metternich has promised to communicate to me his new plan for the organization of the Empire. I repeated that it seemed to me that the exclusion of Prussia from the league was a step only to be taken as a last resort. There is no doubt that Hanover would be much endangered by a measure that Prussia would regard as hostile.

The King of Würtemberg has left Vienna. He has been

prodigal of gifts, which far surpass the means of his unhappy country.

The marriage of the Prince-Royal of Würtemberg to the Grand-Duchess Catharine is not declared, but it admits of little doubt. The Empress-mother of the betrothed has consented to it.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

State of the Negotiation regarding Saxony.

VIENNA, *January* 21, 1815.

SIR,—The negotiations are still at the same point. However, I have no longer any doubt that Prussia and Russia will yield on the principal question, though they may not officially assent to it,—that of the incorporation of the whole of Saxony with Prussia. The Russians seem convinced that this measure would not be necessary to the reconstruction of Prussia. The report that Lord Clancarty, the Duke de Dalberg, and I made on the subject, and which was afterwards examined anew in presence of Baron de Wessenberg, proves that Prussia, in obtaining from Saxony a district containing a population of 906,369 souls, which might be taken without endangering the political existence of Saxony, and in preserving her communications by Bautzen to Zittau (a position on which Austria sets a high price), and leaving Leipzig still to the King of Saxony, may be reconstructed in such a manner as to obtain all and even more than the treaties destine for her, that Hanover and Vienna may have their claims satisfied, and still there would remain a considerable surplus at the disposal of the Allies. It would be exceedingly unreasonable to dispute the abundance of disposable subjects, and to make that an argument for insisting on the total incorporation of Saxony, for by the latest state-

ment of Chancellor Hardenberg the losses of Prussia amounted to 3,080,215 souls, allowing 119,500 for Hildesheim, ceded to Hanover; adding 180,000 souls which are still due to us, 231,500, as well as 51,000 for Weimar, the necessary population would then amount to 3,411,715

To obtain this, Prussia demands the whole of

Saxony, ...	2,051,240
She wished Russia to leave her from the Grand-Duchy of Weimar, ...	810,268
The Duchy of Berg, ...	299,877
Königswinter, ...	3,000
Duchy of Westphalia, ...	131,888
Dortmund and Corvey, ...	19,500
Fulda, ...	48,628
On the left bank of the Rhine, ...	729,228
A total of . .	4,093,629

This would leave a surplus of 681,914 souls.

It is alleged that she is entitled to this surplus because Austria and other States are augmented. Besides, she offers the King of Saxony a settlement on the left bank of the Rhine, containing 704,000 inhabitants. If the argument drawn from the insufficiency of objects is entirely false, that based on geographical position would be more so.

It is very remarkable that a Cabinet which refused to make common cause with the rest of Europe, to prevent Russia from approaching the Oder, and who thus placed herself in dependence on this Power, now insists on a line by which she has never been molested, and which could only be useful against Austria.

France and Austria at once observed, that if there was enough of disposable territory to give a surplus of 681,000 souls to Prussia, to which she had no right, assigning to the

King of Saxony 700,000 subjects on the left bank of the Rhine, that there was so much the less reason for the incorporation, or even for the cession of a large portion of Saxony, especially as the arrangement with regard to the mediatized would also give great latitude.

Austria remarks, especially in a counter project which Prince Metternich has permitted me to read, that the idea of placing the King of Saxony in the Low Countries would be to throw him into the arms of France, that Prussia was wrong in claiming so large a surplus above what she was entitled to, seeing that Austria, by consenting to take the year 1805 for the scale of reconstruction, had already renounced more than two millions of subjects, which the war of the revolution had caused her to lose before that epoch, whilst this same term was that at which Prussia was raised to the highest degree by the advantages that Bonaparte granted to her.

To this memorial was added another from Prince Schwarzenberg, providing that the position Prussia seeks would be positively offensive as regards Bohemia, where there are only two insignificant fortresses, Josephstadt and Theresienstadt. Lord Castlereagh, unwilling to disturb the peace of the Continent on a purely territorial question, has endeavoured to induce France and Austria to give up the disputed points. I have spoken to Count Stadion, who, as well as Schwarzenberg, is reputed to be most strongly opposed to Metternich, in order to show him that it would be of much more importance to consolidate the system recently established than to risk a war in which England could not intermeddle, since she would have no reason for it but a simple question of limits. Stadion assured me that neither he nor Schwarzenberg would dream of making war on this question, but that he had cause to complain that his interests had been too quickly abandoned when they might have been saved by persistence. Talley-

rand said the same thing to me. Satisfied with having rescued the principle of legitimacy on which rests the maintenance of the King of Saxony, he regards the preservation of one line more, in Saxony, as important to the preservation of Austria, which would be forced, by the position of Russia and that which is in preparation for Prussia, to maintain a military establishment beyond her strength and her finances. In fact, what would it serve to have saved the principle, if it was to be rendered illusory in the execution of the measures which ought to spring from it? My conversation with Talleyrand, and even that I have had with Metternich, made me hope that peace will not be disturbed. However, a conversation which I had yesterday with the Prussian Chancellor, at his request, throws me again into doubt. He confided to me, under the seal of secrecy, that he will propose to the King, his master, to give up the demand for the whole of Saxony; but all that he calculates on leaving to this country is limited to a population of 840,000 inhabitants. He cuts off Leipzig and the lines of communication; will not leave to Saxony the part of Lusatia towards Bautzen and Zittau, which Austria does not intend to give to Prussia, and demands Bayreuth besides. Now it seems to me impossible that Austria and Bavaria should consent to such an arrangement, especially as Saxony would be ruined by preserving only the small radius of Dresden and the circle of mines, which contain 600,000 inhabitants, the greater part of them poor. I have tried to induce Prince Hardenberg to listen to this, but he replied, with warmth, that after having seen the counter project he would insist on giving his ultimatum; that if it was not accepted, Prussia, supported by Russia, would make war with 300,000 men—that in this case she would spare nothing, and she would regard as enemies all who would not join her. He particularly mentioned Hanover

and England, knowing well himself that we would not take part with Prussia in such a cause. I refrained from remarking on the proposition, in order to avoid useless explanations.

Talleyrand thinks it certain that the Emperor Alexander and the Russians wish no more war; it is even said that the King of Prussia himself would be against it. The tone at Berlin is very warlike, and this tone has several times decided similar questions.—I am, etc.

Private.]

VIENNA, *March* 11, 1815.

SIR,—Since my very humble despatch of March 5, I have received the rescripts of your Royal Highness, dated 21st February, which have strengthened my repugnance to the abandonment of the Duchy of Lauenburg. This feeling in itself commands too much respect not to make me feel how much it gains in value by the reasoning founded on the doubt which your delicacy dictates, being unwilling to dispose of a province belonging to the King, your august father, during his lifetime. I will beware of combating a sentiment which I revere. I can only deplore the necessity which has guided my steps, and which has placed me in the position of a sufferer who consents to sacrifice one of his limbs to save the rest of his body. The Sovereign Prince of the Low Countries finds himself in a more distressing situation than your Royal Highness, having been called on to give up all his hereditary States. In his letter to Lord Clancarty, he laments this necessity, adding, that his chief consolation is, that in future he will have Hanover for a neighbour. If a State of five millions of inhabitants, enjoying a frontier extending along the sea, and which is elsewhere protected by fortresses, sets such a price on getting rid of the Prussians on one of her borders, how important must this advantage

be to us! In the meantime, nothing now remains for me but to await the final resolutions which your Royal Highness shall deign to take, after having weighed the contents of my despatches of February 14, and having listened to Lord Castlereagh.

I try to delay as much as I can the conclusion of the formal treaty with Prussia, although it would only explain the preliminary articles which I arranged with Prince Hardenberg.

The new war which it is believed the presence of Bonaparte in France must kindle, should hasten the conclusion of all business. It is especially desirable that the provisional condition, which has been so oppressive to all the provinces which await the final decision of their fate by the Congress, should cease. Lord Clancarty has already written to the Prince of Orange, urging him to take final possession of his new States. Prussia will do likewise, and this would without doubt be the time for us to press the cession of East Friesland and Lingen. But it is questionable if, whilst insisting on this, I could defer the cession of Lauenburg. I will try to obtain a delay, on the pretext that the Elector of Hesse, not having decided what cession he would make to us, we should remain 20,000 subjects below the population which we are entitled to, and which Prussia meanwhile possesses. I fear, however, that the Prussian Chancellor, though most willing to favour our desires, will not be able to do so, the King his master being much displeased with the arrangements about Hanover. He shows it often in a disobliging manner. This feeling is augmented by the danger to which the Trans-Rhenish Provinces would be exposed by renewed war in France. I confess, Sir, that my doubts as to your final resolution takes from me, for the time, the boldness which facilitates the success of negotiations. The Duke

of Cambridge has just sent me, at my request, Major Prot, an able officer, whose services I require in discussing the military arrangements of Germany. Undoubtedly they will endeavour to hurry on the settlement of the territorial affairs of Bavaria, in order to recommence the conferences on the Germanic line. A new accident, which threatens to retard this, has originated in the despotic disposition of the King of Würtemberg, who wants to give a new constitution to his kingdom, against which every voice is raised, especially those of the mediatized Princes, who, by submitting before the final decision of the Congress, would see themselves permanently associated with the native subjects of his Majesty of Würtemberg. Your Royal Highness will deign to notice annexed to this the last note delivered on this account by the mediatized, also the note that I have addressed to the members of the German Committee on this subject. I add to both the sketch of a Prussian note to which I have promised to accede. At present, the Congress has to decide whether it will authorize the restoration of a truly federal bond to Germany, or if, renouncing this real union, we must be contented with a simple system of permanent alliance between the diverse States. I think I have on this occasion maintained the principles which have evinced to your Royal Highness the general confidence of Germany.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, 18*th March* 1815.

SIR,—Your Royal Highness will doubtless have approved of the declaration made on the 13th March by the eight subscribing Powers of the Treaty of Paris against Bonaparte. It is desirable that all Europe should act with the same

concord and energy which pervade this document, executed, indeed, at a time when no one could foresee the extent of the danger which now manifests itself in so alarming a manner.

The time is past for lamenting over the almost criminal carelessness of those who ought to have put it out of Bonaparte's power to do mischief. I made lamentation in vain whilst it was not past remedy. The same indifference is manifested in Congress in all that ought to be done to strengthen the excellent spirit of the people who have brought about these happy results, by which we have profited so little.

On all sides it has been evident that war was made rather against the success of Bonaparte than against his principles. No justice has been rendered to the feeble. The oppression of many of the Provinces of Germany has been continued, and the burdens laid on the people have in many places been augmented by the abuses of the Provisional Governments. All the complaints of the abuse of power in Southern Germany, especially in Würtemberg and Baden, have been fruitless, and for four months the Congress has scarcely troubled itself about the Germanic Federation. It is whilst under the influence of the feelings which so many wrongs bring forth, that divided Germany will again be called to unite her efforts against France. The worst is, that the Powers, united only in appearance, will remember that the distrust which has failed to hinder the success of the last year's negotiations, has been only too well justified by events. If Austria feared the progress of Russian domination in Poland, whilst distinct treaties prescribed its boundaries, how will she look on the invasion of Germany by the Russian army? And can the Poles themselves be trusted, to whom anticipations and promises are alike unfulfilled!

The Saxon affair is not terminated, the King having deferred his consent to the cessions demanded, though Great Britain, Austria, and France have declared that they can do nothing more for him, and that the mediation asked by this Prince could only be granted for the execution of the arrangements, and after he should have consented to them unconditionally.

The territorial arrangement between Austria and Bavaria is also undecided. Amongst other things, it is proposed to pledge the Elector of Hesse to the cession of the county of Hanau. If a slightly different form had been given to the deliberations of the Congress, perhaps these complications would not be so great. The Act of the 13th March is a striking example. It is reasonably asked by what right the eight Powers signing the Treaty of Paris speak in the name of all the Sovereigns of Europe, whom they were not at the trouble of consulting; by what right Sweden and Portugal decide for Sardinia, Denmark, the Low Countries, or Bavaria. The Kings of Bavaria and Denmark, both present, have, with reason, regarded this omission as an insult.

With so many causes of jealousy and distrust, there is room to inquire what degree of cordiality and union will there be in this general coalition. It is already matter of observation that Austria should only send 30,000 men on the Rhine, towards Offenburg, concentrating her forces in Italy. It seems, however, that General Vincent's despatches, received yesterday from Paris, have dissipated this probably ill-founded doubt. For the General announces that the hatred of the French army is especially directed against Austria. Whatever be the feeling, that which is most general in France is the resolve to reconquer the left bank of the Rhine. This expedition will drag us into war without delay, and will render uncertain all that we have arranged with

Prussia. The Duke of Wellington sets out immediately to take the command of the English army in the Low Countries.

I do not yet know the result of the military councils held in reference to warlike preparations in Germany. I learn that it is proposed to re-establish the armies as they were in 1813, so that Hanover will again form a corps with the Brunswickers, the Oldenburgers, the contingents of the Hanseatic towns, and those of Mecklenburg. The extent of the danger became known yesterday by the despatches of General Vincent. M. de la Bensadure, whom I saw this morning, said to me that the defection of the French army is not so much to be dreaded as a treason so general that it must lead to a civil war.

The renewal of the Treaty of Chaumont, according to which Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia ought each to furnish 150,000 men, is projected. As for the subsidies demanded from England, the Duke of Wellington has only submitted the question to his Government, promising, however, that England shall make compensation in money for the number of troops which are lacking to make up her quota of 150,000 men.

As it is intended to invite Denmark, Sardinia, the Low Countries, Bavaria, and Würtemberg to accede to the treaty, the Duke asked me if Hanover ought also to be invited, or if it would not be better for her to act simply as subsidized by England. Without hesitation I preferred that Hanover should be invited, in order to preserve her rank amongst the independent Powers. I shall endeavour, however, to limit to 12,000 men the corps which we shall add to that serving with the English army.

Flattering myself that your Royal Highness will deign to approve of my views, I shall despatch to-morrow a courier to his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and to our

Government, to prepare the necessary armaments. I hope, for the good of Germany, that Sweden will not be invited to join us.—I am, etc.

P.S.—I have just come from Court. Of the four French ambassadors, not one has appeared, though the news from Paris of the 11th is a little better. To make amends, Eugène Beauharnais is at Court. Murat still declares that he will be faithful to his engagements with Austria. Woe to whoever trusts him! The steps taken to arrest Joseph Bonaparte in Switzerland will probably fail. Jerome and his sisters will be conducted to Gratz and to Brunn.

The King of Prussia gives the command of his troops to Blucher. Schwarzenberg will command the Austrians on the Upper Rhine. Perhaps the Archduke Charles will command in Italy.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *25th March* 1815.

SIR,—Several English couriers have arrived to-day, of whom the one despatched on the 14th of March has delivered to me the rescripts with which your Royal Highness has honoured me of that date. The more I regretted finding myself in the distressing position of having to give up anything on the preservation of which your Royal Highness with reason justly sets so high a value, and to consent to the cession of the Duchy of Lauenburg in order to preserve still more essential interests, which would have been compromised by my refusal, the happier I feel now that these despatches remove my doubt whether your Royal Highness approved of my decision on this subject. I am now at ease on this point, which I took very much to heart, and I am

deeply affected by the magnanimity with which your Royal Highness testifies your complete approbation, in a matter in which I could not reconcile your wishes with what the chief interest of your States required. You will excuse the too lively apprehensions on this subject manifested in my private correspondence.

I will do all I can to try to redeem Lauenburg. Meanwhile, this matter is undecided, owing to the cavils raised by Sweden against the cession of Swedish Pomerania to Denmark, the province for which Lauenburg was to be exchanged.

Prussia seems indifferent enough on this point, since she has long ago agreed, contingently with Sweden, as to the price which she should pay for Pomerania. The new preparations for war are very costly to Prussia, and it will be difficult for her to make the acquisition without paying partly by the cession of other possessions.

Notwithstanding the desire to forward the affairs of Congress, so as to give the exclusive attention to the troubles in France which they demand, slight progress is made.

The territorial arrangements betwixt Austria and Bavaria are not completed. The King of Saxony gives us reason to hope for his consent to the cession demanded from him, but he has not yet given it. These two points must be decided before the advancement of German affairs can be thought of.

It is doubtful if the possession of his country and the disposal of his army would be granted to the King of Saxony, even if he should consent to the arrangements made by the Congress. Prussia has only stated the question. In the meantime this Power has taken several steps, which demonstrate only too clearly her desire to procure for herself a military supremacy over Northern Germany. In the military Council, which has been held here, it was desired to assign all

the troops of the Princes of Northern Germany, except those of Hanover, Brunswick, and Oldenburg, to form a mass with the Prussian army. The Duke of Wellington having spoken of the necessity of reinforcing the English army in the Low Countries, Prussia offered him the command of part of hers. The Duke, however, has not fallen into this snare. On the contrary, he has flatly refused to undertake the command of the Prussians, and insisted, moreover, that the contingents of the Northern Princes should be assigned to him, with the assurance that he would then defend Northern Germany and Holland from every foe.

Prince Hardenberg objected that the German Princes had not the right to dispose of their troops. But the Duke judiciously replied that the laws of the federation were not yet fixed, having sent eight days ago a courier to Hanover to apprise the Government of the necessity of putting our troops, to the number of 12,000 men, in marching order. I have, by the Duke of Wellington's advice, written confidential letters to the Elector of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick, in order that they may apply to the English Government to complete the army which Great Britain should bring into the field, according to the Treaty of Chaumont, which is wished to be renewed.

The Powers signing this Treaty have shown less zeal for the renewal of these stipulations since they have found that the British Plenipotentiary would promise nothing on the subject of subsidies. I believe as it is, that Austria and Prussia will have much difficulty in providing for the expenses of the campaign. As for the Russians, they gained from thirteen to seventeen millions of crowns[1] by the last campaign above their ordinary expenditure. But it is by not paying that this is done, and this example, which costs us so dear, renders

[1] Ecu = three francs.

the prospect of the reappearance of her armies in Germany more ominous. Since the 1st April Russians to the number of 50,000 have entered Bohemia, 150,000 passed through Silesia and unhappy Saxony. The Prussians will have in all 216,000 men, and the Austrians nearly 400,000. Their regiments are very strong. A single brigade which passed this way some days since contained 11,000 men. Their principal force is directed on Italy. Since the 9th of March Murat has advanced on all points towards the Roman frontier. The Minister of Murat always says that his Sovereign wishes to act in unison with Austria. It seems as if, on this point, no one would be convinced of danger till it was too late, just as it was with regard to Bonaparte. It is asserted that Lucien speaks unreservedly at Rome of the re-establishment of his brother. Your Royal Highness is without doubt informed of the plot formed here to carry off Bonaparte's son from Schönbrunn. It happened that the correspondence between the inhabitants of the Castle and the Isle of Elba was carried on by a Madame Amaranthe, a sort of half lady's-maid, half maid-of-honour to Maria Louisa, whose husband remained with Napoleon. M. de Montesquieu, who was at the head of the scheme of abduction, has been sent off, some say to the fortress of Mongatsch, others to France. His mother, *Grande Maîtresse* to Maria Louisa, has also departed. The little *ci-devant* King of Rome has been accommodated in the Imperial Palace in town.

I have for some days been invited to a Conference on the navigation of the rivers, to which the principles of free-trade were to be applied, in accordance with the system adopted for the Rhine. It seemed to me that this business was ill-digested, and I do not think myself called on to make sacrifice gratuitously, at your Royal Highness's expense, to favour some vague ideas on the liberty of Commerce! I

found it necessary then to give the note subjoined to the Protocol of 24th March.

The German Princes have presented the annexed note for the purpose of bringing to a close the affairs of Germany. I have engaged Lord Wellington to interest himself in this important business. All these Princes feel their danger, and show confidence in me with regard to Hanover. The reason that the Duke of Wellington states in confidence for not having accepted the command of a Prussian corps is, the spirit manifested by this army against the arrangements made by his Government, and the discontent which they have exhibited in regard to Saxony, about which they especially blame England. I think that the Duke has duly appreciated the circumstances.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

The King's German Legion.

VIENNA, *8th April* 1815.

SIR,—At present we are obliged to make the greatest efforts to recover the tranquillity which the Peace of Paris and the Congress of Vienna might have secured to Europe, if the dangerous experiment had not been tried of compromising with crime, by leaving Bonaparte, Murat, and a number of their accomplices, in a condition to do harm. I think I am fulfilling a sacred duty in rendering as efficacious as possible the aid we can give to the common cause, and in maintaining the military glory which Hanover has all along enjoyed. It is of course natural that our army should not be perfect at the present moment. A long war has mown down our population, since, besides the number of soldiers who have been so fortunate as to fight for their

legitimate Sovereign, the conscription of the usurper has dragged away a large number to be butchered.

It is after such an exhaustion of our resources that we have begun, in the presence of the enemy, to raise a new corps of troops. We have succeeded, with the generous assistance of Great Britain, in putting 30,000 men under arms. Good-will, the most ardent zeal even, cannot supply the want of experienced and veteran officers. The 26,000 men whom we shall soon have in Flanders are, from what I learn, good as men, but it is natural that they should feel the effects of so essential a want.

On the other side, the German Legion, the corps which has served with so much distinction under the first captain of our age, reckons many excellent officers, but it is reduced in numbers, and there is no means of recruiting it, at least Hanover cannot furnish men. Our population, however, does not admit of exceeding the above-mentioned number of troops which we place on the field, for it is still necessary to defend the interior of the country, and to maintain the police.

In this state of things nothing would be more natural than to think of uniting at once two corps which are destined some day to be one.

England agreed in 1805 to restore to us, six months after the peace, "such men of the Legion as are liable to serve, as a corps, in their state of military equipment." The term fixed for this restitution expired, in truth, at the end of the month of November 1813. But it is fortunate, under present circumstances, that the German Legion remained on the same footing as before. I think it would be an unpardonable error on the part of the Hanoverian Government if they did not intend in future to preserve the Legion as it is, and without much change in its constitution. *Esprit de corps* cannot be bestowed; it must be acquired in actual service. Indeed, it

is with the view of preserving the Legion that your Royal Highness has deferred raising regiments of Guards in Hanover, in order afterwards to make them enter the Legion in our service, as Hanoverian Guards.

The Duke of Wellington's army would gain, if the Legion could be engaged to pass at once to our service to complete it, whether as battalions of the line, the staff of which would return to Hanover, or as volunteers of the battalions of militia. England and Hanover could arrange for the calculation of the numbers to be furnished by each Power, by counting the number of men they should each have respectively furnished.

The principal difficulty to be overcome would be that resulting from the difference of pay, as well as from the advantages secured to the officers of the Legion who enjoy permanent rank in the English army, and who have a right to half-pay,—an advantage too great to be made up by Hanover, whilst England would dispute their right, on the ground that an officer loses these advantages by entering a foreign service.

I shall not hazard suggestions for getting over this difficulty. I do not know if the English Government could assign to the officers annuities equivalent to the half-pay which they would lose by entering the service of Hanover. However, I am persuaded that if your Royal Highness will consult the Duke of Cambridge, and employ General Charles Alten to arrange the matter with the Legion itself, that the corps will willingly agree to all equitable conditions, and extend the glory of your Royal Highness's arms.

The Duke of Wellington's advice being of great weight in this affair, I, by the advice of Lord Clancarty, sent off this despatch by a special express to his Excellency, in order that he may, if he thinks proper, accompany it by his

remarks. The arrangement should be made so as not to press heavily on our finances, which cannot bear greater burdens than those which she will have to bear in accordance with existing arrangements.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *8th April* 1815.

P.S.—The *general* business of the Congress advances scarcely at all. Spain refuses absolutely her consent to the arrangements agreed on with relation to Italy. She holds rigorously to the rights of the Spanish house of Bourbon over Tuscany, Parma, and Piacenza.

On the other hand, Bavaria is not content with the indemnities offered her for Salzburg and Inn Viertel, though she would gain 300,000 florins of annual revenue, and a population of 200,000 inhabitants. This matter has especially retarded German affairs. It seemed besides that Würtemberg is further than ever from conforming to political and national order in Germany. She counts perhaps on fishing in troubled waters, whilst, on the other hand, the Diet, newly convoked, resists the tyrannical innovations proposed by his Majesty of Würtemberg. As to the Bavarian question, it can hardly be denied that Austria shows in it a moderation which approaches to feebleness, and which has injured Prince Metternich in public opinion.

Her treaty with Bavaria is clear as regards the cession of Salzburg. The Duke of Wellington was persuaded that Austria must insist on this position. Nevertheless Austria has abandoned her right. Yesterday evening the matter approached a conclusion. Bavaria is only willing to yield about half the territory of Salzburg. She asked Elvangen from Würtemberg, and reserved the reversion of the Palati-

nate on the Rhine, in case the male line of Baden should become extinct. I believe that the project will even be extended over all the Margravate of Baden, which ought, however, to fall to Count de Hochberg, the legitimate and acknowledged son of the grandfather of the present Duke. The King of Saxony declared, the day before yesterday, that he would consent to the territorial cessions demanded of him. But he attached three conditions to this consent:—

1. That the debt of the country be divided, not according to the population, as Prussia desires, but in accordance with the population joined to the revenue and the area.

2. That Prussia should yield at cost price three-fifths of the salt of the Saxon salt mines, all which the division, made without respect to local circumstances, has assigned entire to Prussia.

3. That the King of Saxony shall not free his subjects, Saxons as well as Poles, from their oath of fidelity, till he returns to Dresden. Prussia is unwilling to yield this last point, thinking that the King of Saxony's demand shows an unmerited distrust.

These are about the principal points which at present check our progress.

In the meantime, Murat has raised the mask which was only impenetrable to those who thought fit—to be blind. His advanced posts have attacked the Austrian advanced posts of the regiment of your Royal Highness near Rimini. The Austrians have three able generals in Italy, Frimont, Bianchi, and Nugent. But they will be obliged to begin, from not having been cautious in time, by giving up places which would have protected them; these are Mantua, Piacenza, and Alessandra.

The Emperor of Russia is about to take the title of King of Poland. This matter has been too deeply gone into for

every one not to feel its painful importance. The Duke of Wellington was too judicious to allow himself to be induced to provoke this measure; without offering this title to the Emperor Alexander, he has been obliged to yield in granting it. However, his demand that Austria and Prussia should make declarations, granting a sort of nationality to their Polish subjects, has not been acceded to. This title of King of Poland has not yet been officially made known. I shall only reply when I shall have the official response to the notification of the title taken by Hanover. When I reminded Count Nesselrode the other day of this matter, he excused himself because the note was still with the Emperor, but said that he had meanwhile signed the treaty of *accessit*, in which the Royal title was given to Hanover. The Duke of Saxe-Weimar announced yesterday his new title of Grand-Duke. I could not refuse to recognise it on behalf of Hanover, as all the other Powers have consented. We shall see this example followed presently by the Dukes of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Schwerin. I suppose that your Royal Highness will not oppose their wishes. As to the King of the Low Countries, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, I thought proper to reply in the most polite manner, assuring him that your Royal Highness would have no hesitation in acknowledging his dignity on behalf of Hanover. In every case I beg you to give me your orders on this subject, that I may give notes in due form.

The preparations for war are carried on with great vigour. I am persuaded, and so is everybody, that Prince Metternich will act with energy, provided that afterwards suspicions and jealousies do not interfere. It does not seem certain whether the Emperor Alexander will command his army, or will give the command nominally to Schwarzenberg. The command on the Rhine is estimated at 264,000 effective

men, commanded, under him, by the Prince-Royal of Würtemberg, Marshal Wrede, Prince Hohenzollern, and Jerome Colloredo, with a strong reserve under the Archduke Ferdinand of Milan. The order of battle is well chosen. The *ci-devant* Saxon General Langenau is quarter-master-general; Radetzky remains only for form's sake, and on account of the jealousy of the others. All the Archdukes will be employed, but not in chief. It seems strange that the Archduke Charles takes the Government of Mayence. Even the Prince-Royal of Austria will have a brigade of cavalry. Some ladies of the Bonaparte family have been brought to Austria; they will be lodged in the fort of Mungatsch. This rigour would have been more appropriate towards Jerome and Joseph, who have both fled before they could be apprehended. Jerome was warned by his wife, who, in her turn, had it from the Minister of Würtemberg, to whom Prince Metternich had said that the Sieur Jerome would be conducted to Gratz. If he presents himself in our territory, I will have him prosecuted for high treason. I am informed that M. Camus, to whom we have had to restore an estate at Hildesheim, by the express orders of his Prussian Majesty, is under surveillance.

M. de Montesquieu having been overtaken in his flight, is at Monjutch. To make amends, we have here with Prince Talleyrand the famous Monterau.

Bonaparte has already given instructions to all the Ministers of France who hold posts at foreign Courts. They have not received them.

Beauharnais has left us. The Emperor Alexander has insulted Germany by asking a principality for him there. Prussia has nobly resisted. It has been proposed to give him Ponte Corvo, belonging to the Pope. This has not satisfied the *ci-devant* Viceroy. At last it has been agreed that

the King of Bavaria should give him the Castle of Bayreuth, with its dependencies, and that his rights resulting from the famous treaty of 11th April should be secured to him.—I am, etc. E. G. M.

Private.].

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *April* 12, 1815.

SIR,—I despatched a courier yesterday to Hanover to put the Duke of Cambridge and our Government in possession of all that relates to the Treaty of Alliance against Napoleon Bonaparte, and to communicate to him the despatch of the 8th, which I sent by a special express to the Duke of Wellington, in reference to the German Legion.

I have availed myself of this opportunity of forwarding to London the Act of Accession signed with Prussia. Your Royal Highness will find subjoined the same document signed betwixt us and the Austrian Plenipotentiaries. What we have to arrange with Russia is subject to so many delays that I cannot fix the day of signature. In the meantime I entreat your Royal Highness to cause the act of your ratifications of the three treaties, which I herewith present, to be despatched. To my very humble despatch of the 8th current, the ratification of Austria on the accession of Hanover to the treaty of 3d January is annexed, which I have sent to serve as a model for the form of the despatches. I subjoined to my despatch of yesterday the ratification of the same treaty on the part of France, also the correspondence which took place on the treaty of the 3d February between me and the Plenipotentiaries of the King of the Low Countries, and of Bavaria.

In a conference held yesterday the territorial arrangements

between Austria and Bavaria have been settled. Bavaria only gives up five bailiwicks of Salzburg. She keeps the town, which gives her a military position—regarded by the Duke of Wellington as necessary to Austria. Bavaria retains also part of Hundsruck and Inn Viertel, obtains Hanau, the country of Isenburg, which will be incorporated, and Mergentheim, belonging to Würtemberg. The indemnification of Hesse, Würtemberg, and Baden is now the question. When this is once arranged, I flatter myself that the general affairs in Germany will proceed a little faster.

Matters in Italy have come to a crisis, which should have been long ago foreseen. Murat has deployed 20,000 men before General Bianchi, who had only 5000, and had to order a retreat. Seeing, however, that Murat detached a column to outflank him, he threw himself on it, and beat it, taking 200 prisoners. General Filangeri, who was mortally wounded on this occasion, was the pearl of Murat's army.

Prince Metternich's slight success in his negotiations with Bavaria, and the result of all the manœuvres with Murat, have raised a great outcry against this Minister. These two circumstances, added to all for which he has been blamed during the Congress, could only terminate in undermining his credit with the Emperor his master. Indeed, I think that the open war made on him by the Emperor Alexander has partly strengthened him in his post. The Emperor Alexander has made peace with him, but he has been only coolly received by the Minister, and I doubt not that the hatred remains the same on both sides.

I send your Royal Highness, subjoined, the declaration of Austria against Murat, as it appeared to-day. The feeling in Italy, instead of being, as was dreaded, in favour of Napoleon and Murat, proves, on the contrary, to be against them.

I saw to-day the declaration of the Emperor of Austria in

reference to his possessions in Italy, which is to be published on the 18th current. The provinces are thus designated:—"The Lombardo-Venetian province to Lake Maggiore to the rivers Ticino and Po; Mantua, on the left bank of this river the Valtellina and the two counties of Chiavenna and Bormio re-united to the empire of Austria—raised to the rank of a new kingdom, under the denomination of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom."

The new declaration of the European Powers against Napoleon, proposed by Prince Talleyrand and strongly supported by the Emperor Alexander, has given rise to warm discussions, which seemed to have come to an end yesterday evening, so far that copies were distributed to all the royal Courts for signature. The declaration was even printed in the evening, with all the signatures placed in alphabetical order.

Several Ministers, in particular those of Spain and Portugal, having refused to sign, and Lord Clancarty having renewed the objections he made previously, the declaration will be again discussed. I am very glad of it, for I only signed it because I did not think it right for me to stand alone in a business agreed to after three days' discussion by all the Powers.

I look on the declaration as for the most part useless, for that of the 13th March said all that was necessary before the commencement of hostilities. In fact the whole document seems to me an attempt on the part of Talleyrand, prompted by M. Monterau, to make his peace with the Jacobins. The declaration is bitter against Bonaparte, but it only alludes to the King in praising his paternal government. It says nothing of the part which he is expected to sustain. Lord Clancarty had the greatest difficulty in getting the title of legitimate King substituted for recalled King, the name proposed to be given Louis XVIII. Apparently the author

wished to indicate that the King had been recalled on condition of accepting the constitution drawn up by M. de Talleyrand, and that he was dethroned for having granted another in his own right.

This declaration promises, moreover, that the war shall cease when France shall offer, by her institutions, a pledge for the safety of Europe, and promises her beforehand the conditions of the Treaty of Paris. In my opinion we ought to make war as Allies of the King of France, regarding as traitors those who fight against him. It is thus we should treat all who have taken part in the conspiracy.

It is certain that Europe will have no rest till the French regicides are deprived of the power to do harm.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *April* 13, 1815.

P.S.—The courier not having set out yesterday, I am able to acknowledge receipt of the despatch of 31st March, by which your Royal Highness directs me—

First, To report on the probable duration of the Congress, and of my absence from London.

Second, To collect information relative to a certain Mr. Griffith.

I humbly execute this order in as far as I can form an opinion at the present moment.

After the territorial affairs of Bavaria are arranged, it remains to reconcile the Courts of Würtemberg, Hesse, and Baden, to the changes to which this settlement exposes their possessions. It may easily be foreseen, and I know from the Minister of the Elector that he will be very unwilling to give up the county of Hanau—the place where he resided during his father's lifetime. Darmstadt and Baden will

hardly accept indemnification on the left bank of the Rhine. It is true that the great Courts have agreed on these transfers, but it is difficult to believe that they would, under existing circumstances, use force to obtain what good-will refused to them. The King of Prussia has consented, with a very bad grace, to the bestowal on Bavaria of the position of Hanau on the Main.

After these arrangements have been made, the settlement of the Germanic League will be attempted. We have concerted a plan with Russia for settling the points into which the general act of Congress on the political state of Germany ought to enter, with the intention of declaring afterwards that the League exists, and assembling the first Bundestag, which will be employed on the details, according to the bases agreed on. Even this preliminary work will be rendered more difficult by the jealousy which Bavaria and Würtemberg manifest on all occasions, when they think they ought to renounce the exercise of what they understand by supreme power for the general good.

It is of great importance, then, to conclude the League, even though it cannot be rendered so complete a compact as your Royal Highness would desire. For without the League, we shall risk treachery in Germany. I suppose that all this business cannot be ended before the middle of the month of May.

My proposal would be to proceed then directly to Hanover, to prepare there the organization of the different branches of the administration, and to regulate all that remains to be done with the General Diet. Afterwards, I shall ask some days to visit my estates, which I have not seen for fifteen years, and then I will return to my post.

I beg that your Royal Highness will cause me to be informed if you approve of my plan.

The Sovereigns will remain together at headquarters, and

will naturally have their Cabinets with them. If, however, the business intrusted to me were concluded here, I believe I should be more useful to your Royal Highness in London than with the armies.

In the meantime it is said that each Court will only have one Minister at headquarters, who will be accredited to the three Sovereigns present. If this is the case, I shall propose to your Royal Highness to give full powers for Hanover to Count Hardenberg. If afterwards my presence with the army should become necessary, I could repair thither according to your command, from London.

As to Mr. Griffith, I charged Baron d'Ompteda to tell me what he can learn on this subject. His wandering life has made him an object of suspicion here, and it is certain that the Ministers of Murat at Vienna lived with him. I delay making a report on this matter till I shall have collected materials.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *April 22d*, 1815.

SIR,—By my last despatch of the 15th curt., I laid before your Royal Highness the treaty of agreement signed between Hanover and Prussia. It remains only to be signed with Russia. I have again reminded Count de Rasoumowsky and Count Nesselrode of this matter. I suspected at first that these Ministers endeavoured to delay the signature till a final arrangement was made with the Duke of Oldenburg, in regard to an allotment of 20,000 inhabitants which this Prince will receive on the left bank of the Rhine. Count Nesselrode, however, told me this morning that he should have the act we have to sign prepared instantly. I have no reason to doubt that he will keep this engagement, since

he sent me the day before yesterday a very friendly note (of which I subjoin a copy), by which the Emperor of Russia recognises the title Royal, as adopted for Hanover.

As to the proposed arrangement with Oldenburg, Russia, who protects her, particularly desires that Hanover give up to her the districts contiguous to her States, receiving proportionate compensation from Prussia, who, in her turn, will attach to her new States the portion destined for the Duke of Oldenburg on the left bank of the Rhine.

Your Royal Highness may rest assured that I will endeavour to profit by this circumstance, to recover, if not the whole, at least the greater part of the Duchy of Lauenburg. I have reason to believe that the King of Prussia holds especially to this cession as a compensation which enables him to overcome his unwillingness to give up East Friesland. I must then endeavour to forward this affair by means of the Russian mission.

I have been confirmed in this opinion by the following fact.

Prussia having taken possession of the part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw which falls to her share, as well as of her new provinces beyond the Rhine, and even of the greater part of those she should obtain between the Rhine and the Weser, I charged Count de Hardenberg to represent to the Prussian Chancellor that Prussia was in possession of a population of 131,500 souls which belonged to Hanover,—this kingdom having only obtained 119,500 souls by the occupation of Hildesheim. It seemed to me, then, just, until the cession of the Hessian possessions and the Duchy of Lauenburg should be arranged, that Prussia should give up to us, in East Friesland, 119,500 souls, and in the town of Goslar 5500—in all, 125,000.

This would still leave a surplus of 6500 souls in her

hands. The Chancellor protested that he could not agree to partial cessions so long as all could not be arranged at once. He has promised, however, that the matter shall be concluded in fifteen days. It is not unimportant to us, as the revenue we ought to receive is above 50,000 rix-dollars per month. What makes this matter more serious is, that if it is not arranged at present, I have not sufficient confidence in the good faith of the Prussian Cabinet to believe that we shall ever receive what is due to us. Now Darmstadt and Baden are very unwilling to enter into the cessions sought from them to facilitate the arrangement agreed on between Austria and Bavaria. This circumstance, and the constant desire to defer difficult questions to the future, seem to have given rise to the idea of leaving the state of possessions *in statu quo* till the war is over. This state of uncertainty would be in itself a misfortune, and, as regards us, it would expose us to a multitude of difficulties to obtain what is our due. I will do all that I can to accomplish the settlement of Northern Germany. The affair of Royal Saxony is fortunate for us, for the Powers which take an interest in the fate of this State will labour to release the portion which ought to be restored to its legitimate Sovereign from Prussian occupation. This negotiation draws near its conclusion. The treaty of agreement by the German Princes who have not signed the separate acts, will be terminated after to-morrow. They treat by deputy with the Ministers of the four principal Powers. The principles which must be adopted to provide for the subsistence of the armies are incessantly studied. I shall take part with Lord Cathcart on behalf of England in this commission, because our private interests will have to be carefully watched. When these points are settled, the general affairs of Germany will terminate the labours of the Congress.

The declaration to be made to France is still undecided. The publication of the treaty of alliance is the most rational thing to be done. I am disgusted at hearing again declamations on the pretended incapacity of the Bourbons for governing France. And yet those who preach this doctrine are the same who contributed to bind the hands of the King of France, and to set around him the rascals who have ruined him.

The passage of the Austrian troops still continues. The regiments are very numerous, but their march is not very prompt. The immediate commencement of operations desired by the Duke of Wellington has not been approved.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *May 6th*, 1815.

P.S. 2.—The subsidy which England pays us for the 15,000 combatants (16,400) that Hanover has furnished, has enabled us to provide for the expense which bears so heavily on the country.

But notwithstanding this assistance we shall have great difficulty in providing for the maintenance of these 16,400 men and the 10,000 men whom we are obliged to keep at our own expense.

It is true certainly that the above-mentioned subsidy is very considerable, and that the treaty bears that the British Government will not be held liable for other expenses; but it is equally true that we shall suffer very severely by having to conform to the English system of military expenditure.

According to a calculation furnished by Lord Clancarty, intended to prove that the Continental Powers would be

able, with the aid of the subsidies granted, to pay the real price of provisions, I find that the maintenance of a foot-soldier costs £8 stg., and that of a trooper, 1s. 6d. per day, or of 12 livres and £27 stg. a year. Taking the Hanoverian army as composed of 24,300 infantry and 2100 cavalry, the maintenance of this corps alone would amount to £405,000 stg. per annum, without counting the pay of the troops, the clothing, artillery, stores.

The difficulties would be greatly lessened if justice were done us. But hitherto Austria, Russia, and Prussia have not even replied officially to the notes which I have addressed to them to pay our part of the sums which they have raised in the provinces occupied during the late war, of which according to distinct treaties one-seventeenth ought to be ours. The only sums paid by France and the Low Countries when the armies have left them amounted to thirty-seven millions of livres, which have been divided without regard to our rights. Neither Russia, for whom we have disbursed four millions of crowns, Prussia, Sweden, nor Denmark, have paid as yet the considerable outlay caused by their troops during the last campaigns.

I beg your Royal Highness to cause this subject to be mentioned to Lord Castlereagh, who has always shown a disposition to support our just demands, in order that the British Government may intercede in our behalf, and consider if a portion of the subsidies promised to these Powers could be retained.

In the first place, the subsidies are given for the expenses of the war, and there is a general belief that the treasures of England are at our disposal, which serves as an excuse to the other Powers for keeping back what is our due. Perhaps the Duke of Wellington could employ part of the two million pounds sterling left at his disposal in disembarrassing a

Government whose troops have always been his faithful companions in arms.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *May* 12, 1815.

SIR,—Finding that the despatches sent by Hanover arrive often as promptly in London as those forwarded in the ordinary way, I avail myself of a courier whom I send to the Government of Hanover to forward this very humble despatch to your Royal Highness. You will find annexed the copy of my reply with respect to the new treaty of subsidies, which is to replace that which the Duke of Wellington has felt himself obliged to denounce.

I shall take advantage of the first English courier to acquaint the Duke of Wellington with my views on this subject. It is impossible to enter into details, not knowing how the British Government will regard the question of recruiting the German Legion. I wrote you all that the Duke of Cambridge said on this matter. If it should be desirable to incorporate the battalions of the Hanoverian line with the Legion, dismissing the staff, an injustice would be committed towards a numerous corps of officers, who have embraced the service in times of difficulty to save Hanover. Dismissed from the theatre of war, their position would become so much the more distressing, because they would see all hope of suitable promotion frustrated. The militia could not be joined to the Legion without infringing the promises given to the country of Hanover at the time of its formation.

On the other hand, if the Legion passes into our service, the militia could fill the ranks of the Legion by voluntary enrolment, and the officers of these battalions, who are less bound than those of the troops of the line to capitulations

distant from our frontiers, could be employed in the interior at the depôts and at the organization of the levy *en masse* (Landsturm) which might be a useful institution, inasmuch as it is in a certain fashion in union with the military system of the country.

The affairs of Saxony draw nearer and nearer to a conclusion. The Ministers of the King of Saxony, Count de Schulenburg and M. de Globig, whom I saw yesterday evening, think that they will sign their treaty in a few days. The rest of the territorial arrangements in Southern Germany will remain in a provisional condition. Austria has proposed to Prussia and to the other Powers to renounce during the war about to commence the accomplishment of her treaty of exchange with Bavaria, on condition that during the war three great Powers should keep possession of the left bank of the Rhine,—namely, the King of Holland, Austria, and Prussia. Austria proposed to take provisionally for this purpose all the territory destined for Bavaria, reserving by a secret article the good offices and the assistance of the Courts of London, Russia, and Prussia to obtain after the Peace—

(1.) The cession of the provinces that Bavaria had promised to give up.

(2.) The reversion of the Palatinate and of Breisgau. As to the Palatinate, it is a matter on which Bavaria has strongly insisted. Perhaps Austria only desires to facilitate afterwards her arrangements with this power. Austria would besides possess Hanau during the war, and some bailiwicks of Fulda. She demands that Prussia shall renounce on her side the possession for the time of the Duchy of Westphalia, and take in the meantime a population equal in number in the department of La Sarre.

Prussia has given her consent to this arrangement on con-

dition that Austria shall cede to the Grand-Duke of Weimar the 27,000 souls which are destined for him from Fulda; whilst Prussia will, in the meantime, take the half of this province, intended to be exchanged with the Elector of Hesse.

(3.) That she shall besides take possession of the part of the department of Mont Tonnerre, adjoining Mayence, reserving it to exchange with Hesse-Darmstadt.

(4.) That the 67,000 souls intended to satisfy the claims of Saxe-Coburg, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Count de Pappenheim, etc., may be employed for the interest of these Princes.

At a conference held on this point it is decided that after the war Mayence shall fall to Darmstadt; in compensation, the Duchy of Westphalia shall be a fortress of the League; that the garrison shall be composed of Hessians of the two branches of this house, the troops of Nassau and of Prussia, and that the King of Prussia shall nominate the Governor; that during the present war the Governor shall remain Austrian, and the Commandant Prussian.

Hanau will in future be maintained as a fortress by Bavaria. Thus far these negotiations will not hinder the execution of our arrangements with Prussia.

I have this moment received the subjoined note from this Court relative to the proposed exchange of Hohenstein. I shall reply to it immediately. This note is obviously contrary to the sense of our treaty, for it considers the cession of Prussian Hohenstein as a proposition novel and inadmissible.

I am grieved to observe that the great Courts seem to have entirely abandoned the King of Denmark, who leaves Vienna on Tuesday next. He has got no assistance against the cavils of the Swedes, who refuse him the possession of Swedish Pomerania. I learn privately that Prussia has agreed with this Power on the acquisition of this province, a fact which influences her in a manner unfavourable to the Lauenburg

question. It will only rest with us to see that the steps taken by Russia to obtain the additions promised to the Duke of Oldenburg to enlarge his States shall tend this way. As this can only be effected by Hanover, the retrocession of Lauenburg must be insisted on, or at least of the greater part of this country, to induce us, on the other hand, to make the cessions required for the Duke of Oldenburg. The news from Italy is very favourable. A letter from Colonel Stephanini announces that General Frimont has already returned to enter Piedmont with 12,000 men, regarding the war against Murat as decided. This usurper has thrown his infantry, reduced to 12,000 men, into Ancona, where he is cooped up by Bianchi, whose troops are at Sinigaglia, Loreto, and Macerata. Murat has fled with the cavalry to Jessi, trying to escape towards Naples. The official report, retarded because Bianchi is at Maurata, is expected.

Commander Ruffo sets out to rejoin Prince Leopold of Sicily, who has left Vienna some days since to repair to the army of Italy.

He carries with him the preliminary treaty with Austria, by which the possession of Naples is secured to the legitimate King. There are two private articles in the treaty, which have been imparted to me under the seal of secrecy. The one stipulates that Austria shall for some years keep 60,000 men in the kingdom of Naples, the second that Naples shall pay her thirty-seven millions of livres for the expenses of war. I learn that these articles are not very precise! I heard yesterday that the Russian General Chanicof said to a friend of mine in confidence, that he should be appointed Russian Minister to Hanover and Cassel with orders to reside at Hanover. There is no personal objection to Chanicof. He was formerly Minister at Dresden, and has since attended the Grand-Duchess of Weimar. I do not know if the Court of

Russia has made a confidential overture to your Royal Highness on this subject.

I see the Ministers of the Emperor Alexander almost daily, but they have not mentioned it to me.

Even this morning, Baron de Buhl, *ci-devant* Austrian Minister at Florence, came to see me, to announce that he had been ordered to leave Florence in haste, to receive the requisite instructions for his new destination to Cassel and Hanover,—that, in fact, he only awaited some information on the nature of the Germanic League to set out.

Prince Metternich has as yet communicated nothing as to this mission, and M. de Buhl's visit is the only official notice that I have received. He proposes to transmit the greater part of the army to Hanover. He even made a kind of excuse for beginning by sojourning for some time at Cassel, as an acknowledgment of the Elector's politeness in announcing to the Emperor that he had assigned a hotel for the reception of the Austrian Ministers.

Your Royal Highness will remember that I formerly had the honour of making observations on the presence of a diplomatic corps at Hanover. It seemed to me that it would not be suitable to refuse to admit the Ministers when the Courts had appointed them. These Ministers only replace those who were formerly accredited to the Court of Lower Saxony, and usually resided at Hamburg. It will be necessary, however, to instruct the Hanoverian Government as to the reception of the foreign Ministers. Their credentials being of course addressed to your Royal Highness, I think it would be inconsistent with the dignity of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge to receive them simply for transmission. It would perhaps be more fitting to charge the Minister of State, de Bremer, to receive them, and then to present the accredited Ministers to his Royal Highness. I

detained the courier some hours, hoping to be able to give your Royal Highness an account of the result of the conference on the affairs of Germany. Indeed, Prince Metternich had fixed a preparatory conference betwixt himself, Prince Hardenberg, and me, for to-day. But it is put off till to-morrow. It is suspected that the Austrian Court wishes to pledge us only to fulfil very vaguely the article of the treaty of Paris, which decrees that Germany shall be a confederation, and to leave the remainder of the discussion till the Sovereigns meet at Frankfort.

Prince Hardenberg and I will endeavour, on the contrary, to cause the League to be decreed according to the plan recently drawn up by Baron de Humboldt, in conformity to the propositions of Austria and the Plenipotentiaries of Hanover, and to call without delay the first Bundestag of the League, effectively constituted. This measure seems necessary to tranquillize Germany. A fresh delay would only be waiting for the course of events to procure a doubtful and vague advantage.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *May* 13, 1815.

SIR,—I have received through the Duke of Cambridge the embarrassing tidings that Marshal the Duke of Wellington has denounced the treaty of subsidies, which hitherto has sustained our finances in the midst of calamities that threatened their ruin.

This disagreeable news has been rendered still more difficult to endure by the claim made on behalf of the British Government, to be reimbursed for the expense of maintaining 15,000 soldiers, who have been in Flanders for some months.

We should be entirely unable to maintain our army in the Low Countries, if the Duke of Wellington had not offered to conclude a new treaty of subsidies; his proposal offers in itself much less advantageous conditions than those of the treaty which has just been set aside. On the other hand, the Duke has offered to extend them to all our troops, whereas the first treaty only comprised the 10,000 men we sent out immediately on our accession to the treaty of alliance of 20th March.

The Duke of Cambridge and our Government have communicated to me the replies despatched to the Low Countries as well as to London, asking my advice.

By a courier sent off yesterday to Hanover (whom I have also charged with several despatches for your Royal Highness) I have informed the Duke of Cambridge that I think his views perfectly just, and that I quite agree in the opinion of Marshal the Duke of Wellington, that under present circumstances *nothing should hinder all* our corps of 26,000 men from being included in the treaty of subsidies. The expense that this corps would cause us, independently of its maintenance, has been represented to our chamberlain, and I shall add nothing on this subject.

We cannot do better than rely on the justice and generosity of the British Government, guided by a chief who has always honoured our troops with his especial approbation. He has known them too long to confound them with mere mercenaries. He has seen them fight, animated by attachment to the same Prince who governs Great Britain, and he will not forget that he is thus not only sheltered from the chances to which the versatile policy of Cabinets might expose the leader of foreign troops, but also enabled to command these troops more fully than he could dispose of simple auxiliaries,

who might wish to remain united, and not to be under the command of foreign leaders.

The demand made by the English Government for the maintenance of our troops is just in certain respects. England is not obliged to feed the subsidiary troops, but, on the other hand, the objections made by General Decken to the Commissionary-in-Chief Harris could not fail to produce a favourable decision for Hanover. Our means are not equal to the expense of an English commissariat, to which our troops were assigned without consulting the Hanoverian Government. Moreover, whilst it is a question of subsidiary troops, there are in our treaty many favourable conditions which have been overlooked—for example, the first to take the field, etc.

The misgiving that is felt regarding the subsidy offered to us for the corps of 10,000 men that we furnish according to our treaty of accession to the alliance of 26th March, rested on the supposition that Great Britain wished to place the troops she will pay by subsidy in her reckoning of the 150,000 men she must furnish. Now, in this case, it appeared that these troops would be counted twice, first for Great Britain, then for Hanover. But since the Great Powers receive subsidies, the affair takes a turn, and it will rest with Great Britain to succour whom she will. It must be considered, moreover, that our difficulties principally proceed from the circumstance of Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, not having reimbursed us for the enormous outlay caused by their troops during the last campaign.

We have disbursed four millions of crowns for Russia alone. Now, these payments are delayed because it is imagined that the treasures of England are at our service.

It is particularly disagreeable that all this discussion has

taken place at the time when we are engaged in dispute on the maintenance of the Russian army. Your Royal Highness knows by my former reports of the unjust demand made by Russia, Austria, and Prussia on the German Princes, these Powers requiring the Princes to furnish maintenance immediately for three months—vaguely intimating that they will forward the necessary provisions for the following nine months.

Your Royal Highness knows the negotiation begun with the King of Holland on this subject.

I have been obliged to declare that if this sovereign consented to go into the system adopted by the other radii, we would concur in the preparatory arrangements with the other Courts of Germany.

I hope that if the British Government undertakes the expenses of our troops, Marshal the Duke of Wellington will take care that we may not be abandoned to the rapacity of a Prussian commissariat. To demonstrate the danger of such an alternative, I may observe that the three Powers, to avoid the united remonstrances of the German Courts, have only re-assembled the Ministers according to the radii formed. They avoided inviting me to these conferences; but I have procured a sketch of the demands made by Prussia. Her radius would comprise a population of 5,136,000 souls; her army is calculated at 280,000 men, who must be fed; and what she asks for three months amounts to 343,620 cwts. of flour, 114,570 cwts. of meat, 2,520,000 quarts of brandy, 715,950 cwts. of oats, 171,810 cwts. of hay, of which the quota required from Hanover, on acccunt of 1,300,000 inhabitants, is reckoned at 86,906 quarters of flour, 28,990 quarts of meat, 636,780 quarts of brandy, 181,199 quarts of oats, 43,490 quarts of hay, which we shall have to transport at our own expense from Hanover to the Rhine. It is to be

considered that the other German provinces can console themselves with the promise that Prussia will take care of the supplies for the remaining nine months of the year. This would be advantageous to the Princes, whose troops serve under the Duke of Wellington. This measure is evidently based on a system unjust, and at the same time false. Several of the Princes have promised to furnish at once the third of what has been demanded. Bavaria has given a simple refusal, which has caused much ill-humour. An Austrian General has been despatched to Munich to arrange this affair.

At a distance from the places where our interests will be discussed, it only remains for me to await with confidence the arrangements that the Duke of Wellington and the British Government shall conclude on this point with the Plenipotentiaries of Hanover, and the instructions with which your Royal Highness may honour me in consequence. —I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, 13*th May* 1815.

P.S.—The conference on the affairs of Germany announced for to-day (as I stated in my very humble report of yesterday, forwarded by Hanover) took place this morning at Prince Metternich's, in presence of the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Hanover, and Prussia. I was agreeably surprised by the conviction that the report of the Austrians being not really willing to terminate these matters was entirely false. Prince Metternich commenced by causing us to read a declaration from the Emperor of Austria, in accordance with the determination to which we had come at our former sittings. This declaration, after demonstrating the necessity of fulfil-

ling the terms of the Peace of Paris by constituting the Germanic League, distinguishes between the people in whom the European Powers are interested and those whose affairs ought to be discussed only amongst the German Princes without the intervention of foreign Powers.

The articles proposed to constitute the League are truly general enough, and they do not enter so much into details as could have been wished. Many of the ideas which at the commencement of the Congress were thought useful have been abandoned. But all this seemed indispensable to terminate the Congress, and above all, to secure the grand point of constituting Germany as a federal body. The discussion on all that relates to the interior ought to be sent back to the Diet, which it is proposed to convoke for the month of August, and which ought not to separate till the organic laws shall be completed.

Our opinions varied very little. We assemble again to-morrow morning, and we hope to agree, so as to be able to propose the plan to the other German Courts, comprising Denmark for Holstein, and the King of Holland for Luxemburg.

Difficulties are foreseen with Bavaria and Würtemberg, who are very jealous of their plenary sovereignty. It has been proposed (in secret) to exclude them from the League, but I declared that I should not think myself authorized to accede to it for Hanover if the powers of the second order were not made parties to it. They, by uniting their resources, will protect the weak against the strong. This very day it seems that the affair of Swedish Pomerania will be settled thus :—Denmark will be indemnified by a sum of two million rix-dollars, and the cession of Lauenburg. Denmark will withdraw the demand for 600,000 rix-dollars, which she claims from Sweden. The Emperor of Russia gives up

1,500,000 rix-dollars, which Sweden owes him, and Prussia will add one million for this Power. If this proposal is accepted, the plan for recovering Lauenburg, by the exchange in favour of the Duke of Oldenburg, will be set aside. But perhaps we shall find means to arrange with Denmark, especially if England be willing to facilitate a settlement so important for her commerce with the towns of Hamburg and Lübeck.

The good news from Italy which I sent yesterday is not officially confirmed, Frimont having probably forwarded his reports to Prince Schwarzenberg from Milan. Nevertheless, the tidings are not doubtful, for they are founded on a letter from General Neuperg of 2d May. The war is believed to be ended, and Murat ruined; it is feared he may have escaped by Jessi.

I have just seen the Danish Minister, who said, concerning Lauenburg, that the matter was not so far advanced as the Prussian Minister thought. He complains that everything is done for Sweden, and that it seems to be expected that Denmark should sacrifice herself to please Bernadotte.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, 15*th May* 1815.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Royal Courts at the Congress have at last agreed on the question, if it be necessary to make out a new declaration after the events in France since the return of Bonaparte, and the documents published at Paris on the declaration of the Powers on the 13th March.

To clear up the matter, the annexed report of a commission appointed to examine it is published. This Peace, after having been signed by the eight Powers subscribing the Treaty of Paris, has circulated amongst the Ministers of the

other Royal Courts, with the invitation of Prince Metternich as President of the Conferences, to accede to it.

I found nothing in this Peace to induce me to refuse to sign it.

As the rights of the house of Bourbon could not be brought forward in a satisfactory manner, I was very glad the subject was avoided.

The Congress seems now to draw towards a close. The Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia intend to set out on the 26th current, and the Emperor of Austria the day after. The Ministers expect to follow their masters a few days later.

It is inconceivable how, even supposing that important questions not hitherto settled should be terminated with the least possible delay, the Act which must contain all the stipulations concerted during eight months can be printed, received, and signed by all the Powers. The matters which remain to be settled render the thing almost impossible. First there is the succession to the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza. The Emperor Alexander espouses the cause of the wife of Bonaparte and her son. Lord Clancarty said, with reason, that the Treaty of Fontainebleau, of 11th April 1814, has been broken by Napoleon, and that the right of succession which he gave to his son is annihilated by the deed.

The British Plenipotentiary consequently refuses to sign the most trifling document until this point is settled. He has even declined the offer to omit this matter in the Act, and to reserve the question for a future negotiation. Austria seems to be quite guiltless in this transaction. Prince Metternich even complained the other day of being obliged to speak against the interests of his Sovereign's daughter.

The affairs of Germany are still treated confidentially betwixt Austria, Prussia, and Hanover. In approaching the

different subjects, I fear, unfortunately, that we shall be forced to confine ourselves to constituting the League, and to postponing the most important details to the first Diet, which it is proposed to assemble at Frankfort in the month of August.

It is thus that the hope of the people of Germany will be disappointed, for it is obvious that what has not been settled at Vienna will not be accomplished at Frankfort. The excuse is, that Bavaria and Würtemberg, on the one side, are unwilling to submit to anything beyond a merely federal bond, and on the other, they are afraid of entering too much into the affairs of the interior, lest they should be exposed to foreign influence. I dare not combat these doubts, for fear that the League may be concluded to the exclusion of Powers of the second order. Our preliminary conferences ought to terminate to-morrow. I reserve myself, then, in order to return to this matter.

The Saxon affair is settled. The articles agreed on will be paragraphed to-morrow morning. The couriers who will carry the tidings to Dresden will set out immediately, that the King of Saxony may, without delay, take possession of his dominions. The signature to the Act appended under envelope to this report is the first one published, authenticating the political existence of the King of Saxony.

In my very humble report of the 12th current I presented to your Royal Highness a note from the Prussian Chancellor of State, on the proposed exchange of Hohenstein. You will deign to see how I have brought up, in my reply of the 16th current, the opinions announced in the Prussian note, in what manner I have insisted that the treaty concluded on the 14th January between Hanover and Prussia should be executed. According to this treaty we would preserve Lauenburg, whilst we would arrange cessions to be made

by Hesse. I flatter myself that I shall profit by this opportunity for a last attempt to preserve this Duchy, in accordance with the plan contained in my letter to Count Rasoumowsky.

Our private conferences with Prussia commence immediately.

It seems that the taking possession of the provinces beyond the Rhine will be so arranged that Prussia will hold the Duchy of Westphalia, and Darmstadt will have the territory of the department of Mont Tonnerre, which Austria does not like to see in the hands of the Prussians. The appointment of a person to watch over the interests of your Royal Highness at headquarters is now urgent. There is a proposal, according to which each Court will have only one Minister accredited to the three principal Courts. These Ministers would then remain in some place separate from the headquarters of the Sovereigns, and would only be invited there when particular matters had to be decided. It is proposed that the Plenipotentiaries of your Royal Highness be considered as forming the fourth Cabinet. Thus the Minister that we should name, being kept aloof, would be of little use. The Princes de Hardenberg and Metternich desired to obviate this inconvenience themselves, in such a way, however, that the other Courts could not take exception that the Hanoverian Minister was favoured. It is proposed then that Chancellor Hardenberg, if your Royal Highness consents to appoint him, be placed on the list of persons nominated by Great Britain. I have drawn up the subjoined memorandum, which I beg your Royal Highness to transmit to Lord Castlereagh, if you approve of this idea.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *June* 3, 1815.

SIR,—I have received the letter of M. le Cons. Int. of Cabinet Best, of the 16th May, by which your Royal Highness has directed me to proceed to the headquarters of the Duke of Wellington, and thence to London, to arrange the new treaty of subsidies for the Hanoverian troops before going to Hanover.

I will not permit myself to hesitate as to obeying an order from your Royal Highness, and I shall set out for Brussels and London as soon as I have signed the Act of Congress which is in preparation. It is, however, my duty to observe, that the new arrangement for the subsidies which is proposed, seeing the urgency of the case, according to the details forwarded from Hanover, and the explanations I have taken the liberty of giving in my despatch of 13th May, sent by a special express to the Duke of Wellington, for your Royal Highness, will probably be settled before I can repair to the Low Countries, and that the military operations about to be commenced forthwith will probably prevent the commander of the army from treating with me on financial questions.

Fearing thus, on the one side, that I may miss the end for which your Royal Highness proposes recalling me to London, and, on the other, that I may neglect your pressing interests in Hanover by deferring my arrival in this country, I have resolved to set out by Ratisbon, Frankfort, Cologne, Aix-la-Chapelle, Brussels, Ghent, and Ostend, and to entreat your Royal Highness to despatch M. de Bodenhausen very speedily by the same route, that I may know if you still think it necessary for me to proceed to the Duke of Wellington, and to London, or if it would be preferable to save the time that

a second journey to Germany and my stay in England would require.

In accordance with the treaty I am about to sign, several new provinces will become subject to your Royal Highness within eight weeks, dating from signature of the treaty, that is, in the beginning of August. The new organization of our Government, the old form of which is not suitable to the wants of a country augmented by one-half in extent and population since the submission of the ancient relations of the German empire, the necessity for an analogous modification of the representation of the States of the kingdom, and the administration of finance,—all these are subjects so important and pressing as absolutely to require my presence in Hanover.

If your Royal Highness still thinks that it will be of service for me to present myself in London to receive your orders in person before going to Hanover, you have only to let me know it, and my arrival will not be retarded a single day by the step I am about to take.

On the other hand, I will only make a *détour* of a few days' journey, by taking the road to the Low Countries, and I could, without interruption, turn towards Hanover by Cassel if your Royal Highness judged my return to England at the present moment unnecessary.

I trust your Royal Highness is persuaded, without my repeating it, that I shall think myself happy in reiterating in words the profound veneration with which I am, etc.

TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *June* 3, 1815.

SIR,—The affairs of the Congress are almost terminated. Your Royal Highness knows that the Emperor of Russia and

the King of Prussia left Vienna on the 26th of May, and that the Emperor of Austria set out for his headquarters on the 27th. The Cabinets remained to conclude the points which were still under discussion. Russia insisted on leaving these matters, as well as the final signature of the Act of Congress, in suspense! Lord Clancarty distinctly apprehended all the danger and the equivocal character of this proposition, and we are indebted to his firmness, and to his declaration that it the general Act was not signed, Great Britain would consider all the engagements made at Vienna as undecided, for Russia's retractation.

It is, then, agreed that the Cabinets should remain here till all is finished; and a commission was appointed, composed of Lord Clancarty, M. de Humboldt, and M. de Gentz, to draw up the Act in the manner described in my report of yesterday.

I have mentioned the doubts which still remain in regard to the occupation of the provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, intended as compensation to Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt for the cessions made to Austria and Prussia. It is hoped this point will be settled in the course of the day.

The question of the reversion of Parma has been adjourned, but so as to make it easy to exclude young Napoleon, Parma being only given during his lifetime to his mother, and Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, having to be consulted as to the future arrangement.

Your Royal Highness knows the fortunate termination of the Italian affair. Murat has fled, accompanied by a few persons, to Ischia, and thence probably to France. His arrival there as a fugitive would unveil the falsehoods of Napoleon in a manner beneficial to the King of France.

Madame Murat and her children, who were to embark at Gaeta, have been put on board English ships, to be conveyed

to Trieste, Lord Exmouth and General Bianchi having refused to ratify the imprudent promise of Captain Campbell to land them and their people in France.

This is the second little pretender that appears in Austria; and three days ago the son of Bonaparte has been again lodged at Schönbrunn, with his mother. I wish a second attempt may not be made to carry him off. This would doubtless be much easier in the country than in town.

The affairs of Germany are now the most essential that remain to be concluded. I had the honour of informing your Royal Highness that Austria, Prussia, and Hanover, had agreed, at their confidential conferences, on a plan which would be submitted to the German Courts for the formation of the League. This plan is very imperfect, because this important object has been postponed till the end of the Congress, when everything became hurried.

Your Royal Highness knows the causes of this delay. The regular conferences were interrupted since the 17th of November. During this interval Austria and Prussia have only tried to conciliate the Courts of Germany, without following a settled plan. They are entangled by promises to accept or reject this or that notion, which till then had been proceeded on or apparently rejected, so that the work, as finally drawn up, has little conformity to what Germany had a right to expect. One reason why the wording is incomplete is, that several Courts, especially those of the South of Germany, would not make the smallest sacrifice for Germany as soon as they were called on to surrender any part of their sovereignty. The Court of Würtemberg, especially, has rejected every proposition tending to establish the independence and tranquillity of Germany. She has only been willing to speak of a simply federal bond, without binding herself by the smallest promise on anything that might

restrain the despotic exercise of the internal administration of her country. Bavaria has been a little more accommodating. Her Minister has taken an active part in the deliberations, whilst the Minister of Würtemberg has not approved these. The Minister of Baden had orders to vote with Bavaria.

The rest of the German Princes have shown a better spirit. The King of Holland and Denmark will accede to the League for Luxemburg and Holstein. Austria and Prussia have asked no advantages analogous to the extent of their provinces. On the contrary, they claim only a voice in the Assembly of the Princes, when it shall sit by deputation, composed of seventeen members, of whom eleven (namely, the old Electors, Denmark, Holland, and Darmstadt) will have a vote each, and six other votes will be made up by the rest of the Princes (*vota curiata*).

When the Assembly shall meet *in pleno*, it will number sixty-nine votes, of which Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Würtemberg, will each exercise four; Hesse-Cassel, Darmstadt, Baden, Holstein, and Luxemburg, three each; Brunswick, Nassau, and Mecklenburg, two; and the rest of the Princes one. Austria presides, and will have a decisive vote in case of equality *in pleno*.

I despatch subjoined a translation of the first plan, which has, however, been modified by the deliberations which have taken place in the General Assemblies of the German Courts, which meet daily at the Chancellor of State's office. This is proved by what I have just said on the form of the Assembly. It would be needless to trouble your Royal Highness by the recital of these deliberations. In a few days I shall have the honour of sending you, by Hanover, the result of our conferences.

Austria, Prussia, and Hanover have deliberated on the

steps to be taken to end the interminable discussions of an Assembly composed of so many members acting on opinions totally divergent, so that nothing could succeed. We agreed to try to reconcile the opinions as far as this was possible without reducing the plan to a mere shadow of a constitution, stopping short at the last terms that we think will be granted, and signing the League, leaving the Protocol open for those who wish to accede afterwards. I foresee that several Courts of the second order will exclude themselves, —amongst others, Würtemberg and Baden; I even doubt if Bavaria will sign. I cannot positively answer for Denmark. The rest will accede. I have abandoned the opinion that it would be dangerous to enter into a League to which the Powers of the second order were not parties. Such as it has been projected and modified, I can only see in it an additional guarantee for us, and I do not question that the other Courts will accede at Frankfort, where the first Assembly of the Germanic League will meet on the 1st September next. —I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *June 7th*, 1815.

SIR,—Referring to the very humble report which I transmitted to your Royal Highness by M. de Bodenhausen, forwarded by courier to London, 3d June, I continue my account of the progress of the affairs of Congress, beginning by what concerns the Germanic League.

I present to your Royal Highness a translation of the plan proposed to the German Princes by Austria and Prussia. The original German is here under (A.)

You will condescend to see by the Protocols of the sittings that I add under (B.) how this project has been discussed.

I doubt if it will be possible to collect, before the departure of the courier, whom I cannot detain longer, the complete series of official reports. I will send afterwards those that are wanting now.

Under (C.) I have the honour of submitting to your Royal Highness the Act of Federation, as it has been modified at the close of the deliberations.

Affairs being in this state, we have constantly confidential conferences between Austria, Prussia, and Hanover, and we have agreed that Prince Metternich should declare, at the general sitting of the 5th current, that the Congress being on the point of coming to an end, discussions on our League must be brought to a close. That the Emperor of Austria having been repeatedly requested by the German Princes to press the conclusion of the Federal compact, declared, that his Majesty was ready to sign the Act as it was, and that he invited the Ministers of the other German Courts to declare if they would do as much, and that those who should refuse must state in the Protocol if their Courts opposed in general the idea of a League, or if they objected only to certain stipulations, or if their Plenipotentiaries were prevented from signing by want of instructions. Prince Metternich begged the Ministers to deliver next day a written declaration on the Protocol. Prussia, Denmark for Holstein, the King of Holland for Luxemburg, Hanover, all the Princes and Free Towns of Germany, declare for the acceptance of the Act, except Bavaria and Saxony. Hesse-Darmstadt, however, made partial objections, which renders her accession doubtful.

I thought it my duty to state in detail the motives of your Royal Highness's accession, and to add a reserve, in case the League, instead of becoming general, should be limited to a few Courts. Forewarned by the part I had taken in the

confidential deliberations of Austria and Prussia, I put this declaration to the Protocol of 5th June. This has provoked many other declarations of the same import. Several of these leave the accession of certain Ministers doubtful, who in the first place were decidedly for the acceptance.

It is evident that the Federal Act, as it is drawn up, cannot fulfil the wise and magnanimous intentions of your Royal Highness with regard to Germany, and also, that it is not in conformity with the principles which have always distinguished the illustrious house of Brunswick.

Essential points must be yielded, so as not to lose the end proposed. It seemed to me that if, notwithstanding these surrenders, unanimity could not be purchased, seeing that several German Courts were willing to sacrifice the general good to a vanity as mistaken as dangerous in its consequences, that there could no longer be any reason why the more disinterested Powers should not complete their work in a satisfactory manner.

On the other hand, it seemed to me impossible to enter unreservedly into a League from which a great part of Germany would be excluded. I flatter myself that your Royal Highness will approve in this respect the declaration (D.) signed by Chancellor Hardenberg and me, given by us on behalf of your Royal Highness.

Yesterday evening we had a confidential conference at Prince Metternich's, which has been adjourned, because we wished to try if Bavaria could be induced to sign, which undoubtedly would render the League general, as Würtemburg and Baden would not dare to separate themselves from the rest of Germany, if they stood alone.

In our present condition, we risk finding ourselves deprived of the accession of Bavaria, Saxony, Holstein, Luxemburg, Darmstadt, Würtemberg, and Baden, so that, as Prince

Metternich observes, there will remain no State of importance in the League, except Austria, Prussia, and Hanover. Not daring, as I have observed, to delay the departure of the courier, I shall not to-day report the final result of this affair.

The territorial question between Prussia and Austria is so arranged that Austria guarantees to Prussia the immediate cession of the Duchy of Westphalia on the part of Darmstadt, which must be satisfied with the complete indemnification proposed. Austria, in the meantime, retains the provinces destined for Bavaria and Darmstadt on the left bank of the Rhine; and she has besides provided that she is always to keep possessions which might one day become very important by the reversion of the Palatinate and of Breisgau, which Austria reserves, as then the fortress of Mayence would have an Austrian governor and a garrison composed of the troops of Austria, Darmstadt, and Nassau. I have been agreeably surprised to see that Russia favours the project of leaving these territories beyond the Rhine to Austria. Count Nesselrode spoke to me with eagerness of the advantage it would be to the three great Powers to have France for a neighbour on the left bank of this river.

The treaty betwixt Prussia and Denmark on the cession of Swedish Pomerania to Prussia, and of Lauenburg to Denmark, is signed. On our side we now watch the execution of the secret article agreed on between Hanover and Sweden for the payment of the debt incurred for the Swedish troops. Great Britain has, from what I learn, retained the million for Guadaloupe to force Sweden to fulfil the treaty of Kiel. These monthly payments are then probably about to begin. The Act of Congress will likely be terminated on Friday. It is agreed that the Powers subscribing the Treaty of Paris should alone sign, and that the rest of the Courts should

accede separately. This distinction is arbitrary in itself, and even unsound. For Spain has never signed the Peace of Paris, even as she will refuse to sign the Act of Congress. Besides, there is no sufficient reason for admitting Sweden and Portugal into the number of principal Powers, whilst others of the same rank are excluded. But it was difficult to find another way of diminishing the number and the intricacy of the ratifications, which would amount to more than 1600, if all the Courts had signed and exchanged formal Acts.

I flatter myself that I shall be able to set out for Frankfort about the beginning of next week.

Learning from Hanover that our treaty of subsidy is ready to be signed, I only wait to set out towards the Low Countries till I learn if your Royal Highness still desires that I shall come direct to you, or if I shall commence by going to Hanover.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *June* 11, 1815.

SIR,—Since the departure of M. de Bodenhausen, whom I despatched express, on the 3d current, to London, I sent off, on the 7th, a very humble report to your Royal Highness, by a courier that I commissioned to carry to Hanover the copy of our treaty with Prussia. I gave at the same time the necessary instructions to the Minister of your Royal Highness at Berlin, to profit by the stay the Chancellor of State Prince Hardenberg will make there, in order to obtain the despatch needed for the delivery of the Prussian provinces to be ceded to us, and that the commissaries who will decide on the works necessary to facilitate the navigation of the Ems, and to rectify, if required, the boundary line of the

portions of Lingen and Munster to be incorporated with Hanover, may be appointed. I have also directed the attention of our Minister to the question which will arise on the compensation due to us by Prussia, if Hesse refuses the cessions contingently promised us. In this case we have the advantage of being able to retain Lauenburg, until we shall be satisfied with the substitute offered by Prussia. I learnt from the Danish Minister that Prussia has promised to this Power to restore in three months the four bailiwicks of Lauenberg that she reconveys to her. Our business must then be concluded before the expiry of this term. The Prussian Chancellor will doubtless be in a hurry to follow his Sovereign to headquarters; and I flatter myself that Chancellor Hardenberg, after your Royal Highness shall have consented to my proposal to attach him to the grand headquarters, will be able to rejoin the Chancellor as soon as he has gone thither. I think this negotiation should be intrusted to him. He knows the proposal that I have brought forward on this subject. I do not doubt that he will receive, in accordance with my request, instructions from Hanover, and especially the statistics requisite for judging of the matter under all its aspects.

As yet I have not entered on the retrocession of Lauenburg with Count Bernstorf. It will be better to treat directly with the Court of Copenhagen on this matter. I doubt, however, if the three millions at which this possession was valued in the arrangement about Swedish Pomerania will satisfy them.

I await impatiently the close of the negotiation on our treaty of subsidy with England. But that on provisioning the army causes me as much uneasiness, if we are forced to enter into the iniquitous system engendered in the train of Baron de Stein.

The outlay on this annoyance for the three months would cost us, according to the calculation subjoined, still more. I refer in this respect to the annexed copy of a letter I addressed to Lord Clancarty.

It is time that the system according to which *soi-disant* Great Powers are permitted to stipulate for advantages to themselves at the expense of feeble States should cease; without this, the political edifice that the Congress of Vienna was expected to build, will form only a castle in the air.

I am far from wishing to advocate sentimental policy, but I am thoroughly persuaded that it is wrong not to sustain the principles of honour and good faith. One error in regard to Bonaparte has cost us much; we shall be guilty of the same fault if the Jacobins seem inclined to act with us.

Murat by his own folly, the Austrians by their bravery, have restored to us what we so very lightly sacrificed in Italy. But in this country only some brands of discord or a centre of intrigue is necessary. The King of the Two Sicilies will be obliged to grant to Eugène de Beauharnais a domain containing a population of 50,000 souls. The Minister of Great Britain has refused to sign this shameful compact; it will therefore be drawn up in the form of a separate treaty between the rest of the Great Powers.

Prince Talleyrand will receive a million and a half of livres for Benevento! Austria and Prussia demand from the four free towns of Germany a loan of two millions of florins, (they have since reduced it to one and a half) to meet the expense of reprovisioning Mayence, promising their joint security, and that of the other Princes of Germany.

No State of the League will escape from contributing to the requisite outlay for putting an important fortress of the Empire in a state of defence. But the mode adopted is the

forced loans of the French, and it is striking that this affair has never been spoken of to the German Princes in any of their meetings.

I intend to write a private postscript on the affairs of Germany. The League just concluded ought to be a curb on aggressions such as Prussia has allowed herself to practise towards us, causing troops to enter our territory, notwithstanding the refusal of our Government. Being informed by express of this event, I addressed the subjoined note to the Prussian Chancellor, who, in a conversation I had with him, disapproved of the proceedings of the Prussian Generals. I await his official answer. It seems to me clear enough that the salutary curb of subordination becomes daily weaker in Prussia. Each governor and under-governor does as he thinks fit, and if it is not attended to, it is at Berlin that we shall see the first outbursts of German Jacobinism—especially if the Great Powers uphold it by trying to compromise with the Jacobins in France.

The general Act of the Congress was paragraphed on the evening of the 9th. On the 10th, the conferences were continued, to add to this Act some private treaties, amongst others, those with Hesse-Darmstadt on the cession of the Duchy of Westphalia, and the Act of German Federation.

In the evening, Chancellor Prince Hardenberg and Prince Talleyrand left Vienna. It only remains to make copies of the Act and of the annexed documents, which will take about three days.

The Congress of Vienna may then be looked on as ended. Whatever opinion the public may form of its labours, they will never reproach the Plenipotentiaries with having wasted their time. Never have more important affairs been settled than those under consideration at the Congress of Vienna; and though nine months have been passed in inquiring

into all the contested points, a much more considerable space of time has been spent on more trifling subjects. As to the peculiar interests of Hanover, I flatter myself that I have done all I could to give to the German Confederation as much solidity as possible in existing circumstances, in order to guarantee the safety of the States that compose it.

Hanover has acquired the Royal title which was suitable to her new relations,—a title which brings no real advantage to the country that enjoys it. Our limits have been considerably augmented, and our geographical position has gained especially by the uninterrupted contiguity of the kingdom of the Low Countries. Above all, I flatter myself that I have succeeded in preserving to the illustrious house of your Royal Highness the confidence which it has always so justly enjoyed in Germany. The greater part of the Courts have constantly given me the most marked proofs of it, and I have no doubt that it is to this general confidence in the integrity of the Hanoverian Court, that I, as well as my colleague Hardenberg, am indebted for having been exclusively and steadily called to all the confidential conferences between Austria and Prussia on the interests of Germany. I count on leaving Vienna on Thursday next, taking the route by Frankfort and Brussels, hoping to learn by the way from M. de Bodenhausen, whether your Royal Highness wishes me to repair first to you or to Hanover.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *June* 11, 1815.

P.S.—SIR,—I beg leave to continue my very humble report of the 7th June on the affairs of Germany.

The Bavarian Minister having received instructions from his Court on the evening of the 7th June, the following day hav-

ing been fixed for signing the Act of the Germanic Federation, Prince Metternich, after having adjourned the general conference till the evening, invited him to a private interview, at which the Plenipotentiary of Prussia, Chancellor Hardenberg, and I, were present. The Bavarian Minister read his instructions, and we tried to modify the Federal Act in such a manner as to induce him to sign. Count de Rechberg, the Bavarian Minister, has gained great good-will in this affair, and I think we have to congratulate ourselves on having thus obtained the almost unanimous accession of all the German Courts. Your Royal Highness will find in comparing the Act, as I have transmitted it in my report of the 7th current, with the formal compact in which the Act is meanwhile inserted, that they differ very slightly from each other.

The principal objections of Bavaria were directed against the admission of the Princes and Counts of the lately incorporated small States to vote by deputation at a full sitting of the Diet. This question having been postponed till the assembly of Frankfort, she objected to the establishment of a tribunal of the League, *Bundesgericht*. The name of an institution for reference in deciding differences between the German States has been substituted for this. The great Courts seem only desirous of establishing an authority equal to that enjoyed formerly by the two tribunals of the empire which were entitled to decide questions rising betwixt subjects and Governments on the abuse of the supreme power. Since the essence of the thing is abandoned, the name of the authority to be substituted as a sort of shadow of the ancient tribunals is of little consequence. The article concerning the Church has been entirely suppressed, after it had been readopted once since its first omission. It is, without doubt, not proper to pass over religion entirely in a constitutional

Act. But several Courts have been afraid of renewing the ancient disputes against the evangelical and Catholic bodies (*corpus evangelicorum et Catholicorum*) in Germany; others, especially Bavaria, preferred negotiating private Concordats with the Pope to treating in common with other Princes, the majority of whom are not directly interested in this question.

The Protestants, since the Peace of Westphalia, have adopted the principle that each Prince is *summus episcopus* in his States. The intolerance of Catholic Governments is no longer to be feared in Germany, especially as it is argued that the differences of religious creed have no connexion with the civil rights of subjects. This is a point not in keeping with the ancient institutions of some other provinces; but since the union of two ecclesiastical principalities and other Catholic provinces to the kingdom of Hanover, these restrictions would become unjust and impolitic, and I could not have decorously opposed myself alone to the general opinion. After having agreed thus with the Bavarian Minister on these non-essential changes, and on some alterations only relating to the form, the Act of the League, reduced to a treaty, was paragraphed on the 8th June. On the 10th, this treaty was formally subscribed by all the German Courts, except Würtemberg and Baden. The King of Würtemberg seems to have felt the disadvantage of remaining isolated in Germany. A courier despatched from Ludwigsburg arrived on the evening of the 9th, and his Ministers tried then, though in a very awkward way, to excuse their absence from the Conferences, and to insist on being admitted as if they had really taken part in them. Prince Metternich, after having consulted Prussia and Hanover, declared to them that all the discussions were ended; that the Act even of Federation could only be dated the 8th of June, when it had been paragraphed, and that consequently any alteration was impossible; that the

general Act of Congress, of which the German Federation formed part, was signed on the 9th. Würtemberg was then obliged to content herself with acceding by note, and this accession has been formally accepted by all the Ministers of the German Courts.

I beg leave to forward the formal Act, which should be ratified by your Royal Highness, as well as the last Protocols of the Conferences by Hanover.

It is agreed that the ratifications shall be sent to the Chancellor of State's office at Vienna, accompanied by the nomination of the Ministers to whom your Royal Highness will intrust the mission to Frankfort.

This post naturally falls to Privy Councillor Baron de Reden, who occupied that of Envoy to the Diet of the Empire. As, however, Privy Councillor of the Cabinet de Martens has fulfilled the duties of Secretary-General of the Conferences of Vienna, and as he alone is acquainted with all the discussions which have taken place, as well on constitutional articles already adopted as on those to be discussed at Frankfort, I shall rather recommend your Royal Highness to nominate him at once, and to give him the sole charge of affairs till the organic laws of Germany are drawn up, for he has acquired the confidence of all the German Courts, and he is better qualified than M. de Reden. The latter might in the meantime repair to Stuttgart or to Baden, to which Courts I very humbly propose that your Royal Highness should accredit him. When the constitution shall be finished M. de Reden will doubtless conduct the affairs of the Bundestag at Frankfort properly, and I think it would be beneficial then to recall M. de Martens, whose services will be essentially necessary to Hanover. At the same time, this arrangement would enable me to avoid the difficulty of laying detailed instructions on an infinitude of constitutional

points before your Royal Highness, which are all indicated in the voluminous papers accumulated at the Congress of Vienna, and with which M. de Martens is familiar.—I am, etc.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, 14*th June* 1815.

SIR,—I delayed forwarding in my very humble report of the 11th June to your Royal Highness by Hanover, the formal treaty on the Germanic League, as it was signed on the 10th of June. The date of the 8th has been retained, being the day when it was paragraphed. By a postscript added to the above-mentioned report, I have already informed your Royal Highness that the Ministers of Würtemberg, instead of giving an Act of Accession to the whole treaty, wished to limit it to the first eleven articles, whilst Prince Metternich thought himself obliged to refuse the change of the Act of Acceptance of the German Courts. Your Royal Highness will find subjoined (1.) the Act of the Germanic Federation, as it is inserted entire in the Act of Ratification; (2.) the exceptions which refer to Würtemberg. This Court and that of Baden will then remain out of the League till their unlimited accession shall have been given and accepted.

It seems evident that this last difficulty, resulting from the idea of cutting off from the Act of Accession every article which has the least relation to the internal administration of the country, ought to be imputed to the Plenipotentiaries of Würtemberg. The separation of these articles, which was only adopted on the evening of the Conference of the 8th of June, was not known when her last instructions were given. They have however acted in accordance with this unhappy leaning of their master towards despotism, of which the

Court of Würtemberg has given proofs during the whole course of the Congress.—I am, etc.

I add to this despatch the protocol of the sitting of the 10th of June.

Private.]

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE REGENT.

VIENNA, *June 14th*, 1815.

SIR,—Prince Metternich left Vienna during the night of the 12th and 13th curt. Before his departure I had a long interview with him on the affairs of the present time. In his opinion, operations against the enemy should begin about the 15th of this month. There will be then nearly fifty thousand Prussians in line, from the left wing of the Prussian army to the right wing of Prince Schwarzenberg.

Your Royal Highness recollects that the Russian army, according to the first plans formed at Vienna, would remain behind the line of the armies on the Rhine. This position could not fail to cause much distrust and reserve in the movements of the active allied army. Then I thought that the complete success of the Austrian arms in Italy had piqued the Emperor of Russia, and the possibility of his perceiving that his Allies could finish the war against Napoleon (as they had concluded that against Murat). Without connivance on his part, according to Prince Metternich's belief, Prince de Schwarzenberg has been solicited to defer his offensive operations till the Russian army could take part in them. The latter acquiesced in this with pleasure, as much to obtain this considerable increase of forces as not to keep behind him an army which, remaining intact, might one day dream of giving the law to the others. This fear was not unfounded, for we

saw at the Congress of Vienna how the Emperor Alexander liked to uphold ideas very different from those of the other Cabinets. Prince Metternich seemed to have no doubt that the views of this Sovereign as to France were precisely the reverse of the wishes of Austria, which, as he assured me, were entirely for the re-establishment of Louis XVIII. on the throne; and if this were impossible, rather for the Duke of Orleans than for a regency under the Archduchess Maria Louisa. He repeated to me on this occasion, for the second time, the assurance that this Princess had several times declared to him that she would not return to France, even though all the nation wished to recall her. As to Napoleon's son, Prince Metternich seemed to reject all thought of the possibility of preserving the throne of France for him. I do not know in how far Maria Louisa has really renounced the false ambition which seems to have dazzled her in France; but it is certain that she has not renounced the title which agrees so ill with the circumstances in which she is placed. It happened that during my interview with Prince Metternich "*le Grand Maître de l'Impératrice de France*" was announced! Young Napoleon is with his mother at Schönbrunn, where I met him a few days since in the vast thickets of this domain, accompanied by three women and a single lacquey. During the same interview I asked Prince Metternich as to the separate treaty relative to the pension of Eugène Beauharnais. I found my notions on the subject confirmed; it is agreed to exact for him from the King of the Two Sicilies, at the close of the present war, a territory containing fifty thousand souls. The Neapolitan Minister has simply taken the matter *ad referendum*, and Prince Metternich withdrew from the affair, when I showed my surprise that Beauharnais at the end should have nothing, and that Austria could never suffer him to be established in Italy as a sovereign.

The affairs of Italy have also been the principal obstacle to the signing of the Act of Congress by the Spanish Minister. He thought it right to remit to me, as he has done to all the Royal Courts who have not signed the Treaty of Paris, the subjoined note to explain the motives of his refusal. Prince Metternich proposed to refute the arguments contained in this note, but I have not yet seen his note. I confess that I doubt if the manner in which several Powers have been banished from the Conferences, on subjects in which they should have taken part, can be entirely justified. This sentiment is somewhat general, and I think it may be foreseen that several Courts will refuse to accede to arrangements in which they have formerly had no part. The Ministers of the Low Countries and of Bavaria seem especially to feel their exclusion—a humiliation which has not happened to Holland in the whole course of her ancient diplomacy.

Count Nesselrode has gone to the Emperor Alexander to obtain permission to sign the Act selected, which Count, now Prince, Rasoumowsky has refused to do, thinking it proper first to submit the Act of Congress to his master. As your Royal Highness cannot yet have received the Act of Congress, it will be interesting to you to find subjoined the contents and the series of the articles of the treaty, as well as the list of the countries annexed.

I add the extract of the Protocol of the conferences on the 13th February, which render the dispositions then agreed to inevitable. This document is of importance to us, and I made use of it in our treaty with Prussia in order to avoid all contest relative to the non-ratification of his Prussian Majesty. Finally, I present to your Royal Highness a copy of the articles of the Act of Congress which particularly relate to the country of Hanover. Your Royal Highness will find, I hope,

that I have endeavoured to procure for every stipulation which concerns your German interests all the solidity that the guarantee of the Congress of Vienna could give them.—I am, etc.

This despatch will be my last dated from Vienna, as I am about to set out for Frankfort.

EDINBURGH: T. CONSTABLE,
PRINTER TO THE QUEEN, AND TO THE UNIVERSITY.


00027445

Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 26 June, 2018